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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this paper is to argue, among the myriad of other reasons for the 
cause and continuation of the Hundred Years War, that the wine trade between England and 
Gascony was significant enough to incite an armed conflict. This is not to say that the 
author intends to imply that the wine trade was the exclusive instigator of the war but that 
the commodity exchange between England and southwestern France was organized 
developed, and profitable enough to motivate the English monarchy to protect its 
investment.
Before any intelligent discussion of the factors that led to the Hundred Years War, it 
is imperative to understand the background of both the English and French monarchies, to 
comprehend their mutual and divisive history that led to this prolonged conflict. In 
addition, it is equally important to grasp the impact wine had on both cultures. Therefore, 
the first part of this work is directed toward fusing together English and French medieval 
history and society with the wine culture of the period.
Another portion of this manuscript is dedicated to the region that England and 
France fought over throughout the war. This area, called many things, but predominantly 
Gascony, and its capital, Bordeaux, were a centerpiece of wine production due to its 
awesome and unique location. One cannot understand the Hundred Years War without 
being a student of Gascony. One must be able to appreciate Gascony's Anglo-French 
history and the economic significance the Gascon wine trade acquired in the medieval 
period.
Finally, all these elements will be brought together to see how they were effected 
and changed by the Hundred Years War. It is clear that despite the devastating impact the 
conflict had on England and France, the Anglo-Gascon wine trade continued. Moreover, 
the available evidence shows that the wine trade between England and southwestern France 
was economically and culturally important enough to warrant regal protection and support. 
The results of the research do not try to prove that the Anglo-Gascon wine trade was the 
sole instigator of the war, but rather that it was significant enough to incite and perpetuate 
the violence. This work seemed necessary because where the current primary and 
secondary evidence provide a virtually infinite list of causes of the war, including the 
Anglo-Gascon wine trade, the subject had been heretofore hardly considered and under 
examined.
BACCHUS AND BELLUM:
THE ANGLO-GASCON WINE TRADE AND 
THE HUNDRED YEARS WAR 
(987-1453 A.D.)
INTRODUCTION
Most people, if they think of it at all, tend to underestimate the impact of wine on 
the course of history. As historian and vintner, P.T.H. Unwin has noted, however: 
"Viticulture and wine have played fundamental economic, social, political, and ideological 
roles in different parts of the world throughout history."1
Hugh Johnson, perhaps today's foremost wine writer, makes the same point, 
asserting that wine, "weaves in with human history from the beginning as few, if any, 
other products do. Textiles, pottery, bread . . . are other objects of daily use that we can 
also trace back to the Stone Age. Yet wine alone is charged with sacramental meaning, 
with healing, indeed with a life of its own."2
According to recent chemical analysis of the contents of a ceramic jar excavated by 
Dr. Mary M. Voight, an anthropologist at the College of William and Mary, Neolithic 
farmers in what is now Iran were fermenting wine from grapes as long ago as the period 
5,400 to 5,000 B.C.3 Furthermore, this same analysis showed that these ancient vintners 
used evergreen resin as a preservative, suggesting that they had already developed 
considerable experience with wine production and marketing.
Why has wine been so important to mankind for so long? Again, Hugh Johnson 
provides an answer: "Because for most of its history, and mankind's, it has been his . . . 
source of comfort and courage, his only medicine and antiseptic, his one recourse to renew 
his tired spirits and lift him above his weary, saddened self. Wine was the foremost of 
luxuries to millennia of mankind."4 And, while successful cultivation of wine grapes is 
limited to certain favored geographic areas, the determination of peoples living outside
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these regions to enjoy this luxury laid the foundation for one of the oldest and most 
important elements of world commerce: the wine trade.
These fundamentals of human consumption and economic activity were fully 
established in the eras when Greece and Rome dominated the Mediterranean World; and 
they were just as vigorously at work in the period and region with which this paper is 
concerned: Europe's One Hundred Years War (1337-1453 A.D.) between France and 
England. Indeed, it is the purpose of this thesis to demonstrate that England's demand for 
wine from a territory we now recognize as French, was among the key factors which 
precipitated and perpetuated that disastrous conflict.
To understand why wine has exerted such a powerful influence in human affairs, 
one must first come to grips with the most basic reason for its appeal to the peoples of 
earlier times in many parts of the globe. Johnson responds that it is wine's "power to 
banish care" that was so compelling to ancient societies and explains this power in the 
following terms:
It was not the subtle bouquet of wine, or a lingering aftertaste of violets and 
raspberries, that first caught the attention of our ancestors. It was, I am afraid, its 
effect. In a life that was nasty, brutish and short, those who first felt the effects of 
alcohol believed they were being given a preview of paradise. Their anxieties 
disappeared, their fears receded, ideas came more easily, lovers became more 
loving when they drank the magic juice. For a while, they felt all powerful, even 
felt themselves to be gods.5
Surely this was the principal attraction for the French and Englishmen of the High 
Middle Ages who, whatever their rank in society, lived often short and dangerous lives 
under conditions which most of us today would consider intolerable. But there are at least 
two other major reasons which made wine precious to the consumers of this era: first, 
wine was an essential element of the celebration of the central sacrament of the Christian 
faith, the Holy Eucharist; and second, though medieval man had no conception of
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antisepsis, he had enough experience with polluted water — particularly in the emerging 
urban areas — to know that drinking water frequently made him sick and wine, taken in 
moderation, did not.
Some of the attributes of wine that people of the modem era find so attractive — the
careful pairing of wines with specific foods, the development of complex flavors through
extended maturation, and the building of great personal wine collections -- were utterly
unknown to the Europeans of the medieval era. This is so because the wines they drank
had no capacity for aging. The cork and bottle were inventions of the seventeenth century
and so wine, like bread, spoiled when it became exposed to air. Thus, the medieval wine
trade was preoccupied with rushing its products to market and its customers were equally
driven to consume them before they turned to vinegar.
Moreover, this compunction to consume was confined largely to the upper echelons
of medieval society, as it had been for the many societies that had gone before because
wine was too expensive for the masses. As Johnson notes:
Wine provided the first experience of alcohol only for a privileged minority 
of the human race. For the great majority it was ale. Most of the earliest cities 
were in the grain -- rather than grape-growing lands . . . But wine was always 
the choice of the privileged . . . Wine, they found, had a power and value 
far greater than ale and . . .  its history pivots around its value.6
It was the same in medieval Europe where the beverages derived from grape and grain were
divided in their consumption almost entirely along class lines and, to a lesser degree,
between the cities and poorer countryside.
Given wine's minority role in the total quantity of alcoholic beverages consumed,
one might question whether it could have been as influential in cultural and economic terms
as has been asserted above. But it is precisely because wine was the daily drink of the
upper classes — the only persons in a feudal society with the power to make choices about
activities as consequential as foreign trade and wars — that it figured so prominently in the
calculations of kings, nobles, clergy, and the growing merchant class of thirteenth and
fourteenth century Europe. It was their drink, not that of the man in the street or the field
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and, in a society with far fewer choices about consumption for pleasure than we enjoy 
today, ensuring an adequate supply of drinkable wine was a matter of major concern 
among the elites of France and England. Indeed, under certain circumstances, it was 
important enough to be a cause for initiating or perpetuating armed conflict.
In support of the argument that wine mattered to the English nobility of this period 
to a degree we can hardly comprehend today, several pieces of evidence can be advanced. 
First, however, it is necessary to identify the source from which most of this coveted 
beverage came. France, as a whole, had been England's primary supplier of wine for 
many centuries before the Hundred Years War, but, in the decades preceding that conflict 
England's sources had narrowed to just one favored supplier: Gascony.
Located in southwestern France, Gascony's chief attractions for Britain were not 
only the good wines it produced but its easy shipping access from the Atlantic Ocean 
through the great riverport city of Bordeaux. And, as Hugh Johnson attests, "by the 
middle of the thirteenth century, three quarters of England's royal (wine) supplies were 
coming from Bordeaux — and by 'royal' we should understand not just the king's table, 
but for his household's, the civil service, his gifts and favours, and indeed the supplies for 
his entire army. In 1282, Edward I (1272-1307) ordered 600 tonneaux (over 150,000 
U.S. gallons) just for his campaign against the Welsh."
During the first half of the fourteenth century, England's annual imports of wine 
from Bordeaux alone averaged about 80,000 tonneaux, the equivalent of about 20,000,000 
U.S. gallons. Had this been distributed throughout England's population of around
5,000,000, it would have amounted to about six bottles for every man, woman, and child.8 
As we already know, however, the great majority of this wine was consumed only by 
members of the upper classes. One measure of their gargantuan appetite for this wine is 
documented by Asa Briggs in his book on Chateau Haut-Brion in which he notes that: "For
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his wedding feast in 1307, Edward II (1307-1327) . . . ordered 1,000 tonneaux of wine 
from Bordeaux, the equivalent of over 1,000,000 modem bottles.9
But royal wedding orders, however grand, are sporadic and therefore do not 
provide an adequate picture of the scope and meaning of this commerce to England and its 
crown. Far more persuasive is that Edward II and his successors during the Hundred 
Years War were extraordinarily dependent on Gascony not only for their wine but for the 
contribution the wine trade made to the royal coffers. For example, in 1324 when Edward 
II’s income from domestic taxation was on the order of only about £15,000 annually. In 
addition, as will be explained in Chapter III, he was receiving an additional £13,000 per 
year in tolls and duties on the river traffic in and around the port of Bordeaux -- nearly all 
of which was concerned with the shipment of wine.10 At its height during the first third of 
the fourteenth century, wine from Gascony comprised about one third of the value of all 
goods being imported to England and thus was second only to the wool trade in providing 
revenue for the support of the monarchy.11
For those of us who think of wine more as a luxury than a necessity, it is hard to 
comprehend the economic importance and physical scope of the wine shipments between 
Gascony and England during the reigns of the first three Edwards (1272-1377). It can be 
helpful therefore to compare the wine output of Bordeaux in this period with that of modem 
times. In its peak year of 1308, Gascony exported, according to English tax records, the 
amazing figure of 104,895 tonneaux or 26,433,540 U.S. gallons.12 F o ra  variety of 
reasons, some of which will be detailed later in this paper, Gascony never equaled this 
output again until the twentieth century and did not exceed it until after the Second World 
W ar.13 What is more amazing is that better than three-fourths of this total went to early 
fourteenth century England while today roughly that same total meets the needs of the entire 
world. More astonishing still is that the flood of Gascon wine that reached England in 
1308-1309 was consumed by only a fraction of its population of around five million. 
Today, England is still the largest importer of Bordeaux wines, taking about 17% of the
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annual production; but even that healthy slice of Bordeaux's output is very small compared 
to what it was importing in the reign of Edward II. Moreover, today's imports are spread 
broadly throughout a national population of over 56 million.14
These figures help to explain what an enormous — one might say disproportionate 
— role that Gascon wine played in the cultural, economic, and political life of England in 
the years leading to and continuing throughout the Hundred Years War. For France, 
neither the land in this southwestern comer of the country nor the wines it produced were 
of comparable importance. The Capetian kings and their successors had plenty of other 
good sources of wine within their realm, and had no access to the revenues from 
Gascony's trade with England. Their motives were at once more negative and more 
political: they wanted to deny Gascony to England and to extend their sovereignty over all 
the territory within what we regard today as France's natural boundaries.
These, of course, were not the only bones of contention which led to more than a 
century of fighting between France and England starting in 1337; not will it be argued here 
that they were the most important. Sovereignty, feudal rights and relationships, lines of 
royal succession, the interests of the Church, the Black Death, the Flemish wool trade, 
Italian bankers, economic expansion, protection of maritime trade routes, territorial 
ambitions, border conflicts, military technology, the effects of climate, personal vendettas, 
loves gained and lost, unsettled scores, a girlish saint in shining armor — all of these and 
more have their part in the rich tapestry of reasons that prompted, influenced, and 
perpetuated this conflict. Some are dominant, some subdued, but all contribute to the mix 
and none should be ignored. Surely, the roles of Gascony and its wine trade with England 
have not been totally ignored but it will be the effort of this paper to demonstrate that they 
may not have received all the attention they deserve.
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Before one can take the measure of this proposition, however, it is important to 
review some basic information about the nature of the French and English societies and 
governments in the centuries immediately preceding the war. For most of the key 
mitigating factors for each side were rooted in the similar but divergent paths the French 
and English monarchies took on their way to 1337. For example, one cannot grasp why 
Paris wanted sovereignty over Gascony without knowing how it had lost it previously and 
how the recovery of Gascony figured into the overall effort of the Capetian kings to expand 
and consolidate their realm. Neither can one fathom England's centuries-long struggle with 
the question of whether to submit to, ally itself with, or dominate France without 
understanding the circumstances of its creation and the complex web of master and vassal 
relationships that governed feudal societies. Therefore, the first two chapters of this paper 
will be devoted to exploring those circumstances and institutions which, roughly between 
1000 and 1300 A.D., set France and England on a collision course.
Considering the breadth of the issues which eventually rose between these two 
powers in this period, it would be naive to contend that any one or two alone caused the 
conflict. Still, it is fair to argue that some factors may not have gotten all the attention they 
deserve because, for example, sufficient original source material has not been available or 
because available*-data have not been adequately researched. Admittedly, these possibilities 
may seem unlikely, given the depth and breadth of scholarship already expended on the 
Hundred Years War. But, as has already been suggested, under-examination of the roles 
played by Gascony and its wine trade does seem to have occurred and possibly because, 
from the perspective of the twentieth century, something as inconsequential as wine has, at 
least at first glance, had so little credence as a cause for combat. A paper of this scope 
cannot do full justice to a study of this proposition. It can make a start, however, and 
therefore Chapters III and IV are devoted to what is known today about the province of 
Gascony and the extraordinary wine trade it carried on with England in the high Middle 
Ages.
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Finally, there will be a chapter devoted not to retelling the story of the war as a 
whole but to illuminate those parts which particularly involved or ultimately affected the 
fate of Gascony and its commerce in wines. Such an analytical approach runs the risk of 
assigning too much importance to these factors. Again, there is no intent here to challenge 
the accepted conclusions of the most respected scholars about the several causes of this 
grotesquely extended and destructive war. The goal is only to suggest that more fruitful 
research and analysis may still be accomplished on these two subjects.
In support of this contention, it is helpful to recall that the conflict began with 
France's invasion of English Gascony in a dispute over feudal rights and, moreover, that 
the last ditch for which England fought — after 116 years of military triumphs but, in the 
end, political disaster -- was again in Gascony. It did so, despite fiscal exhaustion, a deep 
weariness with foreign adventures and the immediate threat of civil war at home, because 
Gascony was a place where its economic and cultural interests in wine combined with its 
political and historic determination to maintain a foothold on French soil. The desperation 
of this final effort, despite what proved to be impossible odds, demonstrates just how 
much this place and this product mattered to the English monarchy.
CHAPTER I
THE FRENCH MONARCHY: FROM THE CAPETIAN
ACCESSION TO THE EVE OF THE HUNDRED YEARS WAR (987-1328 A.D.)
France approached the second millennium as a tired and broken land, taking longer 
than many other European states to recover from the seemingly endless invasions mounted 
by the predatory raiders of Scandinavia and the continental steppe. Favored with a mild 
climate and fertile soil, its main economic activity was farming and, while subsistence 
agriculture predominated, France was producing sufficient surpluses in grain, wine, and 
salt to begin a revival of its industry and commerce.1
Wine making had been going on in what we now call France for at least a thousand 
years before the Capetian dynasty was begun by Hugh Capet in 987 A.D. Most experts 
believe that the French wine industry dates back to around 600 B.C. with the plantings of 
vines by the Greeks in and around the Mediterranean port of Massilia (today's Marseilles). 
Marseilles was taken over by the Romans in 49 B.C. and the propagation of grapes for 
winemaking was dramatically extended beyond this base when Rome began its land 
expeditions and subsequent settlements in what they called Gaul. This process of 
exploration, conflict with native peoples, establishment of fortified towns, and the spread 
of vineyards continued broadly throughout France for the next 500 years.2
The main axis of this expansion was northward through the Rhone Valley and, 
subsequently, on through what we know today as Burgundy and Champagne. There is
10
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good evidence that the Romans also moved westward from Marseilles to propagate
vineyards in what remains France's most abundant viticultural region — at least in terms of
raw output -- Languedoc and Roussillon. By the fourth century A.D., and possibly much
earlier, Roman vineyards were flourishing in Bordeaux and soon thereafter in the Loire
Valley and the north-central region centered on Paris.3
With the fall of Rome in 476, Paris replaced Marseilles both as the political and
winemaking capital of France. As Jancis Robinson, in her remarkable new Oxford
Companion To Wine puts it:
The Franks had come from the north, and Clovis, the first of (France's) 
Merovingian kings (481-511), established Paris as the capital city of a kingdom 
that hardly extended further than the Ile-de-France. Under Charlemagne (768-814), 
and his heirs, the royal court's principal seats were Aachen (Aix-la-Chapelle) and 
Paris. Hence political power and the wealth that went with it, were concentrated in 
the north. In the Mediterranean, wine was a part of everyday life; but in Paris and 
Aachen, on the northernmost limits of viticulture, wine was a luxury item, and from 
a luxury item it became a status symbol. Also, because Gaul was largely Christian 
by the sixth century, the Church's requirements added impetus to northern 
viticulture. Monasteries and churches needed wine; local magnates, both lay and 
spiritual, wanted good wine.4
A secondary factor in the broad propagation of vineyards throughout France -- 
though the historical evidence for this is less explicit than it is for the role of the Romans — 
is the immigration of Caucasian peoples from Central and Eastern Europe. The Caucusus 
region is believed to be the domain in which the best species of grapes for making wine 
(yitis vinifera) originated and it is apparent that large groups of people were forced to move 
westward from this area by the exhaustion of their livestock grazing lands and increases in 
population. With their sheep and goats before them, some of these people came into 
France and also brought the vines which were a central aspect of their culture. Both the 
livestock and the vines flourished in France's land and climate.5
Clearly, the first great political promoter of the French wine industry was 
Charlemagne, first king of the Holy Roman Empire. As Einhard, his secretary and 
biographer, has reported, Charlemagne was personally temperate and detested  
drunkenness, never drinking more than three cups of wine at dinner. Nevertheless, he was
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a vigorous advocate for the spread of vineyards and for increased wine production. Thus, 
his promotion of the wine trade helped to root it early as a staple of French commerce and 
national life. As Pierre Anglade testified in his introduction to Wines and Vineyards of 
France: "viticulture is an integral part of French culture; it is of incontestable symbolic 
richness; and wine soon came to play a privileged role in French society."6
New wine districts grew throughout the early Middle Ages as individual churches 
and monastic orders perfected their viticultural techniques and began increasing their 
production for sale to the general population. When the Roman Church's leaders saw the 
profits that could be made from this trade, first on a local basis and then for export, it began 
to take over the more successful winemaking estates. It was not long before the 
monasteries became the chief innovators, largest land holders and most important wine 
producers in medieval Europe — especially in the Rhone Valley, Burgundy, and 
Champagne.7 Among the advantages these church-supported estates had over private 
vintners were the continuity of cultivation in church-protected lands; a system of 
communication between monasteries that allowed for the exchange of information about 
vine-growing and winemaking techniques; and that virtually all the monks were literate to 
some degree, making them among the most educated people of the age.8
Throughout this formative period of French viticulture, the common people had 
almost no role as producers or consumers of wine. Particularly in the northern provinces, 
the primary involvement of peasants was in furnishing labor in the vineyards. These 
people were not land owners, for the most part, and the costs of wine production were 
simply too high for the average man. Some peasants may have received wine in return for 
their labor and, doubtless, some made small quantities for household consumption. 
Generally, however, wine remained a luxury product enjoyed primarily by members of the 
nobility and the Church. Thus, from the beginning, one's use of alcoholic beverages was 
determined by class; the working people drank ale and those of the higher estates enjoyed 
wine.9
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With the approach of the new millennium, wine had become France's chief export 
product with good markets growing in England, Scotland, Flanders, and the Netherlands. 
Much of this new growth was possible not only because of the productivity of France's 
vineyards but because the abatement of the invasions by the Goths, Huns, and Celts, to 
name but a few of the earlier marauders of French lands, was nearly complete by the year 
1000. From this point forward, a key aspect of France's national identity was its role as 
the primary supplier of high quality wines to the rest of the world.
Politically, France's chief asset was a stable monarchy. From the outset of their 
dynasty in 987 A.D., the Capetian kings pursued policies which encouraged the country's 
economic development and territorial expansion. Even though the natural boundaries of 
what was to become France were largely on the sea, its economy remained essentially 
continental and agricultural during this period of recovery with surprisingly little attention 
given to the development of maritime industries. As a result, it was not until the middle of 
the twelfth century that ports like Marseilles and Bordeaux would become major features of 
France's economic landscape.10
While the nation's economic revival was slowed by periodic natural disasters and 
public health crises, from the millennium onward it was sufficient to permit a general 
population increase that continued well into the fourteenth century. Indeed, by the second 
half of the thirteenth century, the countryside had reached entirely new levels of population 
density and economic prosperity. The chief medieval chronicler, Sir Jean Froissart, 
described France as ''gorged, contented, and strong, its people rich and prospering and not 
one of them knew the word war." Moreover, Froissart believed that foreign lands should 
marvel at what he called this "noble realm" and went on to describe France as being "full of 
large villages, fine country, sweet rivers, good ponds, fair meadows, mellow and full- 
bodied wines, and of a temperate climate."11
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Froissart failed to note, however, that the growth in population was out-pacing the 
capacity of the nation's agriculture to support it. The expansion of areas cultivated for 
farming had drawn to a halt by the end of the thirteenth century as the fields needed for 
grazing animals and the woodlands used for hunting and growing timber had reached a 
critical minimum level. As France's population continued to grow, the dearth of new 
farmland led to a decline in real wages and a rise in inflation. An economic depression set 
in by the fourteenth century and, to make matters worse, famine struck the countryside 
between 1315-1317.12
Under these circumstances, the life expectancy of individuals in rural communities, 
which had never been very high, fell to less than twenty years. The only class which 
seemed to prosper during this period was the land proprietors whose income came from the 
rents paid by tenant farmers according to the number of people on their properties. There 
were simply too many people for this agriculturally-based economy to support and, while 
the crisis varied from region to region, as Sumption noted, "the denser the population, the 
greater the distress."13
Reliable numbers on France's population during this time are lacking. Two major 
historians of this period, Perroy and Sumption, have reported on the royal census taken in 
1328 but came up with different results. Perroy stated that the royal treasury counted 
approximately 3,300,000 households in 32,000 parishes with a minimum population of 
about 10 to 12,000,000 people.14 Sumption, presumably working with the same data, 
concluded that France had only 24,000 parishes consisting of 2,469,987 households. This 
accounting, however, only included the head of the household and not all those who lived 
within it. Moreover, Sumption's tally did not include the nobility who were not counted 
because they were exempt from taxation. Such omissions notwithstanding, Sumption 
estimated that at that time France could not have had less than 16,000,000 people.15
Despite the marked disparity in these estimates, it seems safe to assume that 
France's population during the first half of the fourteenth century was on the order of
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14.000.000. In any case, Perroy and Sumption are in agreement that France had a 
remarkably dense population for this period of European history, one far exceeding that of 
its neighbors including Spain, Germany, and the British Isles.16
Possibly the best example of this population density in France can be seen in the 
Ile-de-France and its capital city, Paris. Half way through the twelfth century, this political 
and cultural center of the kingdom had relatively little commercial or industrial activity, but 
was, nonetheless, a magnet to neighboring and outlying provinces. Paris' drawing power 
made it a center for the growing court, its associated administrative bureaucracy, and the 
intellectual community of the Sorbonne university.17
Paris was crowded in comparison with other French towns, as was the entire Ile- 
de-France; in addition, it was not only the most densely populated city in northern Europe, 
it was the richest. At a time when England's largest city, London, supported about 40,000 
inhabitants, Paris, including its northern suburbs, contained a population of more than
100.000. And, in a time when the living conditions else- where in France were so 
deplorable, Paris was relatively comfortable and attracted many visitors because of its 
wealth and the cultural freedom associated with life in the capital.18
By modem sanitary standards, of course, Paris was no rose garden. The city was 
divided by the river Seine and almost completely dependent on it for its drinking water, 
transportation and sewage removal. Butchers slaughtered and cleaned their meat in the 
streets and it was common for pigs, dogs and rats to feed on the waste piled in the front of 
every home and shop. Paris was, in a word, filthy and as a result disease was rampant. 
For all but the nobility and the emerging merchant class, survival in the city was tough and 
creature comforts rare.19 Consequently, one of the industries of key interest to the 
monarchy was the wine trade. Throughout the Ile-de-France, viticulture, along with grain 
production and other agricultural activity, was heavily subsidized by the crown. As has 
already been noted, wine's importance stemmed in part from the understanding that water 
supplies, particularly in the cities, were contaminated. Ale was a cheaper alternative but
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royalty, the clergy, and the mercantile class had both the means and the desire to have 
something more to their taste. Thus, unlike today, the areas immediately surrounding Paris 
became a bountiful source of wine production and offered virtually any variety the king and 
his court required.20
It is important to realize that fourteenth century France was not the large, unified, 
international power that it eventually became under, for example, Louis XIV. The land 
holdings of the French crown were much smaller and subject to predations from other 
princes, great and small. The kings of the Middle Ages, particularly in France, spent a 
majority of their time dealing with neighboring principalities, each trying through alliances 
and other means to consolidate as much property as possible within their domains. In 
feudal times, a king's worth was measured simply by the quantity and quality of the land 
under his authority. Each king had his own method of acquiring property, some more 
violent than others, but their common goal was to secure the loyalty and service of the still 
independent landholders on their borders. In doing so, a king also sought to gain the 
allegiance of the residents of that area and thus their support for the economic policies and 
martial adventures of the monarchy.
The success of France's Capetian kings in expanding their realm stemmed in large 
part from the continuity of their leadership. Their dynasty, begun under Hugh Capet (987- 
996) extended through fourteen kings until the death of Charles IV (1322-1328). Because 
each of these kings left a viable male heir, France's monarchy became unique among the 
great medieval dynasties of Europe. Some had special abilities and, unlike most such royal 
families, none were manifestly incompetent.21
This combination of natural ability, an unbroken family line and the apparent favor 
of the Almighty all assisted the Capetians' effort to expand and consolidate the French 
kingdom and to stimulate economic prosperity within its borders.22 There was, it should
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be noted, a general economic improvement across Europe at the close of the tenth century 
and this trend was highly evident in France. According to Perroy, "when it attained its 
climax, round about 1300, it might be said that France had a lead over the rest of western 
Christendom which put her in a position to exert a political and cultural hegemony and 
indeed made it inevitable that she should."23
This achievement was all the more remarkable because at its outset and up until the 
end of the eleventh century the Capetian domain had been small and insecure, barely 
extending beyond the cities of Paris and Orleans in a compact realm known as the Ile-de- 
France. But, by the beginning of the fourteenth century, its territory to the east included 
the entire country of Flanders and the western half of what is now Belgium. To the north it 
included Brittany, Normandy, and all the lesser provinces facing the English Channel. To 
the west, it encompassed the more fertile lands of Maine, Anjou, Touraine, and Poitou. In 
the southwest, the Capetian kings regained most of Aquitaine including, after 1324, the last 
English bastion in France: Gascony. The success of the Capetian monarchy can be 
attributed, in part, to their feats of arms but in larger measure to their grasp of the forces at 
work in medieval society and their skill in exploiting the shifting loyalties within it.24
Basically, medieval society was disorganized and chaotic. Invading armies, failing 
crops and rampant disease made most people’s lives short and unpredictable.
The common people as well as their rulers longed for some degree of order and were 
willing to make substantial sacrifices to achieve it. Beneath the ruling class the population 
was divided functionally into three groups: those who worked, i.e. the great majority of 
farmers, tradesmen, and their families; those who prayed, i.e. those who ran the church 
and its associated monasteries, convents, and alms houses; and those who fought, i.e. a 
professional class of warriors who battled for their own gain or in temporary alliances with 
regional or national rulers. It was this small but elite group of cavalrymen on
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whom many of our romantic notions about the Middle Ages are based. And it was this 
group to whom the Capetian kings turned to achieve the expansion and stability of their 
realm.
These professional fighters, or knights, constituted only about 1-2% of the 
households in France but were the most distinctive and influential figures in their society. 
These were the men who, if they survived the rigors of frequent combat, became elevated 
to the nobility as their martial exploits earned them property rights from thankful sovereigns 
and other influential landowners. Once these knights became property holders and nobles, 
however, they also became vassals in service to the lord who had granted them the land. 
And it was this bargain that was the basis for the political system that dominated the feudal 
period. In this regard, the realm led by the Capetian kings was no different than any other 
medieval monarchy. Since kings were typically the greatest landholders within their 
region, they obviously were in the best position to offer property in return for service, but 
these land-for-service relationships also demanded ongoing attention from the monarch to 
ensure that he would be able to count on the loyalty of the knight and his heirs when the 
king's needs arose.26
The services that kings, like the Capetians, required depended in part upon the size 
of the land grant. Most typically, however, the duty demanded by the king was military 
service. For centuries, this was how a medieval king raised an army to fight his wars and 
such a system was required because monarchs simply did not have the means to maintain 
standing armies and relied, instead, upon their knight-landholders to supply the necessary 
forces when a crisis loomed. These forces consisted of the knights themselves, heavily 
armed and supported by large masses of largely untrained infantry recruited from the 
knight's own region. All the expenses needed to transport, supply, and arm the noble and 
his men — including their equipment, horses, armor, weapons, administrators, attendants, 
servants, travel and entertainment — fell upon the knight who often had to levy special taxes 
on his tenants to pay for the operation.27
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It was accepted that every vassal, from the highest noble to the lowest subject, 
owed his superior such acts of homage. By the thirteenth century, however, these 
obligations were becoming increasingly difficult to fulfill. As noted above, the French 
population and the agricultural activity necessary to support it were increasing. This, in 
turn, drove down the supply of desirable land — even for the nobility. Under these 
conditions, the more established nobles who had received their land grants centuries earlier 
had to raise the money to meet their obligations to the monarchy either by selling off 
portions of their property or by giving them to lesser nobles in return for secondary service 
relationships. These lesser nobles, in turn, further partitioned their new land among the 
local peasantry for money or service.28
This practice, called subinfeudation, so reduced what were once huge properties 
that by the dawn of the fourteenth century some monarchies were nothing but a jigsaw 
puzzle of sub-divided land grants extending from king to peasant in a complex chain of 
obligations. While this system had been initiated, in part, to provide more order in society, 
it was by this time breeding chaos because not many knew to whom they were obligated or 
to what extent. In addition, the fragmentation of the countryside into smaller properties 
meant that the lesser nobility had fewer resources on which they could depend to provide 
the military forces the king required for his campaigns.29
This scenario played itself out in Capetian France until many nobles were unable or 
unwilling to fulfill their military obligations to their overlord and, ultimately, to the king. 
Their failure to live up to these land-for-service bargains was caused by factors in addition 
to the problem of land ownership fragmentation. For example, noble families were 
exposed to higher mortality rates due to their frequent involvement in wars. Moreover, the 
nobility was not exempt from the high frequency of death for infants and women in 
childbirth that plagued medieval society. There is statistical evidence to show that breaks in 
the male line of succession typically caused noble families to die out in less than a century. 
They were then replaced by others whose value to the monarchy brought them noble status
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but usually lesser land-holdings; these newly-minted 'nobles' were sometimes referred to 
as parvenus. There were also families who, having accumulated a substantial fief-like 
estate through purchase, marriage, or inheritance, were more gradually recognized as 
members of the nobility.30
Loyalty, obligation, and a sense of community were difficult enough to maintain 
under these circumstances, even among vassals who lived within the general vicinity of 
their king; but it grew weaker still as the physical distance from the royal court increased. 
Neighboring princes, despite their formal obligations, family ties or seemingly common 
interests, were frequently slow to respond to the demands of their nominal superiors. This 
tendency was fostered by the slow pace of transportation and communications which made 
regional authorities isolated and therefore largely independent, at least in their conduct of 
day-to-day affairs. Mounted messengers could travel only thirty miles on a good day and 
thus the orders passed between kings and their vassals were often out paced by events or 
garbled.31
Another problem complicating monarchical rule was that outlying nobles, having 
become accustomed to self-reliance in the political administration of their regions, began 
thinking of themselves as independent principalities. This tendency became increasingly 
strong in provinces which employed local rather than royal judicial or monetary systems; or 
where there were substantial differences between the local cultural or linguistic practices 
and those of the court.32
A striking example of a province unwilling to maintain its obligations to the French 
crown was Anjou. Occupying a key position in what is now west-central France, this 
principality was a rich assembly of lands brought together over time through conquest, 
inheritance, and marriage. In the mid-twelfth century, Geoffrey Plantagenet was Count of 
Anjou (including Maine and Tourraine) and, after a series of hard fought campaigns
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between 1141 and 1144, took over as the Duke of Normandy and Lord of Brittany. This
made Geoffrey sufficiently powerful not just to ignore his obligations as a vassal of
France's Louis VII (1137-1180) but to confront him.33 In 1150 Geoffrey passed the titles
of Duke of Normandy and Count of Anjou to his young son Henry, a succession
recognized by Louis VII in return for a long-contested but small piece of land, the Vexin,
lying between Normandy and the Ile-de-France. Its possession was regarded as critical by
both sides because of its proximity to Paris; in English hands it was a dagger at the throat
of the French court since Vexin was only one day's hard march from the capital.34
In 1151, however, Henry saw an opportunity to further increase his authority at
Louis' expense and in terms of territory the stakes were far higher than the Vexin. As the
noted wine historian Hugh Johnson relates:
In Paris in 1151 the court received a visit of homage from the . . . 18-year 
old Henry Plantagenet. Alienor (France's 29-year-old Queen) compared the 
fiery youth with her religious husband and decided on a change. . . 
Astonishingly, after 15 years of marriage (and two daughters) the King and 
Queen of France returned to Bordeaux (where they married in 1137) to be 
ceremonially de-wed on the grounds that they were cousins who never should have 
been married in the first place. Eight weeks later Alienor (Eleanor) married Henry 
Plantagenet, Duke of Normandy and Count of Anjou. Two years after that, in 
1154, he became King Henry II and she Queen Eleanor of England. The famous 
link was made.35
The reason this marriage is so famous a part of both French and English history is 
that Henry's bride was Eleanor o f Aquitaine and for her marriage dowry she brought with 
her, first to Louis and then to Henry, that vast stretch of French territory that extended 
southward from the Loire River to the Pyranees Mountains. By this union, Henry had 
added the provinces of Poitou and Gascony to his prior holdings in Anjou, Touraine, 
Maine, Brittany, and Normandy and thus gained control over half the territory of France. 
And when, just two years later, he was elevated to the English throne, the Capetian 
monarchy was confronted with a political disaster.36 As Winston Churchill put it in his 
The Birth of Britain:
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Henry II's accession to the Island throne in 1154 threatened France with far 
graver dangers. Hitherto there had always been political relief in playing off 
over-mighty subjects one against another. . . But when in one hour Henry II 
was King of England, Duke of Normandy, Lord of Aquitaine, Brittany, Poitou, 
Anjou, Maine, and Guienne(Gascony), ruler from the Somme to the Pyranees 
of more than half France, all balance of power among the feudal lords was 
destroyed. Louis VII found instead of a dozen principalities, divided and 
jealous, one single imperial power, whose resources far surpassed his own.37
Theoretically speaking, Henry II remained subservient to the French monarch but, 
with these enormous land holdings — the ultimate yardstick of power in medieval societies, 
he was not about to cooperate with, much less render service to, Louis of France. 
Throughout his reign (1154-1196), Henry used his territorial advantage in France to harass 
the Capetian kings and to further consolidate and extend his French domains. Pressing 
eastward from Aquitaine, he advanced his borders through La Marche, the Auvergne, 
Limousin, and into Toulouse. At his zenith, Henry II owned six times as much French 
territory as his rivals in Paris; though, technically, he was still their vassal. This 
tremendous shift in the balance of power and the French monarchy's subsequent efforts to 
restore hegemony over all of western France set the stage for some of the most important 
developments in European history over the next several centuries.
By the beginning of the thirteenth century, the Capetian monarchy had reached a 
plateau both economically and politically. It had enjoyed a century of growing prosperity 
and had made significant strides in expanding and consolidating the provinces immediately 
around the Ile-de-France. But, the agricultural economy was beginning to falter as the 
demands of an expanding population for additional food and living space began to outstrip 
what a fixed supply of arable land could afford. Moreover, the increasing complexity of 
monarch-to-vassal relationships was making the king's war-fighting capacity less 
dependable. And, finally, there was the problem of huge amounts of territory within
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France's natural boundaries remaining in the hands of princes who refused to acknowledge
their feudal obligations to the French throne.
The Capetians knew that they must expand their territory and exert tighter control
over all the subsidiary principalities within their domain. They were in a quandary,
however, over how to achieve those goals. As Edouard Perroy has described:
Still thoroughly imbued with the feudal spirit,. . . the French monarchy . . . 
tended perhaps unconsciously, but surely, to transform the kingdom into a modem 
state, in which the will of the sovereign, as the supreme law of the nation, must 
be obeyed without a murmur. But, the French monarchy, like all the other 
kingdoms of Europe, lacked two essential implements for the consummation of its 
ambitions: a regular army and stable finances.38
Without these tools it was not clear how the monarchy could impose its will on the 
semi-autonomous provinces within its domain, much less expand its control over those 
adjoining territories whose rulers refused to acknowledge French authority.39 One thing it 
could do, however, was to lay the foundation for gaining greater military and financial 
power by establishing a more effective central government, one capable of more efficiently 
executing the king's policies and collecting his taxes. The major concern, though, was to 
create a stable bureaucracy that was small and loyal. This was a difficult task, at the very 
least, but which was best achieved under kings like Philip II (1179-1223), Louis IX (1226- 
1270), and Philip IV, also known as Philip the Fair (1285-1314). Each of these monarchs 
had a significant amount of time on the throne which leads one to believe that their central 
authority was to some degree sound and effective.40
At the heart of the bureaucracy for each of these kings was a Council made up of 
friends and family, some noble and some ecclesiastical, that were to provide advice and 
delegate the king's authority 41 From there, the monarch's will was passed on to a corps 
of civil servants and other royal authorities who were sent out to the surrounding provinces 
to instruct the king's subjects of his policies and collect revenue. The extension of the 
Paris-based, royal bureaucracy out into the provinces was not easily accomplished. It was 
antithetical to the feudal principle of administration by the local nobility and it required more
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efficient transportation and communication. Not surprisingly, it was resented at the local 
level but it went forward, nonetheless, because the monarchy had to collect the revenues 
vital to achieving its twin goals of fiscal and military self-sufficiency.42
The Capetians knew that the strength of their monarchy ultimately depended not 
only upon a competent bureaucracy but also an effective army. In a sense, the improved 
administrative structure was only a means to this end and by the opening of the fourteenth 
century their military capabilities were still in a sorry state. Fewer and fewer among the 
nobility were able or willing to put themselves or their infantry at risk for the king despite 
their formal obligation to do so whenever summoned. The later Capetians realized that 
under these circumstances they could field only ridiculously small forces. The number of 
knights had fallen as low as 600 from a high of about 2,500. The more lightly armed 
cavalry, often referred to as sergeants, could not even muster 5,000. The infantry, whose 
lack of formal training never made them highly regarded, were comparably reduced.43
All in all, the monarchy had trouble producing an army of 10-15,000 men from its 
traditional sources and thus committed itself to taking radical steps to increasing its military 
strength to a new level that later French kings would feel obliged to continue and other 
European monarchies had to attempt to duplicate. Since the Capetians could no longer 
count upon their vassals to volunteer such forces, the monarchy turned — despite the 
growing weakness in its agriculturally-based economy — to increased taxation. In effect, 
the monarchy altered the historic bargain between the king and his subjects from one of 
land in return for on-call, largely amateur forces to a new arrangement in which the king 
gave improved, professional protection of his subjects' land in return for taxes. Such 
forces would, of course, not only defend the realm but provide the means to expand it.44
Thus, the monarchy imposed a new, general tax to expand its armed forces but, so 
as to avoid any meaningful opposition, excluded the nobility from those who had to pay.
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In imposing this levy, the French monarchy argued that it was only following the lead of 
the Iberian kingdom, Sicily, portions of the Holy Roman Empire, and even England which 
had imposed national taxation to build up their royal treasuries. But what was possible in 
these smaller, more homogeneous countries proved, at least initially, far more difficult in a 
country as large and diverse as France.45
An authoritarian approach was needed to make the new tax system work and the 
monarchy did not shrink from this imperative. It is perhaps no accident, therefore, that 
France was the most important European country where representative assemblies were 
established last and developed least. Consent to the tax from the peasantry would have 
been convenient but the king knew he needed the revenue and was not about to let this 
scruple stand in his way. Moreover, the decision once taken was strictly enforced; those 
who could or would not pay their taxes were faced with confiscation of their land. The 
monarchy defended its behavior by declaring taxation a duty which the peasantry owed to 
the king not only on the basis of natural law but as their just contribution to the larger 
community's common good -- a concept well beyond the comprehension of most members 
of this locally-focused, largely agrarian populace.46
And the peasants were not the only ones to feel the sting of this new levy. By the 
early fourteenth century, the largest and richest landowner in the realm -- the Catholic 
Church — became subject to taxation. One might have expected that high church officials 
or even the Pope himself would have protested this challenge to the church's sovereignty. 
At this time, however, the Pope had fled from Rome and taken refuge in the southeastern 
French city of Avignon. Thus under the protection of the French crown, His Holiness was 
in no position to protest the new tax.47
The funds gathered by these means financed the monarchy's recapture of the 
provinces of France held by the English crown. This achievement consisted of a long
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series of military and diplomatic advances and reversals, separated by periods of truce, that 
extended throughout the thirteenth century and into the early part of the fourteenth. These 
events will be reviewed in more detail in Chapter III but, briefly, the high points for France 
were: 1200 — the reacquisition of the Vexin; 1203 — regaining Normandy, Maine, Anjou, 
Touraine, and most of Poitou; 1214 — the successful defense of Poitou; 1224 — seizure of 
the port of La Rochelle; 1242 -- another successful defense of Poitou; 1259 — the Treaty of 
Paris whereby England's Henry III surrendered his claims to all English lands in France 
except Gascony; and 1324 -- the seizure of Gascony by Charles IV (1322-1328).
The Capetian dynasty, after nearly 350 years of challenged but uninterrupted rule 
came to a close with Charles' death in 1328. Its efforts to rebuild the country's 
agriculturally-based economy; to consolidate and enlarge its realm; to establish an effective 
central government; and to build military forces more responsive to the king had been 
highly successful and had set a standard admired and emulated by nearly all future French 
kings. So, despite its many political, economic, and military defects — ones shared in 
varying degrees by all its European neighbors — France was a powerful and dynamic 
kingdom with many important resources at its disposal as it entered the decade just 
preceding the Hundred Years War. Its immediate concerns were how to maintain its 
dominance over its closely-related but ever-threatening royal rival across the Channel and 
how to deal with an elder, non-Capetian noble who sought to ascend the French throne in 
1328.
CHAPTER II
THE ENGLISH MONARCHY: FROM THE NORMAN
CONQUEST TO THE EVE OF THE HUNDRED YEARS WAR (1066-1327 A.D.)
In many important respects, particularly in terms of her social and political 
structure, England's history during this period parallels that of France. Just as France had 
begun a new era with the advent of the Capetian regime in 987, England began to take a 
new form in 1066 with the successful invasion of its territory by the Norman noble, 
William the Conqueror. There is still a debate over when the birth of the English nation 
actually occurred. Some believe that the foundations of the country were laid by its earlier 
inhabitants, the Anglo-Saxons; others insist that there was no truly organized society and 
credible government until the Norman takeover in the mid-eleventh century.1 For the 
purposes of this study, we will embrace the latter hypothesis.
Long burdened by seaborne invasions and primitive agricultural practices, England, 
was slower than some regions on the European continent to achieve economic stability and 
agricultural progress. It's development was further delayed by the Anglo-Norman conflict 
and the periodic lapses into political anarchy that followed. Moreover, England's 
geography and her reputation as a country popu- lated by barbarians, i.e. the native Anglo- 
Saxons, also had much to do with her tardy evolution.2
The arrival of a substantial segment of the northern French nobility after William's
successful invasion helped spur England's advancement but it continued to trail France
because of its less temperate climate, its lack of significant urban centers, and its smaller
population. Precise numbers about England's population at this time are lacking and, just
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as for France, the data we have today vary substantially by source. While there is 
agreement among several authorities as to the number of parishes, i.e. about 8,600, there is 
no such common estimate for the number of people country-wide. For instance, Edouard 
Perroy estimates about 3,500,000 while Kenneth Fowler claims a higher total of 4,500,000 
and then Jonathan Sumption offers still a higher range of between 5-6,000,000. Each of 
these authors conducted his research in the same general period, i.e. the early to mid­
fourteenth century and thus a closer pattern of results might be expected. For the purposes 
of this study, however, it is sufficient to approximate England's population at between 4- 
5,000,000 or roughly one-third that of France.3
England was like France in that most of its able-bodied men were farmers. There 
was far less arable land, however, and its location determined where the country's 
population was concentrated. The most fertile regions were the eastern and southern 
lowlands, today's East Anglia, Hampshire, and Kent. The lack of good land elsewhere 
meant that these regions had to be intensively farmed while other uses had to be found for 
the grasslands at higher elevations like those in the chalk hills of Kent, Sussex, and the 
great heaths of the Pennine Chain. These soon became locations for raising sheep as the 
English learned that the wool yielded by these animals could become the country's first 
great economic asset and a key commodity for export. As Perroy wrote, "On the 
Cistercian Estates in Yorkshire sheep-farming achieved such a degree of perfection that the 
English wool was rightly regarded in the continental markets as the finest in Europe."4
The demand from Europe for English wool grew rapidly and helped to diversify the 
country's economy. England's best customers were the Low Countries, the home of the 
most extensive cloth-making industry on the continent. Their looms soon became largely 
dependent on English wool and it was not long before England became the main producer 
of high-grade wool for all of Europe. Also sought after by the cloth industries of Italy,
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France, and Germany, this highly-prized raw material began to grow in political influence 
as well as economic value.5
The English monarchy found that it could use wool as a tool of its foreign policy by 
withholding this key commodity from the king's enemies and authorizing its export to his 
friends. This manipulation of the wool trade was made easier because wool is a bulky raw 
material and its movement could be easily monitored, especially if its export was authorized 
only through a small number of ports. Domestically, it also became an important source of 
income for the king who sold licenses for wool exports which could be bought for money 
or for services to the crown. Eventually, the English monarchy raised a good portion of its 
revenue through the taxation of this increasingly valued commodity.6
Winemaking occupied no comparably important place in England's early economic 
landscape. Wine production was never successful because England's climate was too cool 
and damp for wine grapes to ripen. While wine-abundant France is only a few miles away, 
even today the English Channel appears to mark the northern limit of winemaking -- at least 
in commercial terms.7
The early Britons were drinkers of mead or ale but when their land was conquered 
by Rome in the first century A.D. they were exposed to wines imported from the 
Mediterranean region. The Anglo-Saxon chieftains prized it greatly, and, as in other 
countries, wine became a drink for the wealthy and the powerful because it was an 
expensive commodity to import. Before long, the nobility, the higher clergy, and the 
wealthier merchants were consuming wine in large quantities while the common folk were 
left to enjoy wine only on special occasions.8
As Europe moved into the era of Charlemagne, the Anglo-Saxons were getting 
most of their wine from France but were still trying to establish a native wine industry. 
Wine was necessary for the celebration of the Holy Eucharist and strenuous efforts were
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being made by the English monasteries and others to produce it. There is a reference, for 
example, in Bede's Ecclesiastical History (completed in 781 A.D.) to the fact that "wines 
are cultivated in various localities" and there is a charter, dated 955 of King Edwy (great 
grandson of King Alfred) which grants a vineyard at Pethanburgh, Somerset, to the monks 
of Glastonbury Abbey. We also know that not all vineyards were owned by monks and 
that the Laws of King Alfred made it an offense for anyone to destroy a vineyard. The most 
authoritative source on the state of English winemaking in this era is the Domesday Book 
of 1086 which William the Conqueror published as the complete inventory of the assets of 
his new kingdom. It lists a total of thirty-eight vineyards of which twelve were monastic.9
In any case, the Norman knights who invaded England with William in 1066 took 
no chances on depending on native English wine or limited supplies of French wine in 
England. As the Bayeaux tapestry explicitly shows, they crossed the Channel with stocks 
of wine and arms in virtually equal measure.10 Following the conquest, imports of wine 
from northern France rose sharply, much of it coming from the riverport of Rouen in 
Normandy but probably originating in vineyards throughout the Ile-de-France for this was 
the wine the Normans knew and liked best. By the year 1200, however, an important shift 
in the source of wine was underway since shipping records show that while wine was 
continuing to flow from these northern vineyards, a majority was coming from France's 
western provinces of Anjou and Poitou via the port of La Rochelle.11
After the Norman conquest, England increasingly had something to trade for wine 
that the French wanted more than animal hides: wool. With the establishment of this wool 
for wine exchange, the amount of wine being imported rose substantially and the new 
Norman rulers of England ~  monarchs, nobles, and high clergy — became as expansive as 
their counterparts across the Channel in their use of wine. And this sharp increase in 
England's demand for wine fueled the interests of these elites in controlling these regions in 
France where wine was produced or, at least, in profiting from the trade in wine which was 
surging between the two countries.12
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The growth in economic prosperity which England realized with its expanding wool 
trade encouraged her to develop other industries that would further diversify the country's 
largely agricultural economy. Some entrepreneurs came across deposits of coal and metal, 
including iron, lead, and tin, but the initial exploitation of these natural resources were 
inefficient and made no impact on the economy comparable to that of the wool trade. Like 
many such enterprises, the early mining industries were under-capitalized and suffered 
from a lack of overland transport.13
English shipping, however, got off to a fast start. Because it was isolated from the 
continent and needed to get its wool to foreign markets, England developed its maritime 
industry far more quickly than France. It began with fishing as a source of food and work 
in the many English communities located along the country's extensive coastline. The 
wool trade brought more attention to the coasts, particularly in those ports which afforded 
easy access to the continent. For example, wool-shipping towns like Kinston-upon-HuIl, 
King's Lynn, Yarmouth, Dover, and London itself prospered because of the growing 
business with the ports of Handers. Other coastal towns like Southampton also grew in 
importance as a flourishing wine trade developed between England and the French province 
of Gascony.14
Nowhere was the concentration of people and industry greater, however, than in 
London. While most of England’s numerous towns remained small, London continued to 
grow in size and significance. It would be the only English city up to and through the 
fourteenth century that could stand comparison with the cities of continental Europe. With 
a population between 40-50,000, it was less than half the size of Paris; but by 1377, it 
outnumbered the next four largest English cities of York, Bristol, Plymouth, and Coventry 
combined.15
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London prospered in part because of its location on the Thames river and because 
of the growth of the monarchy's administrative apparatus around the borough of 
Westminster. By the reign of Edward III (1327-1377), London had become the political, 
commercial, social, and literary center of the kingdom. And, while this emerging capital 
maintained many of the characteristics of a small country town and was plagued by all the 
hazards of the growing continental cities — including poor sanitation, outbreaks of disease, 
and rampant crime -- it became a mecca to the English people, attracting a wide variety of 
artisans, craftsmen, soldiers and adventurers from across the English countryside.17
The cosmopolitan atmosphere created by this influx of people to London, however, 
gave a false picture of the country's overall economic situation. Most of the population 
was engaged in subsistence farming on too little arable land and those fortunes that did 
exist belonged largely to the French nobility who had left their estates across the Channel to 
appropriate more land in England. For these Anglo-French nobles and their companions 
and supporters, England indeed seemed a land of wealth and plenty. Their outlook is 
reflected by the fourteenth century chronicler, Jean le Bel, who when camping with the 
English army near York in 1327 wrote that he had "never ceased to wonder at such 
abundance" and further clamored about the continual flow of cheap victuals from the 
nearby villages which could be washed down with wine brought in by sea from Gascony 
and the Rhine.18
The great land-based fortunes held by what was, at least initially, a foreign nobility 
masked the adverse circumstances in which most Englishmen lived and that wealth was far 
more unequally distributed in England than in France. Moreover, the small land holdings 
typical of most English property owners were being continually reduced in size as the 
population grew and the competition for fertile land increased. Thus, these free 
landholders and members of the minor gentry were by the fourteenth century increasingly
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vulnerable to harvest failure, natural disasters, and economic depression. Sumption 
appropriately described the plight of the lesser gentry when he wrote that "their fortunes 
were always delicately balanced between profit and loss." And, as for the largely unfree 
peasants who made up the majority of the population in central and southern England, the 
situation was worse still; less than half of them had the minimum acreage necessary for 
mere subsistence living.19
At the opposite end of this economic spectrum stood the greater nobility who, 
despite their wealth, lived rather conspicuously on large estates scattered about the English 
countryside. Including only between 150 and 200 families, this affluent and separate class 
was pleased to be referred to as 'magnates' of the realm but participated in the political 
affairs of the country only when their heredity or economic interests were threatened. As 
long as they had the three cardinal virtues of the English nobility — Norman ancestry, royal 
favor, and money — they could virtually count on access to the king's ear because of their 
feudal position as one of his vassals.20
One key attribute of the noble class, however, a capability long deemed essential for 
communicating with the monarch, was beginning to fade away by the start of the fourteenth 
century: the ability to speak the French language. When the Norman invaders were 
forming this new monarchy in the eleventh century, they only spoke French. As 
transplanted French nobles who still had lands, fortunes, and families back in France, this 
was to be expected. Language was an important symbol of their elevated status and it set 
them apart from the native peoples they had conquered. And, initially, nothing in Anglo- 
Saxon culture persuaded them that there was any advantage to learning the local tongue.21
By the early fourteenth century, however, many things had changed for the upper 
class descendants of these Norman invaders. The English monarchy was well developed 
and had come to have more differences than common interests with the throne of France. It 
also sought to call attention to its increasingly independent status by adopting English 
traditions, culture, and language. Earlier generations of the nobility would only have
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spoken French, and some might have been able to read Latin; but, by the end of the 
thirteenth century, English had become the language of business, light reading, and polite 
conversation. As the Hundred Years War approached, Froissart noted that in the ever more 
difficult negotiations between England and France it was a well known trick among English 
diplomats to evade answering embarrassing questions from the French by pretending not to 
understand them.22
Despite the great disparities between the classes, a sense of English identity and
national unity was also beginning to take hold by the early fourteenth century. It was not
only the growing use of a common language but that England's political institutions were
starting to work more broadly and uniformly across the entire country. In combination,
these trends helped politicians, administrators, and subjects feel that they owed an
allegiance to a greater community than just the locality in which they had been born and
raised. Yet another factor in binding the new nation together was the shared experience of
external threats. According to Sumption:
Their sense of identity was intensified by the consciousness of enemies 
without. The sea defined the frontiers of the kingdom on the south and east 
and separated it from its most powerful rivals. On the west and the north it 
was bound by alien societies still largely pastoral and tribal, only inter­
mittently at peace and the object of crude contempt and venomous detestation.23
This idea of being "English", as opposed to just being from Dorset, Kent, or York, 
and moreover, of having that sense shared to some degree across the classes, was a social 
and, ultimately, a political development of the first importance and one not shared at that 
time in France where allegiances remained far more local and divided by class. It was, in 
fact, an important first step in England's emergence from feudalism toward — much further 
down the road — a constitutionally limited monarchy because at the heart of this newfound
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nationalism was the concept that an individual's loyalty was owed not just to king but 
country .
England's newfound sense of identity began to work itself out in a variety of ways, 
not all of them conducive to domestic harmony and public order. For example, to 
differentiate herself from other countries England began to develop a crude cult of insularity 
which took the form of heaping scorn and sometimes physical abuse on foreigners residing 
in England. Alien advisors of the king became the objects of public ridicule, foreign 
merchants trading in English towns were ostracized, and alien clergymen sent by the Pope 
were resented by the domestic population.24
Despite such growing xenophobia, the English also directed much of their public 
anger inward, most notably toward their kings. While England increasingly gave the 
impression of being a coherent kingdom, the frequency of coordinated political opposition 
to the monarch by the nobility in this period is far greater than in most European states, 
certainly greater than in France. From the advent of the thirteenth century to the end of the 
seventeenth, England's history of devastating civil wars over who should occupy the 
throne stands unrivaled. Surprisingly, from a modem standpoint, these insurrections were 
directed less against the institution of the monarchy than against the individuals who held 
the throne. The accession of Edward III on the eve of the Hundred Years War in 1327 is 
just one example of the violent English trait of unseating one particularly hated monarch, in 
this case, Edward II (1307-1327), only to replace him with another.25
One of the largest obstacles standing in the way of England's development of a 
solid national identity and a society at peace with its monarchs was its ongoing ties to 
France and the Capetian crown. Even by the fourteenth century, the Plantagenet kings of
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England had by no means separated themselves from their French origins and, like many 
among the nobility were still closely bound to France through family ties, culture, and most 
importantly, by their territorial possessions in that country.26 Beginning with the Norman 
conquest but strongly reinforced by the acquisition of Aquitaine, twelfth century England 
controlled more land in France than the Capetian kings.
It was not until 1204 that the French monarchy struck back by confiscating the 
duchy of Normandy, a development which sharply reduced, at least temporarily, the 
English grasp on French territory. From that point forward and throughout the thirteenth 
century the political interests of the English kings and nobles were driven in large measure 
by their efforts to retain, retrieve, or expand their lands across the Channel 27 By the 
fourteenth century, some among the English nobility, whether of Norman or Angevin 
origin, had lost enough of their ancestral possessions 'back home' or had become 
sufficiently Anglicized by their time in the island kingdom to lose interest in the ongoing 
struggle over territory in France. But for a majority of English leaders, especially the 
kings, the ties to their first homeland remained strong and engendered divided loyalties 
which remained a critical problem for the stability of English society and the advancement 
of the English state.28
Moreover, this was a problem that could not easily be resolved because it was not 
just a question of self interest in land ownership but of the land-for-loyalty-and-service 
bargain between medieval kings and their nobles that lay at the heart of the feudal concept 
of vassalage. Because of the tangled early history between England and France many 
among the English nobility found themselves owing allegiance to both the Plantagenet and 
Capetian monarchies. According to the customs of feudalism, a medieval king was 
supposed to be able to depend upon the loyalty of his nobles, including the obligation to 
provide military service whenever the monarch required. Thus, because much of the 
English nobility still held property in France, the French crown could insist that they were 
honor-bound to serve in campaigns intended to drive the English from their possessions in
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France. Moreover, the English kings themselves, because they were of French descent,
were theoretically obligated to support the Capetian crown. But these same kings had also
given huge land grants in England to their Norman supporters and their descendants and
thus were in a position to insist on their loyal service in campaigns to hold on to English
territory in France.29
Accordingly, it was possible for an English noble to be a vassal not only to the king
of England but also to that of France at a time when his Plantagenet monarch was in
conflict with — but still obligated to — his Capetian overlord. Anne Curry, an historian of
the period, has provided some useful insight into this hopelessly complicated situation
confronting many in the English nobility when she wrote:
English kings were sovereign in their kingdom, but they held their French lands as 
dukes or counts. Thus, they had a superior lord — the King of France — to whom 
they owed homage. Feudal custom gave the superior Lord various powers over 
his vassal. Not least, he could declare confiscate his vassal's lands if he considered 
that the latter acted against his own will as Lord.30
And the French king's feudal authority did not end there. As Curry writes:
There were . . . difficulties over the notion of one king paying homage to 
another, not least because this implied an obligation to provide military service 
against the French king's enemies. If the latter were the English king's allies, there 
was a considerable danger that the possession of non-sovereign lands in France 
could impede English foreign policy. But the greatest problem was undoubtedly 
the French king's right as overlord to interfere in a vassal's government of his own 
fief.31
Another obstacle in the path to achieving English unity was the crown's inability to 
consolidate its control over the entire territory we know today as the British Isles. Just as 
the Capetian dynasty had met resistance in trying to gather various neighboring 
principalities into the domain of the French crown, the Plant- agenet family of England had 
failed to induce Ireland, Wales, and Scotland to sub- mit to its authority. Henry II (1154- 
1189) had supposedly conquered Ireland during his reign but the force of English law still 
was hardly felt beyond the vicinity of Dublin. During the reign of Edward I (1272-1307),
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Wales had been vanquished in a long conflict lasting from 1276 to 1295 but was still 
restless under English rule. It was Scotland, however, which turned out to be England’s 
most obdurate neighbor.32
Very little success was achieved in subduing the Scots despite ten years of almost 
ceaseless struggle from 1296 to 1307. And continued Scottish resistance seemed all the 
more certain after the English defeat at Bannockburn in 1314. By the time Edward III came 
to the throne in 1327 the campaign to subjugate the Scots had taken on all the doggedness 
of a papal crusade. Edward's best efforts notwith- standing, Scotland remained England's 
most persistent and effective antagonist, a stance it was to maintain throughout the 
fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. But as Sumption noted, all this "hostility was a problem 
which the English had brought upon themselves."33
It is important to recognize the degree to which England suffered from its seemingly 
endless struggle with Scotland. While much of England was quite distant from the actual 
fighting, the effects of these chronic border wars were felt across the country because they 
continually drained the wealth and manpower of England. Another thorn in England's side 
was the old alliance between Scotland and France, a circumstance that became increasingly 
vexing to Westminster as its differences with Paris escalated toward full-scale warfare in 
the early fourteenth century. As a reminder to Edward II that France had an ally at 
England's back, the last Capetian king -- Charles IV (1322-1328) — formally renewed 
relations between France and Scotland in April 1326 with the Treaty of Corbeil34 And in 
the 1330’s, Charles' immediate successor, Philip VI (1328-1350), continued to support the 
Scots even when they appeared to be on the brink of destruction. Not surprisingly, this 
alliance became one of the many catalysts of the Hundred Years War, a conflict in which 
the Scots would play a prominent part.35
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These foreign conflicts notwithstanding, England continued to make substantial 
progress in the development of its domestic political institutions. Jean Froissart had 
enough confidence in these institutions to declare England to be "the best governed land in 
the world." Since the eleventh century, the country had been governed as one territorial 
unit and its system of justice, for example, extended well beyond the king's domain and his 
immediate tenants to virtually all places and men. This was what was meant by the 
'common law', in other words, a standard of civil behavior common to all of England, 
where all free men could pursue their case from an itinerant justice in one of England's 
shire courts or even at the king's court at Westminster.36
Despite such advances, there was another factor limiting the development of 
English unity: periodic struggles for power between the crown and the higher nobility. 
Given the supposed superiority of the monarch within any feudal system, the frequency 
with which the English nobility successfully challenged the king is remarkable. Certainly, 
nothing of this sort occurred to the same degree in France. English history is marked by 
irregular but often violent eruptions in which an incensed and temporarily united baronage 
staged political struggles to oppose the king's authority and to demand for itself at least 
temporary control over the crown's officials and the direction of the country.37
This ability of the English nobles periodically to stand successfully against the will 
of their king established precedents critical to the development of the monarchy. King 
John's submission to his barons in 1215 by signing Magna Carta is but the most obvious 
example. In most medieval kingdoms, the baronage dutifully supported the monarchy in 
its adventures abroad but in England the king could do virtually nothing of importance 
without winning the cooperation of the nobility. Such cooperation was least likely to be 
forthcoming when the king wanted to conduct an aggressive foreign policy, particularly 
one which ran the risk of war.
Many of the barons had lost their possessions in Normandy and across western 
France and, as a result, had become more insular in their outlook. These nobles thought
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the interests of the English community, including their own, would be better served by the
king tending to the many pressing issues of the day at home. Others, whether or not they
still owned lands in France, were simply tired of paying taxes and serving in the king's
army. Together they often constituted a sufficient consensus among the barons to block the
sovereign's plans for foreign expeditions. Consequently, they drew up an ordinance and
presented it to Edward II in 1311. It read, in part, as follows:
Because the king ought not to make war against anyone or leave his 
kingdom without the general assent of his baronage, on account of the many 
perils that could happen to him and his kingdom, we ordain that henceforth 
the king shall not leave his kingdom or make war without the general assent 
of his baronage given in Parliament, and if he does otherwise and has his feudal 
host summoned for the purpose, then the summons shall be void.38
The crown was not without its own resources, however, in these periodic crises. 
The barons, for example, only exercised their authority when some great issue arose, while 
the monarchy operated on a more continuous basis and through an increasingly pervasive 
and effective administrative apparatus. This royal bureaucracy exercised control through 
thirty-nine shire governments of unequal size and varying importance. Unlike France, in 
England each of these districts was a royal administrative area and not merely a feudal 
entity.39 Governing over these districts were the principal organs of what we now call "the 
state" including the Chancery and the Exchequer.
These institutions were older and more developed than their counter-parts in France; 
in fact, they had been in place for two centuries by the time Edward III came to the throne. 
The Chancery, manned mainly by long-serving clergymen, acted as the secretariat for most 
operations of government. Characterized by a notable esprit-de-corps and a fondness for 
documentation, they had the authority to use the king's great seal on their innumerable 
letters, orders, and writs, giving the impression that each of these documents was a direct 
pronouncement of the king's will.40 The Exchequer handled the financial administration of
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the realm. Endowed with a large staff, this department exercised partially effective control 
over the king’s expenditures. This agency of government never attained the influence of 
the corresponding institution in France, however. It was valued, nonetheless, for the 
accuracy of its accounts and, in a world where communications were slow, was praised for 
the timeliness of its reports.41
The king was able to exert the greatest influence on those institutions of government 
that were closest to the throne and most administrative functions were concentrated in the 
royal household. Medieval governments were far smaller than they are today and were 
operated more directly by the monarch himself. Consequently, their success had much to 
do with each king's personality and the time and energy he was willing to devote to these 
tasks.42
Within the household was the King's Council which was a small body of personal 
assistants, including confidential clerks, well-off knights, and the Chancellor, all of whom 
owed their jobs to the position of trust they had established with the king. The Council 
was the inner circle of the royal government and, because of its immediate knowledge of 
political, economic, and military affairs, was an asset the monarch could use in his periodic 
struggles with the council of barons.43
The king conducted his financial affairs within an office of his household known as 
the Wardrobe. This office was the pivot of his administration and the source of policy 
guidance to the Exchequer. The mobility of the wardrobe was a critical asset; it enabled the 
king to collect taxes and issue warrants even in time of war when the monarch was 
governing from his campaign tent. During the Hundred Years War, Edward III had no 
time to dictate policy throughout the normal bureaucracy and so he relied upon the 
Wardrobe to collect revenues directly from custom posts and the royal manors and to issue 
demands for Parliamentary subsidies. This practice made the Wardrobe the principal 
spending department and placed the dispensing of revenue under the personal control of the 
king.44
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Nothing limited the English king's power, however, so much as a lack of money. 
The monarchy had several traditional sources of revenue, including the profits from the 
royal mints, the imposition of fines and fees, plus income from the productive activities and 
rents of the properties he owned. In the 1330s, the total revenues collected from all these 
sources was between £15-20,000 a year or about one-sixth what the French monarchy 
raised from similar sources. Like their French counterparts, the English monarchs found 
they needed additional income to support their armies and implement their foreign policies. 
One thing they chose not to do, however, despite the precedent established by the French, 
was to manipulate the nation's currency; over time this proved to be the right course of 
action as the English pound sterling held strong against other currencies well into the 
fifteenth century.45
Most of the additional income the crown raised was raised through several different 
forms of taxation. The tax that proved to be the most profitable was the custom duties 
imposed on goods being shipped in and out of the island kingdom. Initiated by Edward I 
as a tax on English merchants who were exporting wool and hides, it was extended after 
1303 as an additional duty on foreign merchants. The yield from these levies became 
substantial and they were extended to imported and exported goods of every description.46
And the English crown did not stop there in terms of taxation. In addition to the 
usual customs duties, the king's Wardrobe income was supplemented by a personal 
property tax which was set at 10% of a subject's total property value for those living in 
towns and 15% for those who lived in the country. This was a bold initiative and 
predictably unpopular, leading taxpayers to frequently evade financial responsibility 
through many ingenious methods. As a result, when the crown received only a modest 
increase in income through this tax, it turned to others that proved more profitable. These 
included acquisitions of subsidies from Parliament and forced annual gifts to the monarchy 
from the clergy.47
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As England and France drew ever closer to open conflict, London’s determination
to be aggressive in its foreign policy increased. This, in turn, prompted the monarchy to
find still more revenue to support its plans. As Sumption put it:
Faced with onerous and occasionally urgent commitments abroad and only a 
modest income arriving at measured intervals at home, the English kings from 
Edward I onward resorted to heavy borrowing not only from their own subjects but 
from the nascent banking systems of Handers, the Rhineland, and, above all, 
Italy.48
There was a succession of Italian bankers, starting with the Riccardi family, that did 
business with the north European powers and who ruined their fortunes by working too 
closely and trusting too much. The remarkable thing is that there were other Italian banking 
families who were willing to replace them. In the 1320s, the Bardi family of Florence 
became so closely associated with Edward II that their London headquarters were 
ransacked by the mobs that initiated the riots of 1326. This family also went bankrupt 
trying to cater to Edward Ill's ambitions but not before it also lent money to the 
Plantagenet's nemesis across the Channel.49
All of these resources and limitations notwithstanding, the effectiveness of the 
English monarchy in this period ultimately depended upon — more than any other single 
factor — the capacity for personal leadership exhibited by the king. Unfortunately fop 
England, this quality was not evident in the monarch who occupied its throne for two 
decades in the period just preceding the Hundred Years War. Edward II (1307-1327) 
showed none of the political acumen and strength of character evidenced by both his father 
and his son and he was successfully challenged by the barons early in his reign. We will 
relate Edward's unhappy story in more detail in the next chapter, as part of a review of the 
reigns of all those English kings who were also Dukes of Gascony. For now, suffice it to 
say that Edward II's capacity for leadership was so low that by the end of his term England 
had been beaten by the Scots, had lost all its territories in France, and had endured crushing
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taxation, famine, and civil war at home. Once again the barons had moved against their 
king but this time, instead of just forcing him to adopt some set of reforms or forego a 
foreign adventure, they had deposed him from the throne and, with his wife's connivance, 
he was imprisoned and subsequently murdered.
As we have seen, France entered the decade preceding the Hundred Years War on a 
low note as well. With the death of Charles IV the Capetian dynasty of nearly 350 years 
had ended and the succession to the French throne was in dispute. But the Capetian’s long 
struggle to retrieve their lands from England's Plantagenet kings had been a success; their 
investments in developing a more efficient central government and more effective armed 
forces had paid off. England, in comparison, was in far worse condition both 
economically and politically in 1327 and, for a feudal society, it had just done the 
unthinkable: the barons had deposed and, directly or indirectly, killed their king. To be 
sure, the continuity of government was assured because Edward II had a male heir but he 
was only a boy and those immediately in charge of England's government were deeply 
distrusted even by those who had wanted Edward deposed. In Chapter V we will take up 
the tale of Edward III as he came to manhood in the ten years between his father's death 
and the start of the Hundred Years War. For the purposes of this study, however, it is 
important to pause and first examine one French/English province, Gascony, and its chief 
economic activity, the wine trade, which, at least from England's point of view, were to 
become major factors in that conflict.
CHAPTER III
GASCONY: THE MAVERICK DUCHY (FROM ANTIQUITY TO 1327 A.D.)
Viewing the major events of European history through the lens of England's 
relationship with Gascony in the time preceding the Hundred Years War provides some 
very helpful insights into what England and, to a lesser degree, France had at stake in that 
protracted conflict. It also runs the risk of losing perspective on other major factors that 
precipitated the war. Mindful of the need to guard against that risk, we will nevertheless 
use this device in the conviction that insufficient attention has been paid so far to the role of 
Gascony in these tumultuous events.
More specifically, this chapter will briefly examine the reigns of the six kings of 
England who were also Dukes of Gascony during the 185 years preceding the war. What 
those kings did or did not do about this southernmost English overseas possession during 
this era speaks volumes about their abilities as monarchs, about the other pressures they 
were experiencing and, most important, about the growing prominence of Gascony in the 
foreign policy of both England and France. First, however, it is important to define Gascon 
nomenclature, geography, early history, and economic resources which made Gascony a 
potent trading partner in medieval Europe.
Gascony is a place that has had many names and whose borders have shifted with 
surprising frequency. The Romans called it Burdigala and in the Middle Ages it was
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referred to variously, in a wide range of French and English texts, as either Aquitaine, 
Guienne, Guyenne, Gironde, Gascony or Bordeaux. It is fairly clear, however, that the 
term Aquitaine refers to the far larger region extending southward from the Loire River 
Valley to France's border with Spain. Gascony, it is generally agreed, is the southwestern 
most portion of this enormous territory, bounded by the Charente River in the north and the 
Pyranees Mountains in the south.1
For the purposes of this study, however, it is far more helpful to look at Gascony 
not in terms of borders but of rivers. It is this region's abundant waterways which had 
first attracted the Romans, which provided an ideal environment for winemaking and, most 
importantly, which equipped it to easily ship its wines and other products to England. 
Viewed in this way, Gascony is a great drainage basin facing the Atlantic on France's 
western shore. Its two main rivers are the Dordogne and the Garonne — the first rising in 
the high country of the Massif Central and flowing generally east to west; the second 
starting in the Pyranees and running north and then northwest.2
These two rivers meet to form the broad Gironde Estuary -- not unlike America's 
Chesapeake Bay — which flows another 65 miles to the northwest before emptying into the 
Atlantic. Standing near the confluence of the Dordogne and the Garonne is the great port 
city of Bordeaux, a trading center and provincial capital which during the period we are 
examining was already three-fourths the size of London. In a country blessed with a 
wealth of river systems, only the Loire is longer and none is more open to ocean-going 
traffic than that of the Gironde.
The early history of this region is less well documented than that of the other 
important vineyard areas of France. This is probably the case because the Roman tenure 
here was briefer than for these other regions and because the role of the Church in Gascon 
viticulture was comparatively slight. In any case, it is believed that the Romans established
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the city of Bordeaux, possibly as early as the first century A.D. More certainly, we know
from the writings of the region's fourth century Roman governor, poet and vintner — a man
named Ausonious — that Bordeaux was a thriving port and wine producer during his
tenure. What little is known about what happened thereafter, roughly from the fall of
Rome to the seventh century is perhaps best summarized by Hugh Johnson:
In Bordeaux the unwelcome intruders were . . . the Goths . . . the Vandals . . . 
and the Visigoths (who) came to stay in 414. . . Gothic as they were, though, the 
new arrivals were not unimpressed by the old Gallo-Roman establishment. . . 
they sought out its leading families, intermarried with them and were happy to take 
over their rational working of land and government. . . This extension of the 
Roman system was ended by the arrival of the Franks at the close of the fifth 
century. The sixth century is lost to us in a welter of Frankish princelings and 
Saxon earls. The seventh is complicated still further by the arrival of . . . the 
Gascons, who came north from . . . Spain.
Johnson has also provided a useful precis of what transpired in Bordeaux from the arrival
of the Gascon people to the era of the Norman Conquest:
The Gascon era was interrupted by the advance of the Saracens, also from 
Spain. . . Now it was the turn of the Carolingian Franks [who] took Bordeaux in 
763. . The city [then] withstood three waves of Viking attacks . . . until [it] was 
le f t . . . totally devastated . . .  in 870. . . There is some evidence that wine­
growing survived these centuries of changing management. The principal 
customers were Ireland and the western Celtic fringes of Britain. Eastern England, 
however, imported wine by the shorter route, from northern France and the Rhine. 
But after 870 there is a silence of nearly 250 years.4
Before documenting the events which eventually bound Gascony so closely to 
England, it is important to emphasize how separated this province was from Carolingian 
and then Capetian France. These were kingdoms of the north and Gascony was not only 
far away from Paris geographically but ethnically and linguistically as well. As Johnson 
has suggested, many of its inhabitants were of Spanish rather than French background. 
Given the primitive state of medieval roads and the presence of brigands in many rural 
areas, there was essentially no overland traffic between Bordeaux and Paris in medieval 
times.5 Gascony's greatest asset was its many rivers and its easy access to the sea. But
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this splendid system made England, the Low Countries and Scandinavia nearly as easy to 
reach as other parts of France and, moreover, these foreign countries had a greater need 
than the rest of France for what Bordeaux had to sell: grain, wine and salt. These 
fundamental facts of production and transportation made Gascony — once its parade of 
Gothic, Frankish, Saxon, Moorish and Viking marauders got out of the way — develop as 
an economically self-sufficient and politically independent region quite distinct from the rest 
of France.6
From the standpoint of the Capetian kings, this maverick stance of the Gascon 
people was irritating but not critical. This distant comer of their realm held a low place on 
their list of lands to be formally incorporated into the kingdom of France. In fact, Gascony 
and its people were regarded somewhat dismissively, even derisively, by members of the 
French court who thought of the region as hopelessly rural and remote and its citizens as 
primitive and untrustworthy. This conde- scending attitude toward the Gascons on the part 
of Paris was a long-standing element of France's outlook and a staple of French humor and 
literature almost to the present day. Among the most famous examples of this phenomenon 
is Alexandre Dumas' classic novel, The Three Musketeers, in which three urbane veterans 
of the king's elite guard are joined by a raw recruit, D'Artagnan, a country bumpkin from 
Gascony. In the American context, a parallel could be drawn between the Parisian attitude 
toward this southwestern outpost and that of sophisticated New Yorkers toward some hill 
country regions of the southeastern United States.7
Given these perceptions, it is perhaps somewhat easier to understand why Louis 
VII (1137-1180) was prepared to divorce Eleanor of Aquitaine in 1152 and thereby 
abandon at least his marital ties to the southwestern quadrant of his kingdom. His behavior 
is still puzzling, however, for he was no stranger to Gascony having been both married and 
divorced at St. Andre's Cathedral in Bordeaux. One would have thought he could have 
seen the economic potential of this region and, in any case, would have been constrained to 
hold on to it if only to keep faith with the mission of his predecessors to consolidate and
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extend the Capetian domain, not shrink it. But Eleanor was determined to be free and, 
while he had apparently adored her, her independent behavior had been a source of some 
embarrassment. Moreover, she had so far failed to produce a male heir for the French 
throne and in 1152, as Hugh Johnson has observed, "Bordeaux was dignified with an 
archbishop and a duke but was on nobody's route to anywhere . . . .  except the pilgrim 
road to Compostella in northwest Spain."8
Perhaps Louis VII would have thought twice about releasing his wife and thus 
weakening his claim to Gascony and all the rest of Aquitaine could he have anticipated that 
Eleanor's new husband, Henry, Duke of Normandy and Count of Anjou, would just two 
years later, be promoted to King of England. Whatever his reasoning, Louis further 
loosened the ties between Paris and Bordeaux and the English, though not immediately, 
took great advantage of what had happened.
By becoming the first English Duke of Gascony, Henry II (1154-1189) had 
underscored his subordinate relationship to the French king. But since, in strict feudal 
terms, he already was in that status because of his other titles in northern and western 
France, nothing much had changed. Moreover, Henry initially ignored his new possession 
in southern Aquitaine because more pressing concerns demanded his attention in his new 
role as King of England. He had succeeded King Stephen (1135-1154) in a bargain forced 
by the English barons to settle twelve years of civil war and many fences remained to be 
mended. In addition, the Scots and Welsh were taking advantage of England's internal 
weaknesses and Henry had to address their incursions. Finally, the relationship between 
the English Church and State grew increasingly difficult in the mid-twelfth century, a 
situation exemplified by the great feud Henry II had with his former friend, the Archbishop 
of Canterbury, Thomas Becket.9
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By 1165, however, the king's domestic problems were sufficiently resolved so that
he could concentrate the bulk of his attention on affairs abroad. As Kenneth Morgan
reminds us in The Oxford Illustrated History of Britain:
Out of the thirty-four years of his reign, Henry II spent twenty-one on the 
Continent. Socially and culturally, England was in a bit of a backwater compared 
with the French parts of the Angevin domain. The prosperous communities of the 
valleys of the Seine, Loire and Garonne river systems were centres of learning, art, 
architecture, poetry and music. Aquitaine and Anjou produced two of the essential 
commodities of medieval commerce: wine and salt These could be exchanged for 
English cloth and this trade must have brought great profit to the prince who ruled 
over both producers and consumers.10
Despite all this time in his French domains, Henry II apparently never devoted
much attention to Gascony nor did he do anything memorable to promote its wines. As a
native of Anjou, he favored the wines of the Loire and his wife Eleanor — before she was
imprisoned in England by her husband — also lived in the Loire Valley at Poitiers and
Fontrevault and preferred the wines of Poitou. When Henry decided in 1172 to divide his
huge kingdom among his four sons, events were set in motion which eventually advanced
the fortunes of Gascony and its trade with England but no one could argue that this had
been among the king's intentions.11
Henry II designated his eldest son, Henry, as his successor in England, Anjou and
Normandy; Richard got the Aquitaine; Geoffrey was tapped for Brittany; and John, the
youngest, got nothing. Not surprisingly, John soon became known as "Sans Terre" in
France and Lackland in England. Young Henry and Geoffrey, however, died before their
father's demise in 1189 — an unexpected outcome which advanced Richard as King of
England, freed Eleanor to resume her role as Duchess of Aquitaine and left John as Lord of
Ireland, the kingdom's least desirable position. With these radical changes in England's
leadership structure, as Hugh Johnson has written:
At last, in the 1190s, Bordeaux began to come into the picture. With its cathedral 
and ducal palace, it became Richard II's base in France (although from 1190 to 
1192 he was away on the Third Crusade, earning himself the surname Coeur de 
Lion). But La Rochelle still had favoured treatment (as the main source of
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England's wines). In 1190, the Queen-Duchess built it a new port whose 
monumental walls still stand today. New deep-draught freighters, known as 
cogs, were coming into use in northern ports and required better anchorages and 
deeper wharves. Bordeaux began to complain bitterly that the royal favour 
continued to rain on the makers of down-market white wines around La Rochelle, 
while a great log-jam of old feudal dues and customs prevented its (Gascony's) 
wine industry from competing at all.12
It was Richard II's disregarded brother John who succeeded him in 1199 and who 
began to pay attention to the potential of the Gascon wine trade with England. In following 
this path, however, John was driven less by the outraged pleas of the Gascon vintners or a 
newfound preference for their wines than he was by pressure from Louis VII's successor 
in France, Philip II -- also known as Philip Augustus (1180-1223). Philip and Richard had 
been partners on the Third Crusade but Richard was captured on his way home and 
imprisoned in Austria from December 1192 to February 1194. Philip, already back in 
France, had decided to move against England's possessions in his country and started by 
attacking English forces in the Vexin and Normandy. Richard was ransomed at enormous 
cost by England and spent the next five years resisting Philip's encroachments. As Morgan 
has reported:
By the end of 1198, Richard's skillful diplomacy, fine generalship and, above 
all, greater resources meant that he had succeeded in recapturing almost 
everything that had been lost. Then, in April 1199, Richard died as the 
result of a wound suffered at the siege of Chalus-Chabrol. . . .  In the 
Angevin-Capetian struggle this was to be the decisive turning-point.13
Immediately after Richard's death, Philip II resumed the pressure against John, 
being well acquainted with his weaknesses. In 1200 the new English king ceded the Vexin 
to France and in 1202 Philip pushed him harder, declaring that all of John's French 
domains were forfeit. In 1203, John "threw in the towel and withdrew to England. Philip 
overran Normandy, Anjou, Maine, Touraine and all of Poitou except La Rochelle. These 
humiliating reverses earned for John a new nickname: 'Lack-land' now became 'Soft- 
sw ord '."14
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These events left the King of England with only one of his French domains intact: 
Gascony. In his role as Duke, John traveled to Bordeaux in 1203 and, according to 
Johnson:
accepted the arguments of Bordeaux's citizens that lower taxes would mean higher 
revenues. Unblock our port, they said, and let our city prosper. John still drove a 
bargain. In exchange for vessels and support against the King of France . . . .  he 
exempted them from the principal tax on their exports, the so called Grand Coutume 
. . . .  Gascon merchants were at last to start coming to England.15
La Rochelle, still in English hands, loudly protested this new favor showed to 
Bordeaux and succeeded in winning the same exemption in 1204. But in the next year the 
Gascons found a new way to curry favor with King John by stoutly resisting a siege of the 
city of Bordeaux mounted not by Philip of France but Alphonse of Spain. By thus 
demonstrating their fealty to England and, probably, their own determination to bend to no 
outside force, they further ingratiated themselves to the John. He reciprocated by placing a 
substantial order for Gascon wine and by appointing the first native-born mayor of 
Bordeaux, Pierre Lambert.16
John may have held his own in Gascony but he was unsuccessful elsewhere. He 
raised taxes significantly in England, purportedly to support the armies necessary to regain 
the lands he had lost in France. His relations with the Church were not good and in 1209 
John was excommunicated by Pope Innocent III who also closed the doors of English 
churches for a period of six years. England's barons, fed up with their king, attempted to 
overthrow John in 1212 but he survived. Philip II threatened to invade England in the 
same year but the attack did not materialize. In 1214, John went on the offensive in an 
attempt to at least regain territory in Poitou but was disastrously defeated at the battle of 
Bouvines. Exasperated with these results, some members of the English nobility rebelled 
against John and in 1215 he retained his throne only by agreeing with the barons to adopt a 
fundamental program of reforms, redefining the powers of the monarch. The document he 
signed was called Magna Carta.17
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By 1216, John was dead and his place was taken by his nine-year-old son, Henry 
III (1216-1272) who did not begin to reign in his own right until 1232. By then, England 
had suffered another defeat in France but one which worked to the advantage of the wine 
merchants of Bordeaux. In 1224, Louis VIII — who had sue- ceeded Philip II — renewed 
the Capetian pressure on Poitou and, with the conn- ivance of its inhabitants, finally 
captured the port of La Rochelle. Louis also threatened Gascony but its defenses held and 
the mayor of Bordeaux wrote to Westminster to remind the regency how stout his people 
had been in defense of the king's territory compared to those in La Rochelle. He further 
promised that: "We will defend Bordeaux, the town of our lord the King of England, 
whom we will never fail faithfully to serve, so long as life is left in us." England 
responded with reinforcements of its garrisons in Gascony in 1225 but the danger had then 
passed.18
From this point onward, Gascony had pinned its hopes on the King of England 
rather than on France or on going it alone. By defying Louis VIII and so openly pledging 
their loyalty to Henry III, the Gascons had chosen what they must have known would be a 
dangerous path but one which also promised tremendous economic success. The English 
needed what they had to sell; France did not. And, with the closure of the port of La 
Rochelle, the English had nowhere else to turn if they wanted French wine and, clearly, 
they did. Consciously or not, both sides now recognized their interdependence and each 
was determined to profit from it.
Of course, this strengthened relationship ran a lot deeper than the wine trade which, 
early in the thirteenth century, was merely a trickle between the two countries. At the time 
of the loss of La Rochelle to the French, Gascony's immediate concern was increased 
protection from the incursions of the Capetian kings while England's focus was that it was 
down to just one base on French soil from which to launch any efforts to recover its former
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domains. But anyone with an ounce of economic sense on both sides could also see that 
there were fortunes to be made from exporting Gascony's primary product to England.
Henry Ill's formal recognition of the significance of the stronger bonds between 
England and Gascony did not occur until 1235 when he granted the citizens of Bordeaux 
the right to elect -- rather than have him appoint — their own mayor, a privilege extended to 
no other English possession in France and granted to the City of London only as recently 
as 1191. He did so because he was keenly aware that: "After 1224, only Gascony 
remained of the lands of Henry Ill's ancestors had once held in France. The effect of this 
was to reverse the territorial balance of the twelfth century."19
Things got no better for Henry throughout the remainder of his reign. The military 
expeditions he led against France in 1230 and 1242 failed to dislodge the French and 
eventually, pressured by his barons, he signed the Treaty of Paris in 1259 with Louis IX, 
also known as St. Louis (1226-1270). By this agreement, Henry surrendered England's 
claims to all it former lands in France except Gascony and to retain Gascony he had to 
further pledge that it was, ultimately, a feudal fiefdom of the French monarchy for which 
he and future English kings would have to pay homage. This agreement was a bitter pill 
for England to swallow but was, in large measure, only a recognition of the military and 
political status quo . Moreover, it bought England a thirty-year period of relative peace in 
its never-ending dispute about sovereignty over territories in France. These thirty years 
also bought Gascony an unparalleled period of calm in which to develop its wine 
production and exporting capacity.20 While the treaty bought some time for all the parties 
involved, the long-term ramifications of the accord were quite detrimental. The treaty was 
harmful because it further complicated the feudal issue, making the lord-vassal relationship 
harder to interpret as time went on. As Edouard Perroy mentioned, "It has been rightly 
said that the Treaty of Paris, which replaced the two sovereigns in a most delicate feudal 
position, was at the very root of the Hundred Years War. Its application, which
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immediately raised overwhelming difficulties, provoked ceaseless conflicts for the next 
seventy years."21
Henry III had been in trouble at home since 1233 over his domestic policies and, by 
the time of the Treaty of Paris, real power had devolved, once again, to the barons. Civil 
war broke out in England in 1264 and, while the king eventually prevailed in 1267, he died 
only five years later without having made any progress in retrieving his lost lands in 
France. Certainly, like other English kings, he would not have let the treaty stand in his 
way if there had been any realistic hope of regaining French territory through military 
intervention. Thus, at the end of Henry's reign, Gascony remained England's last bastion 
on the continent.22
Henry's successor, Edward I (1272-1307) is arguably the English king who most 
involved himself in the affairs of Gascony. He learned of his father's death in Sicily as he 
was returning from yet another crusade in the Holy Land and, consistent with his 
obligations under the Treaty of Paris, went first to the French capital to pay homage to the 
new king, Philip III who was also known as Philip the Bold (1270-1285). Edward's 
statement acknowledging his status as a vassal of Philip — then limited to the province of 
Gascony — was carefully crafted to meet the letter if not the spirit of the law. This evasion 
did not escape Philip's attention nor did Edward's next move which was to depart Paris not 
for London but Bordeaux. By commencing his reign in the Gascon capital, Edward was 
signaling his determination to retain his foothold on French soil.23
Of the six English kings who were also Dukes of Gascony, none was better known 
or liked by the Gascons than Edward I. He remained in Bordeaux from 1272 to 1274. He 
was the darling of his Gascon subjects, particularly the Bordelais, because he was the 
closest thing to a resident duke they had had since the English takeover and because he paid 
so much attention to their economic and military security. He promoted the burgeoning
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commerce between the two main parts of his kingdom with wine being shipped north from 
Bordeaux and wool, cloth, leather and corn coming south from England. Moreover, well 
aware of the many ambiguities left by the Treaty of Paris regarding the borders of 
Gascony, he paid considerable attention to the fortification of his duchy.24
When Edward returned to London in the fall of 1274, he plunged into a series of 
governmental reforms and renewed the crown's efforts to subdue the Welsh and the Scots. 
In these military expeditions he utilized large numbers of Gascon soldiers who turned out 
to be good fighters and especially skillful in the use of the crossbow. Edward's campaigns 
against Wales began in 1276 and were fairly successfully concluded by 1284; his wars 
against Scotland, however, continued throughout his reign and this king remains best 
known to history as "the Hammer of the Scots."25
Despite these ongoing struggles at home, Edward I again underscored the 
importance he attached to Gascony by returning there for a three-year period of personal 
rule from 1286 to 1289. He was the last Plantagenet king to hold court in Bordeaux and 
his extended presence further cemented the ties between England and Gascony. It was a 
bond, however, always being challenged by the French crown. Despite Edward's initial 
pledge of fealty to Philip III, the French monarchy was increasingly convinced that the 
English king was not living up to his interpretation of the Treaty of Paris. In retaliation, 
Philip's successor, Philip IV — also known as Philip the Fair (1285-1314) — periodically 
applied pressure to the borders of Gascony and challenged English and Gascon commercial 
shipping.26
Getting no satisfaction from Edward, Philip declared the Duchy of Gascony forfeit 
in 1293 and demanded at least a ceremonial surrender of the main Gascon fortresses. 
Edward acquiesced but when it became apparent that the French would take advantage of 
this token gesture and permanently occupy the forts, England declared war in 1294. The 
conflict continued until 1303 and involved a series of English campaigns in Gascony 
punctuated by intervals of truce since neither side thought they could afford the costs
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involved in continuous fighting. In addition, Edward was once again preoccupied with his 
battles for control of Scotland. By the end of his reign, however, Edward's grasp on 
Gascony was essentially as firm as it had been when he began.27
Clearly, Edward I ruled over Gascony with a far lighter hand than he imposed on 
Scotland and Wales. Scotland and Wales constituted a severe drain on the English 
economy and the king's purse, while Gascony contributed more every year to both. Royal 
income from the wine trade alone, worth only about £300 per year in the 1240s had grown 
to £6,000 by 1300. By the end of Edward's reign it was easily double that amount.28
One might reasonably conclude from this evidence that the relations between 
Edward I and his Gascon subjects were entirely cordial. In fact, the king and his resident 
English nobles found the Gascons nearly as stiff-necked, shrewd and self-absorbed as the 
French had always insisted. Edward was certainly their greatest champion and the 
monarch who knew their character best, but he described them as a "very captious and 
unreliable people" and he made it a practice to record all the promises he got from the 
Gascons in writing 29 English merchants in the wine trade with Gascony, as will be 
described in more detail below, found their counterparts from Bordeaux to be very sharp 
customers. In summary, the relationship between England and Gascony flourished during 
the reign of Edward I in part because of his personal attention but also because they shared, 
if not a deep affection, a strong set of mutual interests.
Edward II (1307-1327) is the last King of England and Duke of Gascony whose 
reign was completed before the war began and his performance in both roles is generally 
agreed to have been a disaster. The strength of character so evident in Edward I did not 
show up in his son. Sir Jean Froissart, the foremost chronicler of the period, concurred 
with these sentiments as he compared the royal father and son. He noted that:
we must remark a common opinion of the English,. . . that between two valiant
kings of England there is always one weak in mind and body;. . . for true it is that
61
his grandfather, called the good king Edward the First was brave, wise, very 
enterprising, and fortunate in war. . . When he died, his son by his first marriage 
succeeded to the crown, but not to the understanding or prowess of his father, for 
he governed his kingdom very unwisely, through the evil counsels of others, . . ,30
The war with Scotland was in full flood when Edward II succeeded his father and 
England was experiencing military setbacks in Ireland, Wales and Gascony as well. The 
English barons, frustrated by years of high taxation and demands for reforms left 
unsatisfied by Edward I, were determined to work their will on his son. In 1308, when 
Edward II formally ascended the throne, he was forced by the barons to accept a coronation 
oath which more explicitly obligated him to obey English law and custom.31 Three years 
later, they imposed stiffer terms upon his freedom to rule with a set of ordinances 
supplementing Magna Carta. In 1312, the barons seized Edward II's great personal friend 
and court favorite, a handsome young Gascon named Piers Gaveston, and beheaded him. 
From that point forward, the king was at war with his nobles.32
Edward II was no luckier in his foreign affairs. In 1308, he had begun his reign by 
pledging fealty to Philip IV and by marrying Isabelle of France, the sister of the nobleman 
who was to be the last Capetian King of France, Charles IV (1322-1328). Isabelle bore 
Edward, the son who was to become Edward III (1327-1377), but it was soon apparent 
that the marriage would not be a success nor would England's relations with France 
become improved by their union. France continued to gnaw away on the borders of 
Gascony and, unlike his father, there is scant evidence of Edward having paid much 
attention to this threat, much less of having paid a royal visit to assert his determination to 
hold this duchy for England.33
To be fair, Edward II was swamped by issues on the home front: one, to maintain 
his authority as the monarch against an increasingly restive and divided nobility; and two, 
to win the war his father had left unfinished against Scotland. In pursuit of the latter goal, 
Edward mounted a huge campaign against the north in 1314, committing an army of about
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25,000 against a Scottish force of about 10,000 under the command of Robert the Bruce. 
To the great surprise of all involved the Scots won in a prolonged, pitched battle near a 
stream called Bannock Burn. Winston Churchill had called it the greatest "slaughter of 
English chivalry (that) ever took place on a single day" and concluded that the Scottish "feat 
in virtually destroying an army of cavalry and archers mainly by the agency of spearmen 
must nevertheless be deemed a prodigy of war. "34
This huge defeat, followed by a succession of bad harvests, livestock diseases, and 
increasing taxation in the period 1315 to 1321 led to a civil war between Edward's royalist 
party and his opponents in the nobility led by the Earl of Lancaster. Edward prevailed at 
the Battle of Boroughbridge in 1322 and beheaded Lancaster but substantial opposition to 
the king's rule and way of life persisted throughout many parts of England. This threat 
forced Edward to keep his attention fixed at home and, seeing his chance, Charles IV 
seized Gascony in 1324.35
This loss marked England's lowest ebb, in terms of controlling territories abroad, 
since before the time of William the Conqueror. Not surprisingly, it also made Edward II 
one of England's most despised kings. Reduced to helplessness and harassed on every 
side by the barons, he surrendered the reins of government to his wife Isabelle who 
arranged his deposition from the throne in 1326 and probably his murder in 1327. 
Although the crowning of their son, Edward III, preserved the principle of hereditary 
success, the deposition of Edward II by his queen and barons had shaken the English 
monarchy to its roots because "the inviolability of anointed kingship had been breached."36
So what are we to make of this strange but serviceable relationship between 
England and Gascony in the nearly 175 years between Henry II and Edward II? At least 
until the catastrophe of the latter king's reign, it is a story of an increasing economic and 
political bond, a marriage of convenience that catered to the interests of both sides. In this
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sense, the territorial and increasingly economic alliance between England and Gascony is 
unusual in feudal times when master and servant relationships, not partnerships, were the 
norm between monarchs and the lords of duchies.
England adopted and perpetuated this special arrangement, in part, because it was 
all it could afford but also because that was all the independence-minded Gascons would 
allow. To a surprising degree, England’s monarchs recognized and respected the will of 
the Gascons to govern and protect themselves. While they could have introduced large 
numbers of civil servants and soldiers as they had in some of their other French 
possessions, in Gascony they opted for a minimalist approach. No Englishman, for 
example, was ever appointed to the See of Bordeaux and few English nobles received 
Gascon land grants from the king.37
As we have already seen, royal visits to the duchy were few and far between. 
Although the English crown ensured that personal representatives of the king made 
frequent visits to perform specific duties or conduct investigations, the year-to-year 
administration of the duchy was carried out by the Seneschal of Aquitaine, in effect a royal 
governor, who was a member of the English nobility appointed by the king to oversee the 
duchy's civil and military affairs. The Seneschal was assisted by a council composed of 
local barons and resident members of the English nobility including one permanent and 
powerful member known as the Constable of Bordeaux. This office was always held by 
an English civil servant, typically a clergyman, whose job it was to supervise the financial 
affairs of the duchy. Answerable directly to the king's Exchequer in Westminster, he was 
a key figure in the Gascon government.38
Apparently the king's appointment of this civil servant was important enough that 
its announcement was made a point of public record. In examining the Calendar of Patent 
Rolls it was made evident that the assignment of the Constable of Bordeaux held enough 
significance that all of the king's subjects should be made aware of the selection. An 
example of the appointment as it was written in the Patent Rolls went like this: "Protection,
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with clause volumus, for one year for Master John de Weston, constable of Bordeaux, 
going to Gascony on the king's service." Albeit a rather brief and seemingly minor 
announcement, the frequent installation of this political figure provided the king an 
opportunity to return the favors of his loyal friends and nobles and to demonstrate 
Gascony's importance for the realm.39
Nearly all of these leaders and civil servants lived in the capital city of Bordeaux. 
Within its fortified walls stood the Cathedral of St. Andre, the castle of the Ombriere, a 
mint, factories, docks and warehouses supporting the duchy's trading activities. 
Bordeaux's population of about 30,000 — mostly made up of merchants, shopkeepers and 
laborers — made it far larger than most English cities and was only about 10,000 fewer than 
London in the same period.40
Outside the capital city, the duchy was divided into three administrative districts 
where local governments was left largely in the hands of native sub-seneschals, prevots, 
baillis and domestic tax collectors. The English did not attempt to extend their civil 
administration far beyond Bordeaux because they had learned from experience that some of 
the local barons and peasantry were essentially ungovernable unless physically subdued. 
Their disdain for authority, an extreme part of the general Gascon penchant for 
independence, applied to both English and local officials. There were, in effect, safe and 
unsafe zones within the duchy and the English administrators had decided to leave local 
government to the locals 41
A parallel situation existed in the military arena. The English built major 
fortifications at Bordeaux, Bourg, Fronsac, Saint Emilion, Li bourne and La Reole — all in 
the vicinity of the capital — but made no attempt to spread castles throughout the duchy as 
they had done in Wales. Major bridges, fords and road junctions were protected by 
garrisons but more than three-quarters of these strong points were manned by Gascon 
rather than English troops.42 Of course, the percentage of English troops could rise 
sharply when Gascony was attacked by the French but, even then, the English made no
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attempt to defend the entire duchy. The extent of England's military involvement varied 
directly in proportion to the frequency and scope of these incursions, with London sending 
reinforcements only as required. England could afford to take this relatively detached 
posture in part because the recapture of Gascony was not France's highest priority -- at 
least not until well after the Treaty of Paris -- and because the Gascons could be trusted to 
react vigorously in their own defense. Thus, under peaceful conditions, the number of 
English soldiers in Gascony rarely exceeded a few hundred.43
What had evolved was a fairly common feudal relationship in which the English 
had learned to accept, even appreciate, the desire of the Gascons to largely govern and 
defend themselves; and in which the Gascons had learned not to ask more of the English 
than was necessary to keep out the French. While the nature and limits of this relationship 
changed under various English kings and was periodically tested by the raids of the 
Capetian monarchs, it was challenged as never before in 1324 when the forces of Charles 
IV walked into Bordeaux while Edward II was distracted by the collapse of his authority at 
home. And it would go on being challenged, at least intermittently, for the next 129 years 
as England and France attacked one another in earnest.
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CHAPTER IV
THE WINE TRADE: THE VITAL ECONOMIC LINK 
BETWEEN GASCONY AND ENGLAND
Old habits die hard. As was previously noted, Great Britain today is still the 
world's largest importer of wines from Bordeaux. The amount it imports is more than 
twice as much the United States takes despite that it has about one-fifth the U.S. 
population.1 This thirst for Bordeaux is accounted for in part by the fact that, unlike the 
U.S., the United Kingdom has no native wine industry. It is also true that the U.S. — 
more a nation of immigrants than the U.K. -- imports more wines from the many nations 
from which its people came, in addition to several New World sources like Chile, 
Argentina and Australia.
So, what accounts for England's continued devotion to the wines of Bordeaux? 
Good taste is one explanation. Bordeaux not only produces more wine than any fine wine- 
producing region of France, it also produces a higher percentage of its wines that are fine.2 
Not to partake from such a favored source would be nonsensical for the British who enjoy 
a reputation for having the most cultivated, certainly the most studious, approach to wine 
among all the nationalities — the French included.
But the answer goes deeper than that and, as we have already contended, it is to be
found in the commercial and cultural ties that have bound England to Gascony since the
thirteenth century. The links that were forged in that period have proven strong enough to
survive more than seven hundred years of political upheaval including such fundamental
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changes as the shift in Gascony's allegiance from England to France and the extraordinary 
diminution of England's power on the world's stage.
Hard evidence in support of this proposition can be found in many places, not least 
of all from taking a walk along the Quai des Chartrons, the waterside warehouse district in 
Bordeaux where the major wine shippers still have their offices. There, one can observe 
how many of the firms bear English names with Barton, Johnston and Lawton being 
perhaps the best known. Such enormously wealthy and influential "Chartronnais" families 
still control the better part of the highly lucrative Bordeaux wine trade and they are the 
functional, if not lineal, descendants of the pioneering entrepreneurs of the thirteenth 
century — both English and Gascon — who established the vineyards, built the wineries, 
constructed the warehouses and docks, financed the shipping, paid the taxes, and 
ultimately made the fortunes that made Bordeaux — the product, the city, and the region — 
world famous.
To understand why these original investors in the Bordeaux wine trade were able to 
establish business dynasties and national tastes that have survived to the present day, it is 
important first to grasp why Gascony is such an ideal site for winemaking; and how, once 
it came to England’s full attention, an economic partnership grew up that quickly became so 
valuable that neither side could afford to let it go.
As was pointed out in Chapter III, Gascony is quite fortunately situated both from 
the point of view of winemaking and shipping. Its geography is ideal in terms of latitude, 
i.e., far enough south to ensure good grape ripening in most years but far enough north to 
guarantee that sufficient fruit acids will remain in the grapes to balance the sugars made by 
the sun. Its climate is also nearly perfect because of the presence of so many rivers and the 
proximity of the Atlantic Ocean; such bodies of water provide a moderating effect on the 
extremes that occasionally upset Gascony's typically mild weather. The region's
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topography and geology also contribute to Bordeaux's success as a wine production area 
with easily cultivated, flat to gently rolling terrain and largely rocky subsoils that offer good 
water drainage and rich mineral reserves for the vines.3
This combination of favorable environmental factors the French call terroir. 
Literally translated, this word just means 'earth' but from a vintner's point of view it 
includes all of those conditions — atmospheric, geographic, geologic and even cultural — 
which influence a vine to produce wines with a recognizable, individual character reflecting 
that place on the earth and no other.4 Cabernet sauvignon, for example, is a species of red 
wine grape that is cultivated widely in both the Old World and the New. Yet the wines 
made from these plants taste differently — despite highly similar vineyard and winery 
techniques — when they come from Bordeaux, Italy, Chile, Australia and various locations 
in the U.S. The differences are less a matter of quality than of character, and character is 
primarily determined by the environment — the unique combination of air, earth and water 
or terroir — in which the grapes grow.
The terroir available to the eleventh century vintners of southern England and 
northern France for making the wines that were in such demand by the Norman invaders of 
England was markedly inferior to that of Gascony. So far as modern research can tell, 
those wines were white, weak and acidic — chiefly because they came from vineyards that 
were located in the northern extremity of those latitudes in which wine grapes can be 
grown. Modem recognition of this fact of nature explains why there are no significant, 
commercial vineyards today in the English shires and French departments bordering the 
English Channel. Even as far south as the Ile-de-France region around Paris where, in 
medieval times vineyards were not only widespread but the chief source of wines for the 
Capetian kings, the growing conditions are now considered far too cold and damp for 
decent winemaking.5
What made such environmentally-challenged winemaking feasible and even 
profitable in the days of William the Conqueror was that the source of supply had to be
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close at hand in an era when transport was a major problem and when, in the absence of 
airtight containers, wine spoiled in short periods of time. Despite these realities, it is 
evident that at least the wealthiest French and English wine consumers of the high Middle 
Ages were aware that the growing conditions were not ideal and that better wines could be 
made in more southern locales. Moreover, these wealthy patrons were willing to pay a 
premium price for wines from as far away as Mediterranean France, Italy and even Greece 
if they could be delivered unspoiled.6
The great majority of English wine consumers, however, had to make do with what 
they extracted from native vineyards or, far more frequently, imported from the vineyards 
located just across the Channel in northern France. Things improved somewhat for 
English wine drinkers when the Plantagenet family took over the English monarchy. 
Hailing from Anjou, the Plantagenets were fond of the wines of the Loire River Valley 
which certainly were more abundant and palatable than those made along the Marne and the 
Seine. Moreover, while the Plantagenet ports of Nantes and La Rochelle were further from 
London than Rouen, the wines coming from western France were still reasonably fresh by 
the time they reached Southampton or other English ports. Thus, from roughly 1154, 
when Henry II made Anjou an English dependency, to 1203 when King John lost it, 
England's main source of wine was the Loire Valley.
It was not until 1224 in the reign of Henry III when the port of La Rochelle was 
also lost to the French that the wines of the Gironde River system became so vital to British 
wine importers. The English had traded in Bordeaux previously, especially after King 
John eliminated the tax on Gascon wines in 1203, but not to any great extent because the 
taste for Loire wines was well established and the shipping time from Bordeaux to London 
was a bit longer than from La Rochelle. Once the latter port was closed, however, the 
English merchants knew that, short of the Mediterranean, they had no place else to go and 
they descended on the port of Bordeaux in a rush. Looking forward from 1066 to 1224, it 
is evident that for reasons of policy as well as of pleasure, England's primary source of
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wine had been moving steadily southward.7 Looking backward from today to 1224, it is 
obvious that in Bordeaux it had found its true home.
The sudden, great demand for Gascon wine that occurred in the second quarter of
the thirteenth century forced the region to make fundamental changes in its still
agriculturally-based economy. Contrary to our modern-day picture of Bordeaux as a great
commercial center completely surrounded by vineyards, the fact is that in this period, wine-
production capacity in the capital area was still fairly sparse. For most of the twelfth
century, the majority of Gascon wines were made inland in what was known as the Haut
Pays or "High Country" district east of Bordeaux. They were then moved downstream to
the capital, often blended with other wines and then either consumed locally or shipped out
to customers in England, the Low Countries or Scandinavia. As Hugh Johnson has
described the situation:
The quantity of wine England bought, and the speed with which Bordeaux 
was suddenly ready to supply it, suggests that huge vineyards had already 
been planted in the (capital) region in readiness. In fact, it was not so.
Bordeaux had started out as an "emporium" and, when her star rose in the 
thirteenth century, was again more of a port than a producer. The area immediately 
around the city, especially the district of Graves to the south, was the principal 
vineyard of Bordeaux. There were also vineyards along the steep banks of the 
Garonne opposite the port (today the Premieres Cotes), in Entre-Deux-Mers, 
between the Garonne and the Dordogne, and others along the estuary at Blaye. The 
M&ioc had hardly any vines. The grand total was not very impressive.8
The reference to the lack of wines from the Medoc is particularly interesting, given 
its present day role as the supreme source of Bordeaux wines. This district, which lies 
along the left bank of the Gironde estuary, was a swamp in the days of Henry III and its 
was not until the mid-seventeenth century that its marshes were drained by Dutch engineers 
and the great estates so prized at present, for example Chateaux Lafite, Mouton and 
Margaux, began to make their appearance. To make up for this dearth of vineyards in the 
immediate vicinity of Bordeaux, the Gascon vintners initially went along the rivers
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throughout the duchy and contracted for whatever was available. As Hugh Johnson has 
reported:
It was the Aquitaine basin as a whole, reaching right up to the High Country, 
that supplied the bulk of England's needs. Most Gascon wine came 
down the Garonne from Gaillac, Moissac and Agen and, closer to home, 
St.-Macaire, Langon and Barsac; or down the Dordogne from Bergerac and, 
although less important at first, St. Emilion. Cahors, high up the river Lot, 
was another provider of what were called High Country wines to distinguish 
them from the produce of Bordeaux itself. In all probability they were often 
better, stronger wine than most of what Bordeaux made locally, and the 
Bordelais were correspondingly jealous of them and anxious to sell their 
own production first.9
To do this, the merchants of Bordeaux sponsored a huge expansion of vineyards in 
the district close to the capital and, when they came into commercial production, adopted 
restrictive trade practices to discourage English access to the Haut Pays wines. The first 
major issue was space. Other agricultural products were set aside to make way for vines. 
The once dominant grain fields of Gascony were replaced by vineyards that poured into the 
Graves district south of the city, across the river into the Entre-Deux-Mers and up the river 
valleys leading eastward from Bordeaux.10 
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Another requirement was the expansion of the labor force to work the new
vineyards. In other wine-producing areas of France where monasteries were the
predominant source for labor, monks tilled the soil out of religious obligation. But
Bordeaux had no broadly established relationship between the Church and the wine making
industry and laymen had to be recruited from other occupations to do this work. Wineries
as well as blending, storage and shipping facilities also had to be expanded on an
unprecedented scale in order to get the product to market before it spoiled.12
A major issue for the Gascon vintners was to come up with a commercially feasible
product that would appeal to their new English customers. These buyers, the Bordeaux
merchants knew, were used to the lighter white wines of the Seine, Marne and Loire
valleys but were also showing interest in the stronger, southern wines from their Haut Pays
vineyards. They decided to bridge this apparent contradiction by coming up with a new
wine for the English market that would also meet their requirements for easy mass
production from grape varieties already well adapted to the region's terroir. 13 This goal
fostered a great deal of experimentation which eventually resulted in a new light wine made
from a mixture of red and white grapes that were pressed and fermented together.14 This
blend, was known by a variety of names including vinum clarum, bin clar, vin gris and,
from Old French, clairet, but its primary characteristic was that it was "clear, light and
bright enough to be distinguished from other red wines."15 The English, apparently were
frantic for it from the outset and eventually adopted the generic word for it they still use
today to describe all Bordeaux reds: "claret". Hugh Johnson provides some idea of what
this original claret must have been like:
Claret was made as . . . what the French call a 'vin d'un n u it ' — one that spends a 
single night in the vat. The grapes were trodden in the usual way, and the wine 
fermented in the vat on the skins -- many of which in any case would have been 
white — but for no longer than 24 hours. Then the pale liquid was run off into 
barrels to ferment as clear juice . . .  It is tempting to compare claret, pale, light, 
highly swallowable, soft enough but with a refreshing 'cut', to modem Beaujolais 
Nouveau. This must have been the general effect.16
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Under no circumstances should one assume that this wine tasted anything like the 
sophisticated, complex and age-worthy red wines of the Medoc and other distinguished 
Bordeaux districts that we know today. It was made from different grapes according to far 
less advanced methods and intended for consumption within months of its manufacture. 
The quality of medieval wine generally was so poor by contemporary standards that even 
the best products of the Middle Ages would not stand comparison with today's most 
ordinary wines.17 And there is no reason to believe that we would find this new creation 
of the Gascon vintners especially appealing. The important point, however, for the 
purposes of this study is the fact that in the early to mid-thirteenth century for Gascony's 
new English customers this wine was an immediate hit.
Thus equipped with a stunning new product and a strong base of wines from the 
Haut Pays, the wine merchants of Gascony began to ship their wines in earnest and as 
Robert-Henri Bautier has asserted: "Wine, more than anything else, contributed to forging 
the permanent economic and political links between England and the possessions in the 
Guienne."18 And the Gascons did not limit their exporting activities just to England. They 
expanded their market to include Scotland, Ireland, Flanders and the Baltic states. 
Moreover, they challenged the vintners of Burgundy and Germany who already had 
flourishing markets in these countries. For example, in less than fifty years following the 
fall of La Rochelle, Gascon exporters had largely taken over the wine trade the Germans 
had previously established with England and the Low Countries. Their shipping distance 
was longer but their argument was that they could deliver better wines at lower prices; the 
marked change in the market in favor of the wines of Gascony indicates that their 
customers agreed.19
The shipment of these wines from Bordeaux was a logistic operation of vast scope 
and complexity because it was concentrated into two relatively brief seasons of the year.
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The first sailing occurred as soon as the new wine was made in the autumn, typically in 
October or early November; and then there was another following the Candlemas 
celebration in February that took more mature and therefore less valuable products often 
called "reek" wines.20 This seasonal rhythm was determined by a number of factors. The 
first was that the vine's annual cycle demands grape harvesting in the fall, typically in
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September, occasionally in October. A second factor was the urgent interest of the
shippers in getting the wines back to market in England before the approaching winter
made navigation more hazardous; in this way the wines could be sold in the lucrative
Christmas season. A third factor was that medieval wines had trouble surviving more than
a year in barrel and therefore needed to be delivered to the customer as soon as possible.22
The combined effect of these compelling influences was that literally hundreds of sailing
ships showed up virtually on the same day in the port of Bordeaux, all wanting the same
cargo and all wanting to head back for England or wherever almost immediately. As Hugh
Johnson has described it:
It is hard to exaggerate how important timing was. The wine Bordeaux sold, 
although certainly a degree fruitier, possibly a degree stronger, and probably a more 
pleasant and satisfying drink than the northern whites it began to supersede, was no 
less perishable. It was expected to turn sour within a year at most and tasted best 
within a few months of the vintage. Year old wine was halved in price as soon as 
the ships with the new vintage dropped anchor. In many cases its was simply 
thrown away.23
Initially, the fleet that carried the wines abroad from Bordeaux was almost entirely 
composed of Gascon ships. As the Anglo-Gascon wine trade was in its youth, the 
Bordelais had little trouble meeting demand and taking on the dual role of vintner and 
shipper. This trend continued well into the reign of Edward III (1327-1377) and is shown 
best in the English kings' Patent Rolls. In this regard the Rolls are particularly helpful in 
that not only do they report all of he king's major public decisions but they even document 
his most basic requests — especially those for wine. As this one entry from one Patent Roll 
elucidates:
Whereas the king has charged Peter del Vyne, master of a ship called La Cogge o f  
St. Martin of Bayonne, laden with wines purchased for the king, now lying in the 
port of Plymouth, to bring the same with all speed to Sandwich, he has taken the 
ship and wines into his protection and the master and the mariners with the ship are 
to have free passage in any port or place in coming thither; directed to admirals, 
sheriffs, mayors, and others.
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This entry was just one of hundreds like it in the Patent Rolls of King Edward III. The 
important thing to note, though, was the trend for Kings Edward I, II, and III to be 
requesting and providing protection for wines coming from Gascon shippers like Peter del 
Vyne from Bayonne.24
Over time, however, the amount of wine being exported went way beyond the 
capacity of these home-based shipping firms and seafarers from other countries, chiefly 
English, got involved. At first, it was just in those years of a particularly successful 
harvest the Bordeaux vintners called upon other merchant mariners, including those from 
the Low Countries, Italy, Germany and Spain. However, as the demand increased for 
Bordeaux wine, Gascon merchants simply could not keep up and it was not long before 
English maritime companies were asked to help with the flurry of business occasioned by 
each new harvest. Once the English merchants broke into the business of shipping wine, 
they saw the potential for great wealth and a strong competition began between the shippers 
of England and Bordeaux.25
The mass sailing that occurred each fall was a tremendous maritime effort. While 
not on the scale of the D-Day invasion of France in June 1944, for its day it was an 
incredible armada of sailing vessels that required an enormous surge of seasonal manpower 
in the ports of England and Gascony. In the Middle Ages, though, this kind of operation 
required a great deal of organization on a scale that could only be handled by a monarch. 
The annual fleet of cargo vessels sailing from south-western France needed the plentiful 
resources of the English crown particularly in terms of protection from piracy and raids 
from enemy vessels as the war loomed on the horizon. The English kings' involvement 
meant that orders were given thus making them a matter of public record. The following 
excerpt from the Patent Rolls of Edward III shows to what degree the English king went 
to, to ensure that year's vintage made it to England:
Protection until Whitsunday for a ship of John Bamme and Simon Thoky of Lynn, 
merchants, called La Rose o f Lynn, which they are sending to Gascony for wines 
and other merchandise, with the fleet of ships going there under the license lately
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granted by the king at the prayer of merchants and masters and mariners of ships 
complaining of the loss caused by the arrest of their ships for his service and on 
condition that all ships going in the fleet be well found in men and armor to resist 
attacks by enemies, and for the master, mariners, men and servants of the same.26
Many hands not normally involved in the wine trade were hired for this great annual event.
As the trade grew the importers and exporters involved sought ways to cut their costs and
not a few began to acquire their own ships instead of paying professional mariners to
transport their cargoes.27 This explains why wine supply firms are to this day often
referred to as "shippers" — even if they have no involvement in the maritime movement of
their products.
As the vineyards so hastily planted around Bordeaux to meet England's new 
demand came into maturity, the merchants of the Gascon capital became less dependent on 
the wines of the Haut Pays and took measures to exclude them from the market and, in 
particular, the most profitable autumn shipment. This discrimination against the wines of 
eastern Gascony began as early as 1203 when King John, in an attempt to recognize 
Gascon importance and as an incentive to increase production, exempted the merchants of 
Bordeaux from paying the Grand Coutume customs duties. The latter saw to it that the 
exemption applied only to them, thus ensuring that every barrel of High Country wine cost 
more in London than one from the vineyards immediately around Bordeaux.28
Bordeaux got away with this because the river system that threads through most of 
Gascony and on which all the vineyards in the duchy depended to move their products, 
flows into the Gironde estuary which is dominated by the port of Bordeaux. 
Consequently, all river traffic carrying wine to England, even from Gascony's most 
insignificant upstream vineyards had to pass under the guns of the capital and deal with its 
tax collectors. To give some idea of the influence this monopoly had over Gascon growers 
and merchants, the case of the tiny village of Castelsagrat, situated along a barely navigable
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tributary of the Garonne over 100 miles from Bordeaux is apt. English records show that 
its vintners did not dare plant any vines within Castelsagrat's walls without first petitioning 
the English king for a discount on the customs they would have to face in Bordeaux.29
The discriminatory methods employed by the Bordeaux merchants and their 
consorting government officials were indeed selfish but there were compelling forces that 
drove them to such lengths. Because medieval wines could turn sour so rapidly, they had 
to be sold, shipped and consumed as speedily as possible. To give a concrete example of 
how quickly wine declined in value, it is useful to look at some of the data available for the 
vintage year 1342 when the Hundred Years War was already five years old. In that year, 
vin nouveau sold at dockside in Bordeaux at an average prices of 21 livres per tonneau ; 
the same wine at six to eight months of age, a vin ancien, sold for only 12 livres and at a 
year old the same wine was a complete loss. To protect themselves from price reductions 
of this sort, Bordeaux merchants utilized many different methods, both fair and unfair, to 
ensure that their wines were sold promptly.30
Throughout the thirteenth century, the output of the Haut Pays vineyards still 
exceeded that of the Bordeaux district and therefore was Bordeaux's biggest competitor for 
shipping facilities and cargo space aboard the wine freighters. So, to further discourage 
this competition, the Gascon capital exacted a tax in addition to the Grand Coutume already 
paid by the Haut Pays producers. Called the Petit Coutume, this tax applied to all wines 
sold retail within its administrative district, one of the three into which Gascony was 
divided. Needless to say, this duty did not apply to the Bordeaux district vintners but was 
required of all vintners outside this area.31
Often the capital district was the only one into which the Haut Pays and other 
Gascon vintners could afford to sell their wines because the Bordelais took additional 
measures to ensure that their products were the first on the market each year and guaranteed 
a place on the great fall sailing. Only when the stocks of Bordeaux wines were insufficient 
to meet the needs of their best customers were wines from outside the Bordeaux district
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allowed access to the port. Typically, these other Gascon wines were delayed for export 
until well into the fall. This meant that the wines and merchants of the Haut Pays were left 
'stewing* on the docks of the capital through October while the wines of the Bordeaux 
district were already on the high seas or being consumed in England.32
Nicholas Faith, in his revealing book about the history of the wine trade in 
Bordeaux called The Winemasters. has described this exclusionary practice in the following 
way:
The citizens of Bordeaux cleverly used the normal pattern of wine-buying by the 
English for monopoly purposes. English ships would descend in their thousands 
in October in time to buy the latest vintage and depart six weeks later to reach 
England before Christmas. To use this seasonal rhythm to the best advantage they 
obtained the rights to forbid the sale of wine from outside the Senechaussee (the 
capital district) before 11 November, St. Martin's Day. Indeed wines from outside 
simply could not be brought into the city from the Haut Pays as from 8 September, 
well before the vintage, until either St. Martin's Day or, if the Bordelais preferred, 
Christmas.33
In addition, as Hugh Johnson has found, these discriminatory methods were not 
only condoned and enforced by the Gascon government in Bordeaux against the interests 
of the rest of the duchy's vintners, they were formally enshrined in law. "Gradually, 
during the course of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, the city arranged for itself a 
code of unfair practices guaranteeing its precedence over its neighbors and rivals -- a 
system known as the 'police des vins'. It was tolerated by the kings of England because it 
simplified their tax collecting. When Bordeaux eventually became French again, it was 
tolerated to prevent seditious backsliding by those who thought they had had a better deal 
under the English."34
Before delving further into the subject of taxation — and, make no mistake about it, 
it was revenue from the wine trade to the English crown that made Gascony, at least from 
an economic standpoint, so dear to the monarchy — it will be helpful to say something
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about the units of measure and the kinds of ships that were involved. The basic unit was 
an oak cask called a tonneau which could hold 252 U.S. gallons or 900 liters of wine. 
These wooden barrels were manufactured in Perigord, the Saintonge or the Angouleme 
regions and became a trademark for the wines of Gascony. For purposes of identification 
and subsequent taxation, the dimensions of this barrel were carefully specified and 
supervised and, in effect, patented because, initially at least, neighboring regions were not 
allowed to use casks of the same size.35
With the expansion of the wine traffic between Gascony and England until it 
became the largest single element in medieval shipping, the Gascon tonneau or, its exact 
equivalent, the English "tun” became the standard measure for determining the carrying 
capacity of a ship. These casks weighed about 2,000 pounds — today's "ton" — and 
required about 100 cubic feet of space in a ship's hold or a merchant's warehouse. These 
units of measure, developed for the wine trade, were the basis for determining taxes and 
have persisted at least in the English-speaking nations as the standards for shipping and 
storage of bulk goods to this day.36
Such huge barrels were hard to maneuver, however, and the merchants of 
Bordeaux soon devised a new container of exactly one-fourth the size holding 225 liters. 
This barrique Bordelaise remains the most widely used oak container for aging and 
shipping wines even at the end of the twentieth century and hold enough to fill 25 cases of 
wine of 12 bottles per case. When first employed the barrique, like the tonneau, was 
unique and was used to distinguish Bordeaux wines from those of any other source, 
including other wines from Gascony.37
The volume of wine that needed to be transported and the containers in which it was 
carried had a tremendous influence on the design and number of ships built in the Middle 
Ages. Medieval shipping varied greatly in size and shape until around the twelfth century. 
Before then, the ships used predominantly to transport wine were slim, usually open 
longboats, not unlike the Viking ships in style; in the twelfth century, however, active
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ports like La Rochelle and others along the Flemish coast began using a new kind of craft 
called the 'cog'. This was a broadly built ship with a capacity of about 1,000 tuns which 
was far greater than that of the longboat because of its innovative hull. The cog was 
specifically designed for carry- ing bulky freight and its roundish prow and stem not only 
gave it a greater girth but also much improved maneuverability. These factors made it a 
more efficient way of transporting wine and, as such, was quickly adopted by other ports. 
In addition, be- cause of its quick helm and ability to carry large amounts of men and arms, 
the cog was favored by the English monarchy because it could also be used as a warship.38
The complexities and costs involved in shipping wine from Gascony to England
were great despite the interest both parties shared in seeing this trade flourish.
Considerable capital had to be advanced to pay not only for the ships that moved the freight
but also for the handling and storage of the great oak casks at either end of the trip.
Another major expense was taxation, for every port at which a wine freighter called wanted
its slice of this highly profitable commerce. To add to the complexity of these voyages, the
taxes varied considerably over time and by whether the shipper was a Gascon, an
Englishman or some other nationality. Before wandering into this maze of medieval
regulations, for which some evidence is still lacking, it may be best to start with some
general statements about the theoretical basis for the taxation of wine as it stood at the
outset of international trade in this commodity. As Unwin has pointed out:
The earliest medieval taxes on wine, such as the modiato of Rouen dating from 
1055, and the later recta prisa of England, were essentially 'instruments for supply 
of the sovereign's table' but such taxes gradually emerged as a more general 
method of increasing the income of the Exchequer through the commutation of a 
seizure of wine into a money payment for the right to import wine. By the middle 
of the twelfth century, a general wine custom seems to have been imposed on wines 
imported into English ports. From the thirteenth century this varied in amount from 
two pence to six pence a tun.39
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The English monarchs not only exacted taxes on wine imports, they reserved the
right to take a part of the cargo for their own use at what amounted to confiscatory prices.
Continuing with Unwin on this point:
Of more importance was the 'prisage' or wine ’prise', which by the end of the 
thirteenth century had developed in England into a formal right, known as the recta 
prisa . This required from each ship the 'seizure by the crown of two tuns or over, 
on the payment of 20 shillings a tun to the owners'. One tun was to be taken from 
behind the mast, where the better wine was stored, and the other tun from the front 
of the mast. This enabled the king to buy the best quality wine at less than the 
market price, although, if the cargo was between 10 and 20 tuns only one tun 
would be seized and, if the cargo was less than 10 tuns no wine would be taken.40
Thus the principle of the English government's right to impose taxes, confiscate 
portions of a cargo and otherwise regulate and restrict the activities of those involved in the 
wine trade was well established long before the Gascon market exploded starting in 1224. 
And, in the case of Gascony and England's other former possessions in France, the 
English monarchs were in a position to tax and regulate on both ends of the voyage since 
the ports involved were all under the control of the English crown. As we have seen, 
King John exempted Gascon merchant ships departing Bordeaux from paying the Grand 
Coutume but that didn't free them from paying other taxes when reaching English ports, 
nor did it free English ships and those from other nations from paying the Grand Coutume 
and other taxes before leaving Bordeaux.
One of the problems in sorting out who paid what is that English policy on taxation 
varied considerably over time as the monarchy altered its system of incentives or 
restrictions to favor one group or another and as its needs for revenue rose and fell in 
reaction to domestic or foreign crises. English merchants, many of them capitalized by — 
or otherwise connected to -- the nobility, were in a good position to make their aspirations 
and complaints heard by the crown and were forever seeking regulations that would favor 
their fortunes at the expense of their foreign competitors. Some of these 'aliens', the 
Gascons in particular, were quick to respond, however, that as subjects of the Duke of
84
Gascony, i.e., the King of England, they were every bit as English as their native-born 
competitors in Bristol, Southampton or London.
The English monarchy had already learned that the best way to ensure some degree 
of allegiance from its continental possessions was to provide them with ready markets in 
England and to offer them what today would be called "preferential tariffs."41 With 
Gascony its last remaining foothold on French soil and its only political basis for 
reasserting its sovereignty over lands formerly held in France, the general inclination of 
England's thirteenth century monarchs was to treat the merchants of Bordeaux as 
generously as possible. Evidence of this generosity becomes evident in the Patent Rolls as 
the king's special requests for friends and other business associates were documented for 
posterity. King Edward III made it quite clear who his friends were in the wine industry 
and what he could do for them in this excerpt that was just one of hundreds like it during 
his reign: "Protection until Christmas for Robert de Whetewe and Henry Annore
purveying victuals in England for John de Insula, mayor of the city of Bordeaux, his 
household and others dwelling with him in the garrison of the city."42 This inclination was 
reinforced in that, even with comparatively light taxation and regulation, the royal revenues 
from Gascon wine sales were growing handsomely.
To get some sense of what an early thirteenth-century Gascon merchant might 
expect on his arrival in England, it is helpful to imagine a Gascon ship on its way to 
London from Bordeaux. On coming up the Thames, the captain would have had to fly a 
flag to identify himself until the ship reached London Bridge. Once tied up at the wharf, 
such ships had to wait about thirty-six hours before being allowed to dispose of their 
cargo. This holding time was required so that the king's London sheriffs could come 
aboard and take advantage of the king's privileges. These could involve the exaction of 
taxes on the cargo or, as previously explained, to exercise the monarch's rights of 'prisage'
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of wine wanted for royal use.43 Whatever the king’s choice, though, it could not escape 
the permanent record of the Chancery. As such there's repetitive evidence of the king's 
requests for how his privilege was to be addressed. In just one case in the Patent Rolls, it 
states:
Writ of aid for John de la Pole and Henry Deorday, deputed by Richard de la Pole, 
the king's butler, to levy and collect two shillings on each cask of wine imported by 
foreign merchants, in the port of London, during pleasure. The like for the 
following: Yarmouth, Ipswich, Sandwich, Wynchelse, Chichester, Southampton, 
Devon & Cornwall, Somerset & Dorset, Bristol & Cheapstowe.44
Royal use, though, in and of itself was a complicated phrase. The term was a rather broad
stipulation that encompassed personal consumption and the use of wine for his own
armies. In addition, the monarchy did not resign itself from a little state trading of its own.
But, as one might expect, even these decisions on how the king wanted to use his stock of
wine were documented. In examining the Patent Rolls, one can find just one of a variety of
ways in which the king chose to distribute his reserves. For instance: "Grant for life to
John de Wodeford, king's chaplain, of a tun of good wine, beyond the three tuns yearly
already granted to him by letters patent, to be received by the hands of the king's butler, to
wit two tuns of good wine of vintage between Michaelmas and Christmas, and two tuns of
good wine of rack between Christmas and Easter."45
At the insistence of the English wine merchants who wanted to further curb Gascon
involvement in the wine trade, restrictions were placed on the activities of Gascon wine
merchants while they were also ashore in England. These restraints included limits on the
individuals or parties to whom they could sell their wines, a forty-day limit on the length of
their stay in England, and a requirement enforcing all foreign tradesmen to live with a
denizen host. Changes in these laws were made as early as 1280, however; the first one
being an extension of the amount of time a foreign merchant could stay in England from
forty days to three months. These kinds of changes continued and they were plainly
intended to favor, in particular, the merchants from Bordeaux.46
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The men from Bordeaux who involved themselves in the wine trade were 
businessmen of varying status. Some were ship owners who, having delivered their 
annual cargo of wine, thereafter sought loads of grain, salt, wool or other products for their 
ships. Some were wine producers who had hired a ship and then followed their vintage to 
England to promote its sale, returning as soon as possible to Gascony to prepare for the 
next year's crop. More common, however, was the Gascon wine merchant who made no 
wine of his own but represented the interests of several Bordeaux vintners. These were the 
merchants who focused their attention on getting the best price for their wares from English 
importers or on selling their wine directly at one of the many seasonal trade fairs held 
throughout the English countryside.47 Most of the merchants were only seasonal visitors 
to England because it was all they could afford. However, there were some wealthier 
Gascons who took advantage of the liberties of the City of London and established 
permanent residences in the capital. These individuals enjoyed and extremely privileged 
situation because not only could they export their wine from Bordeaux without the customs 
duties that English merchants were forced to pay, they were also exempt from paying 
English duties because of their status as ''freemen'1 of the City of London. Naturally, these 
privileges were deeply resented by English merchants who lobbied hard for changes in the 
laws. Others, however, took the more enlightened course of taking up residence in and 
around the city of Bordeaux in pursuit of similar privileges.48
As the thirteenth century drew to a close, the wine merchants of Bordeaux had 
become the most numerous, influential and wealthiest members of the English wine 
trade.49 Hugh Johnson points out that: "to be a Freeman of both London and Bordeaux 
was a license to print money — which is more or less what the grandest Gascons did, 
lending to the king in competition with the great Italian bankers."50 The favor these 
fortunate merchants enjoyed from the crown was no accident because Edward I (1272-
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1307) was on the throne during their ascendancy and of all the English monarchs of this 
era, he most involved himself in strengthening the bonds between his kingdom and 
England's last remaining duchy in France.
Edward's preference showed itself in several concrete forms. As Unwin has 
reported:
From the end of the thirteenth century a new royal policy emerged and this began 
to favour aliens more than denizens, particularly with respect to commercial activity 
in the City of London. . . [It] culminated in the grant. . .  of the so-called 
Gascon Charter of 1302. This allowed the Gascons safe conduct throughout the 
king's realm, permitted them to trade wholesale, and allowed them to dwell where 
they wished and to keep their own hostels. Moreover, on the arrival of the new 
vintage, all existing wine stocks were to be tested by juries and any which had 
deteriorated were to be destroyed. The king also released the Gascons from the 
recta prisa and in exchange they agreed to the payment of a new duty of two 
shillings on every tun of wine which they imported.51
These permissive conditions, incorporated a year later in a general set of trade 
regulations called the Carta Mercatoria, put the Gascon merchants on an even firmer 
financial and political footing with the monarchy but the resentment in the English business 
community grew stronger still. But Edward I held fast against it for all of the reasons 
previously described and possibly because, as Hugh Johnson speculates, the king "had 
inherited his father's quite remarkable wine bill [and] this was his way of paying it." So, 
the Gascon wine merchants continued to prosper and "were even granted the right to 
establish their own association [in London], the Merchant Wine Tonners of Gascoyne, later 
known as the Mystery of Vintners."52
With the death of Edward I in 1307, however, the English rivals of these favored 
Bordeaux merchants had a new opportunity to reduce the advantages heretofore enjoyed by 
their competitors. The Gascon harvest of 1308 produced more wine imported by England 
than in any year before or since: 102,724 tuns.53 In the same year, however, the English 
wine merchants addressed their new king, Edward II (1307-1327) and argued that the 
Carta Mercatoria had died with his father. Edward initially ignored their complaints and
88
renewed the charter but by 1309 the king was already held in such low respect by the 
barons and the business community that the terms of the charter became unenforceable and 
the hostility shown to the Gascon wine merchants went unabated.54
The Gascons were quick to recognize their declining position and took what steps 
they could to protect their right to transport and sell wine to the English market. Despite the 
rising costs involved with transport, as relations with France deteriorated in the early 
fourteenth century, selling wine remained a highly profitable business. The Gascon 
wholesalers had effectively utilized the privileges granted to them by Edward I to form the 
trade association previously described, the Merchant Wine Tonners of Gascony, later 
known as the Vintners Company. Now they used this association to lobby against the 
hostility they faced from their native-born rivals in London.55
The Gascon merchants' opposition to change placed their English counterparts in a 
quandary. On the one hand, English merchants both in London and across the country 
wanted to encourage foreign commerce because of the domestic revenue it generated. On 
the other, these businessmen, particularly the wine merchants, felt disadvantaged by all the 
special privileges that had been granted to the Bordeaux shippers and merchants. Because 
these Englishmen felt so threatened, they worked with other merchants to develop more 
restrictions on the role and profits of their Gascon rivals and found that their goals were 
more easily achieved under the weak, distracted rule of Edward II.56
The isolationism of many of the English wine merchants and the legislation they 
gradually succeeded in getting implemented resulted in great changes in the way Gascon 
wine was transported in the early fourteenth century. Relations between English and 
Gascon merchants had so worsened by 1315 that the latter were willing to quit the English 
market entirely. In the last year of Edward II's reign, 1327, the English merchants finally 
attained their own exemption from the king's prisage which the Bordeaux shippers had 
enjoyed for decades.57 The English believed they had at last leveled the playing field with 
the Gascons but there is some evidence to suggest they had actually gained the upper hand.
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In addition to pursuing changes in the trade laws, they had also been pursuing extra-legal 
methods to reduce the advantages of the Gascons. For example, Edward I had appointed 
an official called "the guager" who was assigned to check the quality of the wine being 
brought into English ports. The Patent Rolls of the period show the addition of this new 
authority. By order of the king: "Mandate to sheriffs, bailiffs, and other ministers to cause 
public proclamation to be made in the king's name in all ports where ships with wine call 
that no merchant or other mariner under a heavy forfeiture sell any wine in casks or pipes 
unless the wine has been duly gauged."58
By the early fourteenth century this royal bureaucrat appears to have been suborned 
by the English merchants. This seems obvious from the complaints frequently made by 
Bordeaux shippers who protested that the guagers often forced them to sit on their wines 
for eight to fifteen days before inspection while English shipments were inspected far 
sooner. A tun of Gascon wine sitting on a London dock for two weeks would thus lose a 
great deal of its value.59
The crowding out of Gascon merchants from the wine trade in London and other 
English ports forced many of them to return to Bordeaux and to take reduced prices for 
their products. For their English customers on the consumer level, however, there was not 
a noticeable change because the wine from Bordeaux was still getting to its importers; the 
only difference was that increasingly it was arriving in English rather than Gascon ships. 
In one way, at least, Gascony benefited from this shift in transportation arrangements. It 
will be recalled that when the Bordeaux wine market suddenly expanded, the Gascon 
vintners had responded so well that all other agricultural pursuits took a back seat. While 
Gascony had once been a tremendous producer of grain, not to mention other farm 
products, it had been virtually independent of the rest of France. But when these staples of 
the medieval diet were suddenly replaced by vines to meet the demand for wine from 
England and elsewhere in northern Europe, the result was that the Gascons had virtually 
eliminated the diverse economy that was fundamental to their political independence.60
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By the latter half of the thirteenth century Gascony needed to import grain and other
essentials and was looking for more ships to import these cargoes. Here, once again, the
English shippers were eager to get involved. Indeed, in some ways the English crown felt
obligated since they had helped to create the market and had subsequently taken greater
control of the shipping traffic. As the Patent Rolls seem to show, the English monarchy
had not only encouraged English shippers to get involved in sending victuals to Gascony
but formally organized it through letters patent. A fine example would be:
Appointment of William de la Pole of Kyngston-upon-Hull to arrest in the ports of 
Kyngston-upon-Hull and other ports and places thence towards the west, ships to 
take wheat, wool, and other things, which the king has ordered him to purvey for 
his service in the duchy of Aquitaine, and to man them with suitable crews, and to 
send these ships with the fleet now going there to buy wines and other merchandise 
for the realm.61
With the English takeover of the movement of wine north from Bordeaux, suddenly 
there were many more foreign merchant ships available to bring in grain and other 
commodities. This further sowed the seeds of English-Gascon interdependence and 
established a more broadly-based trading relationship that has persisted into the modem 
era.62 More immediately, it meant that with the war clouds darkening over England and 
France by the end of the reign of Edward II, the ships that were increasingly at risk plying 
north and south along France's west coast and through the English Channel were more 
frequently English than Gascon. At least for the moment it looked as though the wily 
Gascons had once again got the better of their English 'cousins'.
When one surveys the Gascon-English wine trade over the century and a quarter 
encompassing King John's exemption of the Bordeaux wine producers from paying 
customs duties (1203) to the forced resignation of Edward II (1327), enormous changes 
are evident. Clearly, the closure of the port of La Rochelle (1224) is a key event because it 
forced the English wine importers to look further south for their main source of supply.
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So, too, are the several measures taken by the English monarchs, particularly Edward I, to 
facilitate the work of the Gascon wine merchants in shipping and selling their wares, even 
at the expense of English traders.
But it is in trends rather than specific events that the most dramatic changes become 
apparent. In just over a century, Gascony had transformed itself from a rather obscure 
outpost of England's domains in France to become the monarchy's second largest trading 
partner (after the Low Countries' market in wool) and the largest single contributor of 
customs duties to the king's treasury. Moreover, it had radically altered its internal 
economy from one that was broadly based in agriculture and therefore largely self- 
sufficient to one that was devoted almost entirely to a highly specialized single product on 
the borderline between agriculture and manufacturing for which the principal customer was 
overseas. Put more starkly, Gascony had to a substantial extent made itself dependent not 
only for its continued economic success but for the bread it ate on the ability of foreign, i.e. 
mainly English, ships to get through to the port of Bordeaux.
Gascony's growing dependence on England was reciprocated if not precisely 
mirrored. That part of England's population responsible for nearly all of its political and 
economic decision-making looked upon wine as a necessity, not a luxury, and essentially 
had been left with only one source: Gascony. While England's own wine industry never 
amounted to much, the flood of better and cheaper wine from Bordeaux that became 
available during the thirteenth century put an end to the hopes of domestic vintners and 
more than "1,300 commercial vineyards were grubbed up all over England, and grapes 
made way for more profitable crops."63
For English wine merchants, the profits to be made from buying, shipping, storing, 
blending, and selling the increasingly prolific and urgently wanted vintages from Bordeaux 
had become irresistible as their tenacious struggle with their Gascon counterparts for every 
slice of this market demonstrated. And, for the king himself, the wine trade had become 
equally compelling because the tax revenues it yielded had risen from a negligible sum
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during the reign of King John to one that rivaled all the income Edward II got from his 
domestic tax base.
The mutual dependence that had grown up over this relatively brief span of time 
was manifested in other ways as well and was most evident in the capital cities of these 
trading partners. In Bordeaux, the hand-in-glove relationship between the local 
government -- English-dominated but largely Gascon-run — and the wine industry — 
Gascon at its base but increasingly English-operated at the top — became closer every 
decade. In London too, despite their rivalries over market shares and royal favor, the 
Gascon and English wine traders became functionally indistinguishable and Gascon 
merchants were recognized — officially, at least — as English, the most successful among 
them eventually emerging as citizens of London and electors of its mayor.
One thing had not changed, however, and that was the political status of England's 
former possessions in France. From John's surrender of Normandy, Anjou, Maine, 
Touraine, and Poitou in 1203 to the end of Edward IPs reign in 1327, the only major 
events — notwithstanding Henry Ill's periodic expeditions — had been the previously noted 
French takeover of the port of La Rochelle and the 1259 signing of the Treaty of Paris by 
which England acknowledged — legally, if not genuinely — that the status quo — was 
irrevocable. The bottom line was that England began this period only with Gascony and 
ended it the same way. Thus, as the Hundred Years War approached, Gascony was as 
vital as it had ever been, possibly more, in terms of England's hope to regain territory in 
France. The difference was that it had become vastly more important — and more 
vulnerable -- economically because of the spectacular growth of the wine trade.
CHAPTER V
THE WAR: THE ROLES PLAYED BY -  AND THE EFFECTS UPON -  
GASCONY AND THE WINE TRADE (1327-1453)
This chapter is about the Hundred Years War — viewed from the perspective of 
Gascony and its wine trade with England. Most of the catalysts for this enormous conflict 
are now well understood and require little further argument; others, however, seem to have 
been somewhat overlooked and remain worthy of further investigation. One of these, 
surely, is the wine trade between England and Gascony which, I believe, has been 
undervalued in most assessments of what drove the English monarchy's dogged effort to 
hold on to its last Aquitanian province through more than a century of armed struggle with 
France.
The preceding chapters were intended to provide a broad picture of the political, 
economic, and social circumstances of England and France from the turn of the millennium 
through the early fourteenth century. Moreover, they were meant to highlight the special 
roles played by the duchy of Gascony and its wine trade in the increasingly contentious 
relations between England and France. I have tried to make clear how feudalism both tied 
England and France together and, at the same time, set them on a collision course. As the 
war loomed in the 1320s, the status of Gascony was at the heart of this political issue 
because it was the last remnant of the vast Aquitanian province that the English monarchy 
once held in France. And, in economic terms, retaining Gascony had become crucial to 
England not only because the duchy was its primary source of that indispensable beverage,
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wine; but because — with the transformation of Gascony into a largely one-product 
economy, it had become one of London's two most important overseas markets for English 
goods and the ships that carried them.
No attempt will be made here to tell the entire story of the war, though some of the 
major events — well known to most students of this period — will be recounted to provide a 
chronological framework on which to exhibit the less familiar information available about 
Gascony and the wine trade. I shall instead try to demonstrate not only how this duchy and 
its economy were affected by the war but how they, in turn, prompted and perpetuated the 
struggle. This reciprocal relationship between the war and the wine trade is one important 
key to understanding why the war went on so long and why, for England more than 
France, the conflict began and ended in Gascony.
When Edward II (1307-1327) was deposed by his wife, Isabella, and her allies, 
their minor son, Edward III (1327-1377), was elevated to the Plantagenet throne. Edward 
II was overthrown and subsequently murdered less because he was a tyrant than because 
he was simply incompetent to govern. As was demonstrated in the preceding chapters, 
political instability arose in the English monarchy more often than in France and usually in 
response to some issue or issues that divided the king from the great barons of the nobility. 
This was the case in the first decades of the fourteenth century and most experts agree it 
would not have occurred if Edward II had not been such a weak monarch and thus given 
the nobility an opportunity to exert its usually latent power at his expense. Edward II was a 
king who neither enjoyed nor excelled at the business of governing and therefore failed to 
gain the confidence of most of his subjects.
Fortunately for England, those leadership traits which were so lacking in Edward II 
proved to be abundant in his son. This was not immediately apparent because Edward III 
did not rule in his own right until 1330 when he ended the regency by permanently
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imprisoning his mother and hanging her consort, Roger Mortimer. With these decisive
acts, he quickly demonstrated not only his aptitude for command but also an equally
important gift for understanding the limits of a king's authority within England's unique
political system. As Jonathan Sumption has suggested:
Edward in  and that other great paradigm of medieval kingship, Henry V, were men 
with limited power to command who succeeded because they were their own men, 
and because they learned the limits of their power and knew that beyond those 
limits government was a matter of friendships and patronage, dependent on the 
reputation of the king and his skills in persuasion and bluff.1
These personal attributes of Edward III were crucial to English realm's success in 
rebuilding its strength in this period. As the medieval chronicler, Sir Jean Froissart, has 
pointed out, the anarchy that prevailed in England under the rule of Edward II could not 
have been so readily replaced by the power and confidence exhibited by Edward IE. Laden 
with political gifts, this new leader was quick to perceive that it was in his and England's 
best interest for him to find a way to work with the nobility. His inclination to promote a 
bond rather than a conflict between the barons and the crown permitted England's strength 
to coalesce rather than continue to dissipate and he was the first king to pursue this policy 
in over a century and a half.2
This development notwithstanding, it is important to recall that England was in a 
very weak position both at home and abroad when Edward in  took charge in 1330. Just 
three years previously, Isabella had made a hasty and disadvantageous peace with her 
brother King Charles IV of France (1322-1328). This accord had settled none of the old 
issues that caused contention between the two kingdoms since 1154 and, in particular, 
meant that Edward began his reign with less feudal control over what remained of 
Aquitaine than his father.3
As has been indicated above, France too was going through a wrenching, though 
more natural succession crisis in this period. On February 1, 1328, King Charles IV — 
who was only 33 at the time — fell ill at the royal manor east of Paris known as Vincennes
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and died.4 This event was made more serious by the fact that Charles had left no male heir. 
This was an abrupt change for France because for the past 300 years the Capetian family 
had always provided at least one son capable of taking the throne. The responsibility for 
finding a replacement was daunting because many dynastic issues were involved and 
several candidates for the throne were in contention. One of the claimants was Edward III 
* who, through his mother Isabella, was a nephew of Charles IV.5
After considerable debate among the French nobility, however, a prominent and 
well-respected statesman, Philip of Valois, whom Charles had previously chosen to act as 
regent when he became incapacitated, was selected to be the new king. Philip was no 
stranger to the court as he was a first cousin to the king and had proved to be a loyal vassal 
in his position as the Count of Anjou and Maine. Philip was not well known outside the 
court, however, and — in view of the several other choices that could have been made — it 
is remarkable that his ascension as King Philip VI (1328-1350) aroused no great protest 
within France.6 Certainly this, the most troubled French succession in three centuries, can 
be regarded as calm in comparison with the transition that had just occurred across the 
English Channel.
Elsewhere, including Gascony, the news of Philip's ascension stirred great interest 
and apprehension. Since no one in Bordeaux or London knew what the new French 
monarch intended with respect to foreign policy, orders were issued by Edward III to 
prepare Gascony for any eventuality. English officials in that duchy were told to look for 
shifts in public opinion toward the new French king at the expense of Edward. Anglo- 
Gascon forces were also put on alert in case Philip had plans to further consolidate his 
domain.7
While these political events were unfolding, the exporters and vintners of Bordeaux 
were focused on the recovery of their trade. Since its high point with the spectacularly
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successful vintage of 1308 when Gascony shipped 104,895 tuns of wine, the Bordeaux 
producers had experienced a downturn in the volume of wine sold. This decline was at 
least partially due to the growing friction between France and England. When Charles IV 
took over all but a coastal strip of Gascony in 1324, the French occupation greatly 
disrupted Bordeaux's exports, nearly halving the average annual volume during the first 
two decades. When Isabella and Charles IV made peace in 1327, the Gascons hoped for 
an opportunity to close out the decade with better numbers and enjoyed a success in 1328 
with well over 93,000 tuns exported.8 This achievement may have been, in part, a 
response to the ascension of Edward III in 1327 when he called for the resumption of 
vigorous commercial intercourse between Bordeaux and Britain and encouraged this goal 
by renewing the privileges of the Gascon merchant vintners. These efforts are confirmed 
in the Patent Rolls of Edward HI as he stressed his desires for all merchants in the realm to 
respect and obey the Gascon Charter of 1302 designed by his grandfather. The king 
commands:
Exemplification under the seal now in use of a charter dated 18 March, 8 
Edward III inspecting and confirming a charter, dated 13 August, 30 Edward I 
[30th year of his reign] granting license for the merchant vintners of the duchy of 
Aquitaine to trade freely within the realm under safe conduct and protection of the 
king, upon terms specified in the charter.9
As for the wholesale price of wine leaving Bordeaux, it showed remarkable strength and
stability throughout the first decades of the fourteenth century. Despite bad harvests, poor
weather, famine, disease in the 1310s and the renewal of Anglo-French hostilities in the
1320s, the long-term average price of a tun of claret at the docks in Gascony held steady at
about £3.10
As was previously discussed, the English monarchy was collecting a high 
percentage of its income from these shipments strongly suggesting that income from the 
wine trade was driving England's position in Gascony. Moreover, it seems more than 
coincidental that in 1329, a banner year for the Bordeaux vintners, Edward HI was 
conducting his foreign policy toward France in a manner calculated not to disturb this
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profitable relationship. In the first two years of his reign, young Edward had faced the
threat of losing his last remnant of the Aquitanian provinces; had been pointedly reminded
of his feudal obligation to pay homage to the French throne; had endured repeated insults,
threats, and endless needling from Charles IV and had had his hopes for inheriting the
French throne dashed by the accession of Philip VI. With that kind of behavior at Paris,
one might reasonably assume that Edward III would have reacted with hostility in some
form. Instead, in 1329, Edward — in his capacity as Duke of Guienne — wrote to Philip to
assure him of his friendly intentions and of his plans to pay homage to the new king. In an
exceptionally acquiescent letter written in April of that year, Edward seemed to do all he
could to appease French demands. In it, he wrote:
My most serene prince and lord, to whom I wish every success and every 
happiness, I desire to inform your magnificence that I have long since had the 
desire to pay you a visit in France, in order to fulfill my duties as was fitting; 
but, as a result of the hindrances and difficulties which beset me in my 
kingdom, as you must be aware, I have not been able up to now to accomplish 
the project which I had formed. As soon as I am free, and God willing, I shall 
come in person to pay you the homage which I owe you.11
While this acknowledgment of Edward's subordinate relationship to Philip was 
seen in Paris as a great diplomatic victory, it is important to recognize that Edward was still 
operating under the regency of Queen Isabella in 1329 and that, in any case, this show of 
submission to a more powerful France was a matter more of necessity than choice. 
Westminister desperately needed to hold onto Gascony for its political value as the basis for 
reviving any claims to its former territories in France; for its military value as a great port 
with deep river access to France's west coast; for its economic role as a major trading 
partner and as a primary source of direct income to the crown. In the wake of the 
disastrous reign of Edward II, the Island Kingdom was so weak that if the only way its 
sovereign could retain all these assets was in his status as duke rather than a king then he 
would swallow his pride and pledge fealty to Philip. Accordingly, in June 1329, young 
Edward went to Amiens cathedral and performed his duty as a vassal of the French king
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chiefly, it seems certain, so that he could buy time for himself and his country to gain 
strength.12
The dispute over feudal status of the duchy of Gascony was among the key issues
at the heart of the conflict between England and France in the late 1320s and early 1330s.
In fact, at this point there were even important differences over the definition of exactly
what was owed by a subordinate in a vassal-to-lord relationship. Given France's
demonstrated ability to seize Gascony militarily as it had as recently as 1324, England was
not in a position to argue for undisputed sovereignty over the duchy; still, it sought to limit
its feudal obligation to what was known as 'simple' homage, i.e. periodic ceremonies
involving nothing more than gestures of respect to the suzerain such as Edward III had
performed when he came to Amiens in 1329.
The French, on the other hand, expected a great deal more and chose to recognize
Edward's Amiens display as a rendering of 'liege' homage, a more substantial rite in which
a vassal obligates himself to defend his lord before any other man and against all other
forces. And from a legal context one could see not only how the French got that
impression but also how legally right they may have been. In another letter written by
Edward III shortly after his visit to Amiens, the king quite clearly expressed his intentions
of the type of homage he chose to pay to King Philip VI of France. As shared by
Froissart, the Plantagenet king wrote:
We make known, that when we paid our homage to our excellent and well- 
beloved lord and cousin, Philip, King of France, at Amiens, it was required by 
him of us, that we should acknowledge such homage to be liege, and that we, 
in paying him such homage, should promise expressly to be faithful and true 
to him . . .  we entered into his homage in the same manner as our predecessors, 
the dukes of Guienne, had in former days entered into homage to the kings of 
France who for that time were, and being since, better informed as to the truth, 
acknowledge by these presents, that the homage, which we paid to the king of 
France . . . was, is, and ought to be considered as liege homage, and that we 
owe him loyalty and truth, as duke of Aquitaine, peer of France, earl of Poitou and 
Montreuil; . . . 13
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The language in the letter above makes utterly clear Edward Ill's intentions of the
type of homage he was expected to pay. From those words, how could the French think
otherwise? But, to imagine that the King of England would act as the defender of the King
of France -f- his most likely opponent — was presumptuous of the French in the extreme.
Nevertheless, the French court continued to press the issue of liege homage throughout the
1330s and seriously threatened to reconfiscate Gascony if Edward would not comply. This
threat was deemed by Edward in  to be sufficiently real to persuade him to conclude a new
agreement in Paris in 1331 which excused him from a fresh rendering of homage to France
but only on the understanding that the ceremony at Amiens had obligated Edward to liege
homage.14 While Edward was by then ruling in his own right, it appears that he again had
agreed to make a diplomatic concession to the French court in order to buy time to
strengthen his hand and to pursue other objectives such as his ongoing war with Scotland.
An example of Edward HI "buying time" can be found in the king's Patent Rolls. Among
many other efforts, the king had to keep sending diplomats and other ambassadors to
France to appease their demands and offer distractions. Edward IE made an official order
of this in November of 1330. The order demands:
Appointment of Master John de Hildesle, canon of Chichester, and Master John 
de Fordich, professor of civic law, king's clerks, as proctors for the king in matters 
touching the duchy (of Aquitaine), the county of Pointhieu and Montreuil and other 
territories in France, and especially for all that concerns the homage to be done for 
the duchy, to appear before Philip, King of France, a fortnight after St. Andrew's 
Day and afterwards as required.15
However, there can be little doubt that the presence of substantial French forces along the 
borders of Gascony also compelled him to accept the French interpretation of his feudal 
obligations.
The French and English monarchies spent much of the 1330s dealing with one 
another in this threatening and disingenuous manner. The two kings surely realized that the 
peace concluded back in 1327 had done little to resolve the 'issue over Aquitaine' and that
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all the subsequent peace conferences had failed to reduce the tension over the nature of the 
homage England owed to France. The only thing on which both agreed was that this issue 
had become sufficiently serious to provoke further hostilities, possibly even set off a 
prolonged conflict, and that neither monarch wanted this to occur. As Edouard Perroy has 
written:
In 1331, it was simply a question of completing and consolidating, by detailed 
agreements, the understanding in principle which had emerged from their 
meetings. Three or four years later, though nothing definite had changed the 
data of the problem, hope of achieving the 'final peace' had been abandoned.
All that the two kings asked was that the war should not become general. Neither 
Philip, too much preoccupied by his dreams of the crusade, nor Edward, absorbed 
in Scotland, wanted a general war. But they had got to the point of fearing it, and 
that was enough to make it possible.16
Again, it is not our contention that the issue over Aquitaine was the sole cause of 
the Hundred Years War. Although negotiations on this point continued throughout much 
of the 1330s, there were other conflicts between the two sides that arose during this period 
including differences over the plans for the next crusade, disputes over alliances with other 
kingdoms, French threats to English trade and military clashes on each other's borders. 
But at the center lay the question of the status of Gascony which, as Perroy argues, was 
"the eternal apple of discord between the two dynasties." When it was apparent to both 
sides that this issue could not be resolved through further negotiation a resort to violence 
was accepted as the only remaining option. The fact that the war lasted as long as it did and 
that it both began and ended in Gascony are good evidence that the Aquitanian issue was at 
the heart of the dispute.17
Philip VI was the first to act and precipitated the war in May 1337 by declaring that 
Edward's possession of the duchy of Gascony was null and void. This incidentally, was 
the third time the French had done so in the past forty years.18 The English quickly 
followed suit and, as both sides prepared for the resumption of hostilities, they found it 
necessary to formally justify the breach of the peace with a legal pretext. Philip did so by 
declaring that Edward III was a disloyal vassal who refused to fulfill the obligations of his
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fief. Edward countered by declaring that France's intervention on behalf of Scotland in the 
now chronic Anglo-Scottish conflict was a hostile act.19 While it would be years before the 
main armies of England and France would clash, hostilities broke out immediately in some 
regions, most seriously in Aquitaine where French forces crossed the Gascon frontier and 
captured several English fortifications. In addition, the war also began at sea along the 
English Channel as a Norman fleet skirmished with English shipping and plundered 
communities along the English coast.20
As one would expect, the Anglo-Gascon wine trade was adversely affected once 
clashes of this sort, both on land and at sea, started interfering with the production and 
transport of Gascony's chief export. The first half of the 1330s had shown great promise 
for vintners and exporters alike. The economic future had looked favorable again for both 
the growers and the merchants because the output of the vineyards was good and the prices 
being charged for wine in England allowed for a solid margin of profit for all concerned. 
By the second half of the decade, however, a sharp decline in the supply of new wines 
available for export was clearly underway. The tax records for the 1336 vintage show that 
production only about a quarter what it had been in the previous year and that this was due 
in large measure to the loss of the Haut-Pays vineyards, located well east of Bordeaux, to 
incursions by the French. This normally very productive hinterland region of Gascony 
normally accounted for only about 10% of the total volume exported from the duchy each 
year because, as was discussed earlier, the Bordelais had taken measures to displace it in 
favor of wines grown closer to the capital. Nevertheless, it was an important reserve when 
capital area crops were sparse and suddenly it was in enemy hands. With this loss, the 
burden of production for the English and other foreign markets fell increasingly on vintners 
located in the vicinity of Bordeaux.21
103
By the time the war began in earnest in 1337, the French forces encroached further
on English territory, penetrating the Garonne valley and seizing the fortifications at St.
Macaire and La Reole. Over the next three years the fighting in Gascony was fairly
constant as the French moved into the Dordogne valley, even taking over Liboume and St.
Emilion just across the river from Bordeaux. Particularly hard hit was the rich vine-
growing region of the Entre-Dewc-Mers , the peninsula east of the capital formed by the
confluence of the Garonne and Dordogne rivers. The frequent clashes in these key areas
threatened both the production and river transport of wine and caused what proved to be a
substantial, though temporary, decline in the volume of Bordeaux exports and sharp
fluctuations in the price of wine on the English market.22
The repercussions of the first years of the war on the wine trade were not confined
to Gascony itself. The maritime traffic between Bordeaux and the English ports, always
subject to the depredations of pirates, was further endangered by the marauding operations
of a Franco-Scottish fleet sailing in the Channel. It threatened to paralyze the Anglo-Gascon
wine shipments and the first victims of these attacks were the independent shippers who
sailed alone or in small groups. Their seizure by the French and Scottish raiders resulted in
an acute shortage of wine and therefore sharp rises in price. The wine merchants
responded by seeking protection from Edward III for the transport of the 1337 vintage.23
Their request was granted by the monarchy on the condition that the ships sail together in a
common fleet to facilitate their protection. This issue was addressed in the Patent Rolls
where there are hundreds of orders like the following designed to protect the precious trade
between England and Gascony. This order states:
Inasmuch as the king has learned for certain that much damage is done to his 
subjects since the last truce with France, and that pirates and other enemies are at 
sea on the watch for ships crossing from England, for the safety of the shipping of 
the realm he has appointed Robert de Ledred and William de Walkelate, kings' 
serjeant at arms, to arrest all ships in the water of Thames and all ports and places 
thence towards the west fitted out to cross to Gascony for wine in the present 
season of vintage, and those ships which shall be found between the outer part of 
the Isle of Wight towards the west and the city of London,. . . to go thence when
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the king shall provide safe-conduct for them, and the lords and masters of the same 
ships . . . to be there with their ships at the appointed day.24
Under normal circumstances, while the wine fleet arrived in Bordeaux each fall nearly as a
group, they departed singly for England as soon as their cargo was loaded. The convoy
system necessitated by the war meant that the new wines arrived in England somewhat later
than usual but it did ensure the preservation of the ships and their precious contents.25
The implementation of the convoys changed not only when Gascony's wines
arrived in England but also their price. As Margery James has reported:
The average price at which the king's wine was brought increased from £3 in 
1335-36 to £5 a tun in 1336-37, although prices dropped from time to time as 
the spasmodic arrival of a convoy relieved the scarcity of wine in England;
. . .  It is clear, therefore, that the price of wine had not yet permanently 
increased as a result of the war, but that it was simply reacting to periods of 
abnormal scarcity.26
As has previously been mentioned, the wine trade between Gascony and England 
had originated as a simple wine-for-cash exchange. But, as the trade developed over the 
thirteenth century, the Gascon economy had become increasingly concentrated on wine 
production at the expense of other types of agricultural activity. With the continuation of 
the wine trade into the fourteenth century, the Aquitaine region became ever more 
dependent on imported commodities such as grain, salted fish, animal hides, and even 
some manufactured goods, particularly textiles. England became the prime supplier of 
these necessities and thus, while the northward flow of traffic from Bordeaux consisted 
almost entirely of wine, the ships sailing down from England carried a broad variety of 
agricultural materials and finished products.27 The exchange became so prevalent, even the 
Treaty Rolls began issuing grants to meet demand. As one entry shows: "License, . . 
for Stephen de la Garde of Bayonne and Thomas Norton of Bristol to export 500 quarters 
of wheat, beans, and peas, bought in Somerset and Gloucestershire, from any ports, to 
Bayonne and Bordeaux."28
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This burgeoning reciprocal trade was good for both sides and was a frustration to 
pirates who previously had targeted the cash being sent from England to pay for the wine 
shipments from Bordeaux. But it also increased the economic dependency of Gascony on 
England and vice versa. It should be noted too that as the relationship progressed, the 
merchants which once ran the exchange themselves increasingly turned over the work to 
creditors, agents, and other associated middlemen whose demands for a share of the profits 
also increased the cost of wine in England and other goods in Gascony. With the advent of 
the war both the mutual dependency and the cost of goods and services escalated further.29
The 1340s began with relative peace. The Thierache campaign, which Edward III 
had begun in 1339 by invading France from the north with his new Flemish allies had 
come to a grinding halt in the late summer of 1340. In hindsight, it was an audacious but 
ultimately futile exercise because the English king ran out of funds to support it. It had 
demonstrated, however, that the English were prepared to undertake ambitious amphibious 
operations in support of their war aims and that the supposedly stronger French were ill- 
prepared to resist them. The positive outcome of this closing chapter of the war’s opening 
phase was an agreement for a lengthy truce to allow the Church to intercede and attempt to 
arbitrate some of the issues between the two sides.30
Fortunately for those involved in the Anglo-Gascon wine trade, the truce between 
the warring parties gave the vintners and merchants at least five years to revive their 
battered industry. While Margery James has reported that the records of the wine trade are 
incomplete for the first half of the 1340s, she also observed that the retail price of wine in 
England returned during this period to pre-war levels. That kind of evidence suggests that 
production must have been up and transport must have become less risky. James also 
noted that, while Bordeaux's total exports were reduced in comparison to some of the 
better harvests before the war, wine seemed quite plentiful in England. She took this to
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mean that England must have begun purchasing a greater portion of the total output of the 
Gascon vineyards.31
W INE EXPO RTS FROM  GASCON PORTS DURING TH E 14TH 
CEN TU RY 32
Year
M ich aelm as
to
M ich aelm as
W ines o f  B ordeaux  
Burgesses, n o n ­
n ob les, bu rgesses1 
ecclesiastics
n o n ­
p r iv ileg ed  
w in es  o f  
th e  H a u l  P a ys  
a n d  B ordela is
p r iv ileg ed  
w in es  o f  
the H a u l  
P a ys
T o ta l2
(tu n s)
1305-6 13,958 17,956 57,934 97,848
1306-7 13,886 16,034 53,591 93,452
1308-9 12,260 30,947 38,812 102,724
1310-11 51,351
1323-24 6,234 32,305
1328-29 69,175
1329-30 93,556
1335-36 7,958 14,136 46,901 74,053
1336-37 5,447 2,979 4,645 16,557
1348-49 867 4,586 470 5,923
1349-50 13,427
1350-51 7,282
1352-53 10,927 8,702 0 19,629
1353-54 8,627 7,65 4 42 16,328
1355-56 6,698 7,713 0 14,411
1356-57 8,900 11,159 141 20,200
1357-58 10,506 15,559 1,773 27,838
1363-64 18,280
1364-5 43,869
1365-66 36,207
1366-67 37,103
1368-69 28,264
1369-70 8,945
1372-73 5,535 20 8,720 98 14,373
1373-74 605 7,099 76
1374-75 3,080 323 4,527 0 7,930
1375-76 2,437 1,769 3,522 625 8,656
1376-77 9,636 3,138 10,761 110 23,920
1377-78 6,679 668 5,109 0 12,456
1378-79 7,597 525 5,500 0 13,622
1379-80 2,973 356 2,805 126 6,643
1380-81 4,584 614 3,474 107 9,041
1387-88 397 6,988 120
1388-89 648 9,205 50
1389-90 605 5,082 130
Notes: lNon-burgess wines of Bordeaux were those levied at the rate of 30s. (Bordeaux 
money) a tun.
-TfTe total am ount includes wines laded at Libourne, Bourg, Blaye and other ports of the 
Gironde below Bordeaux. The accounts of the Grande Coulume are found in the Public 
Record Office, London, series E101.
Source: derived from James, M. K... Studies in  the Medieval Wine Trade, edited by E. M. 
Veale, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971: 32-33.
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When the Church-sponsored negotiations broke down between the English and 
French embassies in 1345, Philip VI responded by sending a massive army, led by his heir 
to the throne — the Duke of Normandy — into the Gascon plain in the hopes of forcing the 
English into the sea and finishing with the issue of Aquitaine. The English countered 
quickly, however, and placed an Anglo-Gascon army on the offensive under the leadership 
of the Earl of Derby. He pushed forward boldly, first into the productive wine regions of 
Saintonge, Perigord, and Agenais, and then advanced further into with Poitou with 
seeming impunity.33 While these gains once again expanded Gascony's elastic borders, 
any hopes of soon returning these lands to viticulture were dashed by the devastation 
caused by fighting.
The French army finally got underway in May 1346 and proceeded to the 
confluence of the Lot and Garonne rivers where it attempted a siege of the well-garrisoned 
English stronghold at Aiguillon. Since the French believed this fortress was the key to the 
Gascon plain, Normandy and his forces settled in for weeks under those walls and were 
only moved when they heard of a major battle about to get underway in the north of 
France.34
This battle occurred on a plateau near Ponthieu called Crecy. Edward HI had been 
raiding the northern French countryside when he was suddenly confronted by a quickly 
mustered 'royal army'. Edward had decided to flee the scene because his forces were small 
in number and made up mostly of infantry. The French closed in, however, and leaving 
Edward with no choice but to make a stand. He realized that he could not fight a 
conventional medieval battle because he lacked the experienced cavalry which the French 
had in such abundance. Therefore Edward broke with feudal custom and placed his archers 
and infantry behind hedges and fence lines in a topographically superior position which 
gave the English army a full view of the enemy's movements. The French knights 
confidently moved into the field of battle, apparently certain they would prevail but the
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outcome was not what either side expected.35 Sir Jean Froissart reported the scene from an
eyewitness at the battle. He described the melee in the following manner:
The English archers then advanced one step forward, and shot their arrows with 
such force and quickness, that it seemed as if it snowed. When the Genoese felt 
these arrows, which pierced their arms, heads, and through their armor, some 
of thern cut the strings of their cross-bows, others flung them on the ground, and 
all turned about and retreated quite discomfitted. The French had a large body of 
men at arms on horseback, richly dressed, to support the Genoese. . . .
The English continued shooting as vigorously and quickly as before; some of their 
arrows fell among the horsemen, who were sumptuously equipped, and, killing 
and wounding many, made them caper and fall among the Genoese, so that they 
were in such confusion they could never rally again.36
The repercussions of the French defeat at Crecy were extraordinary. Many of 
France's fighting nobles and the heavy cavalry that had made it the most feared army in 
Europe had been annihilated in a single battle. This victory gave Edward III and his forces 
the chance to roam freely across the northern French countryside essentially unopposed. 
Edward chose, however, to proceed to the port of Calais where he began a prolonged 
siege. By August of 1347 the siege worked and England gained a beachhead on the French 
coast from which to launch future operations. These triumphs in both siege and open field 
warfare prompted Edward to call for a cessation of hostilities, to return home for the winter 
and to use these achievements to politically pressure France to conclude a final peace on 
England's terms.37
The truce was welcomed by all those on both sides who sought a negotiated 
settlement and the cease fire was extended in 1348 and 1349. The prospects for a lasting 
peace were suddenly overshadowed in 1348, however, by the panic that spread across 
Europe by the outbreak of the Black Death. This epidemic was an horrific and massive 
explosion of several strains of the plague virus on a scale never seen before or since. It has 
been estimated to have killed between one-third and one-half of the entire population of 
Europe.38 As people died by the thousands in every village and shire across England and
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the Continent, the war simply could not be resumed and economic activity of all sorts,
including the wine industry, came to a halt.
In Bordeaux, for instance, a region already devastated and depopulated by the war,
the Black Death "more than any other single factor caused an economic crisis of exceptional
severity." Gascon wine production fell to abnormally low levels and the duchy managed to
export only about 6,000 tuns from the 1348 vintage. When the plague abated the next year
the vintners were able to double this figure but these were still pitifully small outputs
compared to those seen earlier in this century. It was a dramatic illustration of the fact that
in this labor-intensive industry, production depended not only on a good harvest but on the
availability of manpower to harvest the crop and turn it into wine. Moreover, as the
production statistics for this period continued to reflect, the plague was not over in a year
but returned to various communities in different strains for many decades, causing great
human suffering and consequent interruptions in economic activity.39
The long-term repercussions of the plague combined with those of the war cannot
be underestimated. It is not too much to say that the Anglo-Gascon wine trade was never
the same after 1348. P.T.H. Unwin who closely researched Margery James' work has
commented on these effects. He has written that,
. . . although the various stages of the war between England and France did 
influence the levels of wine exports from Bordeaux it was the coincidence of 
renewed warfare in the mid-fourteenth century with the onset of the plague in 1348 
that led to the permanent reduction in such exports from their peak at the beginning 
of the century. . . suggesting that the reduction of population by perhaps a third 
as a direct result of plague may have been at least as significant as warfare in 
determining the fortunes of viticulture in the region.40
Inherent in this comment is the likelihood that wine exports fell not only because there were
fewer vintners available to produce the wine but also fewer customers to drink it. The
Black Death struck England and Europe with nearly equal severity and the demand for
Gascon wine in England had to have declined not only because the population dropped
dramatically but because, with the general staggering of economic activity, there had to
have been less ready money in consumer's pockets to pay for it.
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The 1350s began, much like the previous decade, in peace or at least what passed 
for it in this turbulent era. The cessation of hostilities that had lasted through the late 1340s 
continued for several more years because much of Europe was burying its dead and 
recovering in other ways from the effects of the plague. Moreover, a change of leaders 
took place in France which persuaded the Valois monarchy to extend the truce repeatedly 
until 1354. In August 1350, Philip VI died leaving his son John to succeed him. While 
King John "the Good" (1350-1364) adjusted to his new responsibilities, the negotiators for 
both sides sought to take advantage of the cease fire to design a more permanent peace 
agreement. Edward Hi's military triumphs in 1347 had shifted the political balance in favor 
of England and Edward hoped that the settlement would include France's concession of 
undisputed English sovereignty over Aquitaine and possibly several other formerly English 
territories in Anjou. Initially, the arbitration went extremely well for Edward and it 
appeared that he would get everything he asked for and more. Then the French seemed to 
realize all they were conceding and backed out of the deal. This stiffening of resistance on 
the part of the French court led to a breakdown of the talks and hostilities were resumed in 
1354.41
Apparently Edward III was determined to demonstrate his strength to the new 
French king and was sufficiently confident in his forces' ability to carry out successful 
military campaigns in France that he sent his son, Edward of Woodstock— the Prince of 
Wales — to act as his lieutenant in Gascony. Also known as the Black Prince, the king's 
son was to become the scourge of France and, after arriving in Aquitaine in July 1355, 
promptly began to wreak havoc throughout southern France. Edward Ill's plan was to 
have the prince advance from there into northern France on short notice where he could 
participate with his father and another force led by Henry, Duke of Lancaster, in a three­
pronged attack intended to crush King John II’s main forces.42
I l l
In the early spring of 1356, however, the Black Prince was still raiding and
pillaging Languedoc. When his father's orders came, he proceeded north to rendezvous
with Lancaster in the Loire valley. The prince's army moved slowly, though, because it
was laden with booty seized during its campaign in southern France. A newly gathered
and strong French army, led by King John, caught up with young Edward in mid-
September west of Poitiers. Since the Black Prince was unprepared to take on such a
powerful force, he turned again to the tactics used by his father at Crecy and ordered his
men into defensive positions from which they could ambush the French cavalry.43 By
chivalric standards, it was an underhanded strategy but one well suited to the military
realities with which the Black Prince was confronted and, once again, the French forces
were decimated by England's long-bowmen. Young Edward's Anglo-Gascon army also
managed to take a large number of prisoners when many of the French knights fled in
disorder after the slaughter of their horses. Key among them was one knight who refused
to flee: the King of France, John I I 44
Edward IH thought he had achieved a decisive political advantage with his victories
at Crecy and Calais but his delight was unparalleled when he learned of his son's triumph
at Poitiers and his capture of the French king. It appeared that the French would have to
sue for peace and that the English had earned the right to be regarded as the preeminent
military power in Europe. The fourteenth century poet Petrarch wrote about this
extraordinary transformation in the military reputation of England in the following passage:
In my youth, the English were regarded as the most timid of all the uncouth races; 
but today they are the supreme warriors; they have destroyed the reputation of the 
French in a succession of startling victories, and men who were once lower even 
than the wretched Scots have crushed the realm of France with fire and steel.45
During the remainder of the 1350s Edward III took advantage of his military 
supremacy to try to force a favorable outcome to the peace negotiations. In 1358 and 1359, 
with John II his "guest" in England, Edward pursued talks in both London and Paris but 
the French refused to come to a settlement. The English monarchy soon tired of the French
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court's dilatory tactics and decided the French needed another punishing military expedition 
to force a resolution of the issues between them. Led by the Black Prince, a full retinue of 
English cavalry and men-at-arms was landed in France with orders to make a show of force 
rather than to defeat an army or seize territory. Only when this expedition made it to the 
gates of Paris,- however, and threatened to conduct a coronation ceremony for Edward at 
Rheims cathedral were the French persuaded to come to terms. Finally, in May 1360, the 
Black Prince and the Dauphin met in a small village in Beauce, called Bretigny, where a 
preliminary agreement was signed as the basis for a more detailed final settlement.46
Meanwhile, the Anglo-Gascon wine trade showed renewed vigor in the 1350s, in 
part because the Black Prince's successes had reduced the number of Anglo-French 
skirmishes on Aquitanian soil. James' analysis of Bordeaux exports during this period 
show better output but the figures are still very low in comparison with those from earlier 
in the fourteenth century. From these data it appears that Unwin's speculation about the 
combined negative impact of the plague and the war is valid. Records in England for the 
same period show that the English were importing a gradually increasing share of the 
smaller total exports from Bordeaux. In addition, James' figures show a significant overall 
rise in both the wholesale and retail prices of wine. In the early 1340s, the average price 
per tun had been selling from between £3 and £5. Following the resumption of hostilities 
in 1347 and the onset of the plague in 1348, prices shot up dramatically to between £6 and 
£8. Then, during the 1350s, these prices moderated somewhat, descending to an average 
of about £5 to £6.47
Much to the benefit of both kingdoms, the preliminary Treaty of Bretigny that had 
been signed by Edward, the Black Prince, and Charles, the Valois Dauphin, in May 1360
113
was ratified five months later. It was the closest the two sides had yet come to a final peace 
accord in that it addressed many of the centuries-old issues that had proved to be so 
contentious. Nevertheless, it would be inaccurate to characterize this treaty as more than a 
generalized agreement because it left many of the most vexing problems unresolved. 
Moreover, whatever the text of the document said, it was most unlikely to be regarded by 
the Valois monarchy as a permanent settlement because of the circumstances in which 
France had been forced to the bargaining table. It was certain, in fact, that as soon as an 
opportunity presented itself, the French monarchy would seek to redress the military 
balance in its favor and to reopen the bargaining for a settlement on terms more favorable to 
Paris. Still, the importance of the Bretigny accord should not be underestimated because, if 
nothing else, it managed to curb substantial military activity for nearly ten years.48
As for the 'issue over Aquitaine', with this treaty Edward III had finally 
accomplished what he and his predecessors had been insisting upon since 1259: un­
disputed sovereignty over the duchy of Gascony. In return, Edward had to renounce his 
claim to the French throne but by doing so he also reacquired nearly all of western France, 
including Aquitaine, Poitou, Ponthieu, Guines and, in the north, he retained the key port of 
Calais.49 In the end, the signing of the treaty mattered more to England than to Gascony 
because for centuries the Gascons had considered themselves to be subjects of the English 
rather than the French monarchy and thus the Treaty of Bretigny was nothing more to them 
than a confirmation of the status quo.
This is not to say, however, that the Gascons were not pleased with the 
developments of 1360 because the peace agreement finally gave them time to recover from 
the ravages of the fighting that had plagued their territory since the start of the conflict. The 
Bordelais, in particular, were glad to seize the opportunity to restore their vineyards and 
their wine trade with England and other nations. The official export records of the 
increased volumes of wine leaving Bordeaux in the 1360s demonstrate that Gascony made 
the most of the peace. Averaging out the numbers provided by James shows that Bordeaux
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exports for the 1360s rose to about 30,000 tuns annually; while there had already been
some improvement in average output during the 1350s, this was the most significant rise in
production figures since the onset of the plague in 1348. One might assume that with this
increase in supply that the price of wine leaving the docks in Bordeaux would go down but
this did not occur. As stated earlier, the average wholesale price for a tun of wine in the
late 1350s was between £5 and £6 and, perhaps to make up for earlier losses, the Bordeaux
vintners were determined to hold to this level. Consequently, retail prices in England also
stayed the same or increased.50
The issue of fair pricing became the dominant question of the Anglo-Gascon trade
during the 1360s. With the war at a standstill and the production of wine up throughout
Aquitaine, many importers and retailers in England brought their demands for a reduction
in prices to the king and Parliament. The king addressed some of these issues firsthand
and recmited several favored nobles to investigate the wine trade. Due to the official
appointment of someone for the task, the king's selection made it into the Patent Rolls. In
one entry, Edward HI called for a:
Commission to Geoffrey de Staunton, et al., to make inquisition in the county of 
Nottingham touching unlawful confederacies in cities, boroughs, market towns and 
elsewhere to meet fishermen and merchants, alien as well as denizen, . . . and 
taverners who sell wine at excessive prices, contrary to the king's proclamations 
against forestalling the market and against selling of wine by taverners except at 
reasonable prices, having regard to the cost of the same in the port of landing and of 
the carriage thence to the place of sale, lately made for the common good in all 
counties of the realm.51
When the nobles who had a stake in the wine trade saw that there was little change in either
wholesale or retail wine costs, they pursued legislative initiatives intended to discourage
monopoly practices or forestalling of price reductions by the Bordelais. In 1363, for
instance, the House of Commons demanded that wine importers submit paperwork
showing their actual expenditures in the Gascon wine market. In the years following,
further legislation was enacted to restrict the importers from doing business with certain
Gascon wine merchants suspected of profiteering but when these restrictions resulted in
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still higher retail pricing, free trade was reestablished. The Commons even attempted to 
force the Gascon exporters back into the wine shipping business so that they would absorb 
the costs of the voyages to England, an expense the English importers had assumed when 
earlier they had driven the Gascons out of this activity.52
To some extent, the Bordeaux vintners and exporters insistence on high prices 
despite increased production was justified. They had to bear the cost of replanting the 
vineyards lost through the war and still needed to expand their Bordeaux-area fields to 
replace the production previously coming from the Haut-Pays district. Moreover, unlike 
wheat, com, and other crops, there is at least a four-year time lag in growing wine grapes 
between replanting and the first commercially useful harvest. Finally, the progress made in 
reviving the Gascon wine industry had been further interrupted by a return of the plague in 
1362 and a severe famine in 1363. In retrospect, even though the Bordelais were free from 
the consequences of warfare for nearly all of the 1360s, life as a Gascon vintner and 
shipper must have been very difficult throughout this decade.53
These challenges to Gascony's most important economic activity were exacerbated
in this period by an important change in the political relationship between Edward III and
his Gascon subjects. One of the things that may have prompted Edward to settle for peace
in 1360 was that his responsibilities for conducting the war had reduced the attention he
could pay to Gascony. In an attempt to reassert his authority over this key outpost of his
realm, Edward elevated the status of the duchy to a principality and put his son, the Black
Prince, in charge.54 Over the course of the 1360s, however, the younger Edward showed
that he lacked the political skills of his father and perhaps took too literally Edward Ill's
instructions to reassert England's control over the Gascons. According to Perroy:
(The Black Prince) had brought with him the harsh requirements which made up the 
strength of the Plantagenets: a meddlesome administration, a great need for money, 
and a resolve to be obeyed without a murmur by all, whether villagers, vassals, or 
clergy. . . (The Gascons) were 'anti-French’ only in so far as they disliked the
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interference of the king's officials and preferred the mild tutelage of a distant 
Plantagenet.55
It seemed that for this brief period the English monarchy had forgotten what a
fiercely independent people the Gascons were and that Westminster's relations with this
stiff-necked region prospered only when England ruled with a loose rein. The Black
Prince's rule risked the possibility of anarchy in this prized province and caused some
prominent Bordelais to question, possibly for the first time, whether they might not be
better off by finally submitting to the Valois throne. Apparently, some Gascon nobles
considered this issue seriously enough that they specifically made a trip to Paris to speak to
the French king about the possibility of switching allegiance. The chronicler Froissart,
who was a member of the French court at the time, reported that:
The King of France listened without complacency to the lords of Gascony, when 
they requested from him help and assistance as from their sovereign lord, adding, 
that should he refuse it to them, they would withdraw their allegiance, and apply to 
some other court; so that, for fear of losing his claim to this sovereignty, he in the 
end complied with their request. He was, however, sensible that this affair must 
cause a war, which he was desirous not to begin without some appearance of 
right: . . .56
To what degree the French throne provided aid to the Gascon region is difficult to assess. 
In fact, much of the evidence shows that none was offered but the important thing to note 
here was not that the French responded in any manner but that the Gascons considered 
supplanting their allegiance at all. This was the first credible sign or dent in the armor that 
surfaced in the Anglo-Gascon alliance.
This inclination to consider abandoning English rule may also have been prompted 
by the ascension of an attractive new French monarch in 1364. Under the terms of the 
Treaty of Bretigny signed in 1360, King John II of France was to have remained a prisoner 
in London until the first installment of a ransom payment was made by the French court. 
By 1364, however, the money had still not been paid and the French king died in captivity. 
He was replaced by the Dauphin — John's son, Charles -- who had been acting as regent in 
his father's absence and had skillfully brought France through some of the worst times in
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its history. Taking the throne at the age of twenty-nine, Charles V (1364-1380) also 
became known as Charles 'the Wise' and proved to be a very capable politician and 
diplomat. He had served as a lieutenant after the defeat at Poitiers and, while not a terrific 
soldier in the mold of the Black Prince, he did possess great energy and showed a gift for 
delegating authority.57
Despite Charles V's evident abilities, there was growing dissension in many parts 
of the French kingdom because of the realm's military defeats and the disadvantageous 
settlement that followed. As time went on, some of the king's leading vassals began 
expressing their grievances not just to the monarch himself but among their peers and it 
was not long before resentment became widespread among France's nobles.58 Edward in 
caught wind of this swelling discord and sought to capitalize on it by reasserting his title as 
King of France as of June 1369. Charles was startled by the brazenness of Edward's 
action because forfeiture of England's claim to the French throne was, for France, the key 
provision of the Bretigny accord. Charles carefully considered his options but in 
November of that year responded by confiscating all the lands in France that Edward had 
reacquired in 1360. Once again, all the old issues that had divided the two kingdoms came 
to the fore and hostilities were immediately resumed.59
These events precipitated one of the most violent and lengthy periods of combat in 
the Hundred Years War. While the conflict up to this point had largely been fought with 
wide-ranging but brief military campaigns separated by long periods of truce, the 1370s 
was a decade of virtually constant fighting. Sparked by Edward's resumption of his claim 
to the French throne, Charles V's military response was massive and successful on 
virtually every front. France's effort was costly in both time and resources but in just a 
few years it had managed, once again, to overrun Brittany, Ponthieu, and Becherel and to
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reduce Plantagenet Aquitaine to a mere coastal strip between Bordeaux and Bayonne.60
Froissart recorded this episode and described the fall of Ponthieu in this way:
There was a grand skirmish, with many valorous deeds of arms . . . The English 
were so roughly handled, that they were either slain or made prisoners, and the 
bridge and fort conquered by the French. In short, the whole territory and county 
of Ponthieu were freed from the English, so that none remained who could any way 
do mischief.61
These French triumphs, probably unexpected by both sides, were the result in part 
of new tactics adopted by Charles V. Because of the problems the French army had 
experienced in previous direct confrontations with English forces, France implemented a 
scorched earth defensive policy and when the French did go on the offensive, they attacked 
English-held garrisons, fortresses, and towns rather than field armies.62 Here too, 
Froissart provided a good example of the lengths made on behalf of the French to reclaim 
occupied lands.
We will now return to what was going forwards in a distant part of the country, and 
relate the siege of Realville in Quercy by the French. There were upwards of 
12,000 combatants, all good men at arm s;. . . The French had set their miners to 
work at Realville, and by their machines, which cast stones, etc., into it day and 
night, had harassed the garrison so much they could not sufficiently watch these 
miners, who succeeded in their operations, and flung down a great part of the 
walls; by which means the town was taken, and all the English in it were put to 
death without mercy, which was a pity, for there were among them several good 
squires.63
The French, however, were not the only ones to alter their strategy; though, in 
England's case, it was not for the better. Since the resumption of hostilities in 1369, the 
English war effort showed a lack of the central direction that had once allowed it 
confidently to conduct simultaneous and interdependent landings in France. The most 
plausible explanation for this failure may be that, while Edward III did not die until 1377, 
he had lost his beloved wife in the same year the war resumed and was showing signs of 
senility by the early 1370s.64
Whatever the case, Edward certainly had difficulty trying to conduct the war and 
increasingly delegated his responsibilities to less capable subordinates. The result was the
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execution of several uncoordinated military expeditions to France that accomplished little 
but cost a great deal. For instance, in 1370 a major invasion led by one well-respected 
English noble turned into nothing more than a futile coastal raid. In 1372, an English fleet 
attempting to provide Edward's forces in Aquitaine with some relief was sunk by a 
Castilian fleet off La Rochelle, losing all the gold intended to pay the king's soldiers in 
Gascony. In 1373, Edward Ill's third son, John of Gaunt and Duke of Lancaster, 
succeeded in penetrating France's coastal defenses and led a bold campaign across the 
French countryside but, like others before it, his effort bore no fruit.65 The culmination of 
England's failures was France's successful invasion of Gascony in 1374. When the 
English fortress at La Reole fell to the French, it opened the way for an assault on the 
Bordeaux region itself which reduced England's holdings to just the four dioceses of 
Bordeaux, Dax, Aire, and Bayonne.66
Despite these successes, the French realized that their resources were eroding and 
decided that the time had come to return to the bargaining table. England, stunned by the 
extent of its losses and equally low on resources was also willing to talk if only to stop the 
fighting and reevaluate its position. Thus, in 1374, negotiations were resumed though the 
early talks showed few results. England did not want to discuss any outcomes different 
from those it had achieved at Bretigny and France was demanding new frontiers based 
upon their victories at Calais, Brittany, and Gascony. In 1375, despite these wide 
differences, each side sought to show that it was serious about arbitration by renewing its 
embassies with high level diplomats who were brought together at Bruges. Although these 
new ambassadors were soon able to agree to a cease fire, once the discussion turned to 
Aquitaine any semblance of harmony was quickly dissipated, proving once again that for 
England the fate of Gascony was non-negotiable. The issue, as always, was sovereignty 
which Edward IH believed he settled for all time in 1360. With equal conviction the French 
argued that they could not permanently accept any settlement which violated the integrity of 
what they believed were the natural borders of France.67 Froissart, who was on the scene
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while these negotiations were taking place, commented that, "Notwithstanding all that the 
prelates could say or argue, they never could be brought to fix upon any place to discuss 
these treaties on any part of the frontiers; these treaties, therefore, remained in an 
unfinished state." Both kingdoms remained obdurate on this point and thus the talks broke 
down and hostilities were renewed in 1377.68
The EngUsh, who had shown no appetite for taking the offensive in the preceding 
few years, were even less inclined to do so in 1377. The Plantagenet realm was suddenly 
faced with an internal crisis it had not faced in half a century. As Perroy described it, 
"England was in mourning, a ship without a pilot." On June 21, 1377, Edward III died, a 
monarch who guided the destiny of the Island Kingdom for more than fifty years. It was 
the longest reign since Henry HI and Edward never let the English forget or lose touch with 
their continental origins and claims to territory in France. The loss was especially 
devastating because the Black Prince had died prematurely only the year before. The 
Prince of Wales had returned to England in 1371 with his health broken and his reputation 
tarnished by his humiliating losses to the French in Gascony. So, in the summer of 1377, 
the English monarchy skipped a generation and the crown devolved to a boy of ten, 
Richard of Bordeaux, the Black Prince's only son. The French, who had nearly succeeded 
in winning back their kingdom with the victories they achieved in the early 1370s, were 
suddenly presented with a second chance to finish the job while England was staggered by 
the loss of one of its greatest leaders.69
Something must have stiffened English resolve because, when the cease fire ended 
in 1377, the Plantagenet forces not only held their ground but succeeded in reversing the 
first French advances. The high expectations of the French king were quickly dashed 
when English reinforcements arrived in Gascony to strengthen the combined Anglo- 
Gascon defense force. What was remarkable was the relative ease with which the English 
were able to reestablish Gascony's borders, force back their opponents, retake some lost 
garrisons, and launch punitive raids into the French interior. By the time a Castilian raid on
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Bayonne was handily repulsed by the Anglo-Gascon forces, it was clear that France’s 
expectations of an early victory could not be realized.70
The effects of this violent decade on the wine trade were tremendous. Merchants 
who had hoped to see a decline in prices from the highs of the previous decade were deeply 
disappointed in the 1370s when a series of adverse circumstances resulted in a further 
contraction in the availability of wine and a consequent boost in prices to as much as £8 per 
tun. The contraction in vineyard output can be seen in the tax records for Bordeaux which 
show that the annual wine exports for this decade averaged only about 10,000 tuns. 
Although this reduction in supplies to just one-third of what had been available for export 
in the preceding decade would have by itself been enough to cause a rise in prices, the 
situation was made worse by the fact that there were unusually wide variances in the 
amount of wine produced from year to year. These fluctuations are clearly evident in the 
data researched by James; for example, while the 1376 vintage provided almost 24,000 
tuns for export, in 1379 Gascony's vineyards yielded only 6,500 tuns. The market 
uncertainties caused by such broad swings in the amount of wine available for export were 
as responsible as the overall reduction in supply for the sharp rise in both wholesale and 
retail pricing in the 1370s.71
The reduced availability of Gascon wine can be attributed to several factors. First 
and foremost was the war which returned to the region with a vengeance in the early and 
late 1370s. These periods of fighting sharply reduced the borders of Gascony to a 
perimeter in the immediate vicinity of the port of Bordeaux. The wine industry was directly 
affected in two ways: first, many of the vineyards were destroyed as the fighting raged 
over large sections of the Gascon countryside; and
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second, as the English frontier in Gascony was reduced many still productive vineyards fell 
into the hands of the French. Adding insult to these injuries, the viability of the wine 
industry's extensive labor force was tested again as the Black Death reemerged across 
southwestern France in 1373 and a severe famine followed in 1374. Back in England, 
these shocks to the wine industry were compounded by the fact that Edward IH's declining 
years were marked by an economic depression which reduced the demand for wine 
imports.73 One of the reasons England had chosen Aquitaine as its primary vineyard was 
that it had proved to be a seemingly inexhaustible source of good but cheap wine. By the 
end of the 1370s, however, its wines were no longer affordable to many Englishmen and, 
with the average annual production hovering at only the 10,000 tun level, the major import
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houses in England must have been wondering whether if this well — which had produced 
over 100,000 tuns as recently as 1308 — was at last running dry.
The violence and the relentless pace of the fighting in the 1370s seems to have 
sharply reduced the appetite for battle in the last two decades of the fourteenth century. In 
any case, the 1380s and 90s proved to be comparatively peaceful and those clashes that did 
occur were typified by piracy in the English Channel and skirmishes over frontier 
fortifications. The large-scale military campaigns formerly undertaken by the opposing 
monarchies were set aside as both focused on the development of new leaders. As was 
previously noted, King Edward III died leaving his ten year old grandson, Richard II 
(1377-1399), to take the throne. In France, three years later, King Charles V died 
unexpectedly and had to be replaced with a son, Charles VI (1380-1422), who also was 
only ten when he acquired the position. Therefore, the 1380s can be seen as a period of 
internal focus and reconsolidation for both monarchies and one in which "divergent 
interests in the councils of both kingdoms prevented either effective military policy or peace 
negotiations from being pushed forward."74
While it was true that during the 1380s no major campaigns were embarked upon 
and that no significant battles were fought that determined the outcome of the war, it was 
not for a lack of trying. Particularly for the French, who recognized England's weaknesses 
following Edward Ill's death and quickly tried to capitalize on them. Despite the youth of 
their new king, the French nobility sought earnestly to finally bring the war to England by 
planning an invasion of the southern portion of the island kingdom. Many small, 
marauding French armies were prepared in Brittany, organized, supplied, and readied to 
cross the Channel on very short notice; but circumstances in France repeatedly arose that 
delayed their planned departure dates. Alas, after several attempts, the 1380s passed 
without an invasion.75
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Although the French tried to keep their invasion plans covert, amassing an army,
even in the Middle Ages, attracted a great deal of attention, particularly as it was done
repeatedly. So, as one might expect, the English were rightfully alarmed when they caught
wind of France's plans. This concern may not have been so acute under the capable
leadership of Edward III but England was now ruled by a young king who failed to acquire
the confidence of not only the peasantry but, more importantly, that of the nobility.
Richard II fought frequently with his closest advisors and Sistant nobles alike. The
dissension that grew in England between king and nobility was the fuel to the fire for the
French that made their potential invasion plausible. At the same time, the mere intention of
a French invasion of England fed the fire of dissension against Richard II.76
The 1380s indeed were a time of introspection as the monarchies of France and
England matured. Some of the sentiments and concerns of the period were voiced
particularly loudly in England, possibly in response to the recent aggressive nature of
France. Thanks to Froissart, some of these sentiments were recorded as they suggest the
intentions of the English nobility and which may help explain their actions in the future.
Rather cunningly, Froissart chose to create an amalgam of conversations that, as he put it,
"were very common, not only with knights and squires, but among the inhabitants of many
of the towns, . . ." Albeit this kind of talk placed the realm in great jeopardy, Froissart
wrote that those who wished mischief said and shared the following similar concerns:
What is now become of our grand enterprises and our valiant captains? . . .
We used to invade France and rebuff our enemies, so that they were afraid to 
show themselves, or venture to engage us; and, when they did so, they were 
defeated. . . Where are the knights and princes of England who can now do 
such things? . . .  In those days we were feared,. . . but at this moment we 
must be silent, for they know not how to make war, except on our pockets: . .  . 
Only a child reigns now in France, and yet he has given us more alarms than 
any of his predecessors, and shows good courage and inclination to invade us.
. . .  It seems, also, that we are weakened in understanding and activity as well 
as in courage; for we used to know what was intended by France, and what 
were its plans, some months before they could execute them, by which we were 
prepared to resist them. Now, we are not only ignorant of what is going forward in 
France; but they are well informed of all that passes,. . . and we know not whom 
to blame.77
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These domestic interests notwithstanding, the English and French could not go on 
indefinitely without some effort to resolve their deep differences on the battlefield or at the 
bargaining table. J In 1389, peace talks were resumed at which the unofficial truce was 
formally acknowledged by both sides and an agreement was reached to proceed with 
further negotiations. These talks seemed promising and, as a demonstration of good faith, 
the two young monarchs sent high-level diplomats to the table including the Dukes of 
Lancaster and York from England and of Burgundy, Berry, and Bourbon from France. 
Unlike the earlier talks between the representatives of Edward III and Charles V,
sovereignty was not made the central issue because Richard II and his advisors seemed
content to acknowledge his status as a vassal of France so long as England regained actual 
control of Aquitaine and Richard's feudal obligations were strictly limited to rendering 
'simple homage' to Charles VI. The Dukes of Burgundy and Berry were given similarly 
conciliatory instructions by Charles and offered England the payment of war indemnities 
and the exchange of certain lands including Angoumois, Agenais, Quercy and Rouergue. 
They were also ordered, however, to refuse any English offers that did not include
agreeing to render 'liege homage' for the control of Aquitaine.78
Once again, the 'issue over Aquitaine' became the sticking point in arbitration and 
the one irremovable road block to a lasting peace. Several different options were then 
considered for settling the future of the duchy. During Richard II's minority, his uncle, 
John of Gaunt, had essentially run the kingdom. By 1390, when Richard was ruling in his 
own right, he decided to grant John—who was already the Duke of Lancaster—his title as 
Duke of Gascony.79 This decision caused an immediate uproar in Aquitaine and led to 
disruptions in the normal functioning of the government in Bordeaux. Its response was 
driven by fears that John and his officials, like the Black Prince before him, would abuse 
the autonomy traditionally enjoyed by the duchy. They also objected because Richard had 
taken this step in a matter vital to their interests without any prior consultation. The local
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leaders became even more incensed when they learned Richard had considered granting the
duchy to John of Gaunt as an appanage of the French kingdom and that John, in turn,
intended to pass this appanage on to his son.80 This scheme, while eventually abandoned,
was just one in a series of potential deals drafted in the attempt to find a solution to the
problem of sovereignty over Gascony. There was one conversation, however, that seemed
to be largely absent and that was the voice of the Gascons. Indeed, they had strong
opinions about the sovereignty of their land which were recorded by Froissart and
eventually heard by the English crown. This invaluable medieval chronicler reported that:
I was told for truth, that the king and his council had written to the duke of 
Lancaster to return to England, for those from Aquitaine boldly declared they 
would not submit to any other lord but the King of England. . . The whole 
council were fearful of the consequences: . . .fo r [Gascons] declared, that 
should the duchy of Aquitaine be alienated from the crown of England, it would in 
times to come be very prejudicial to its interests. [The English] were 
unwilling, therefore, to risk such a loss, as the towns of Bordeaux and 
Bayonne had always strongly supported the cause of England.81
Such machinations, however justifiable in the larger context of stopping the endless, 
debilitating war between France and England, seriously affected Anglo-Gascon relations by 
shaking the faith of the local leaders in Bordeaux in what they always believed were their 
fellow countrymen in London.82
As we saw back in the 1350s and 60s, while the Black Prince ruled over Aquitaine, 
the Gascons resented the intrusion. The Bordelais preferred to govern themselves with an 
English king as sovereign. And when an English duke came down to south-western 
France to rule, the Gascons reacted harshly, encouraging them to consider other 
sovereigns, possibly French. We saw it with the Black Prince and the issues arose again 
with the potential appointment of John of Gaunt, Duke of Lancaster, as Duke of Gascony. 
Apparently, both King Charles V and VI were receptive to the concerns of Aquitaine; they 
understood, after all, that capturing the heart of Gascony politically was a lot more 
attractive and far less costly than taking the duchy militarily. The French throne particularly 
pursued several Gascon barons, like the Count d'Armagnac and the Lord dAlbreth,
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recognizing that their sphere of influence may be the key to those Aquitanian hearts. The 
Gascons are a very proud people, and they tend to react strongly when their pride is 
contested by another domineering ego. The English crown, by the 1350s and 60s, became 
that ego and the Gascons reacted accordingly. Froissart who was paying particularly close 
attention to the issues in Aquitaine at the time commented on the reactions of the Gascons. 
He wrote:
I, the author of this history,. . . witnessed the great hautiness of the English, 
who are affable to no other nation than their own; nor could any of the 
gentlemen of Gascony or Aquitaine,. . . obtain office or appointment in their 
own country; for the English said [Gascons] were neither on a level with them 
nor worthy of their society, which made the Gascons very indignant, . . .  It 
was on account of the harshness of the [Black] prince's manners that the count 
d'Armagnac and the lord d'Albreth, with other knights and squires, turned to the 
French interest. King Philip of France, and the good John his son, had lost 
Gascony by their overbearing pride; and in like manner did the prince. But King 
Charles, of happy memory, regained them by good humor, liberality, and humility. 
In this manner the Gascons love to be governed.83
To our benefit, Froissart had the rare opportunity to speak with the players of the
drama that was the ever changing relationship between England, Gascony, and France.
While it looked as though the Aquitanians were increasingly leaning toward French
sovereignty due to England's overbearing ego, Froissart's conversations with several
Gascon nobles at the time provide a unique perspective and reality to the Anglo-Gascon
relationship. According to Froissart:
True it is, that when I lived among these lords at Paris, I once heard the lord 
d'Albreth use an expression that I noted down. I believe it may have been said in 
joke: however, it contained, in my opinion, much truth and good sense. A knight 
from Brittany, who had bome arms for [d'Albreth], inquired after his health, and 
how he managed to remain steady to the French: when he thus answered, — 'Thank 
God, my health is very good; but I had more money at command, as well as my 
people, when I made war for the King of England,. . .' The knight, on hearing 
this, burst into laughter and replied, 'In truth, that is the life Gascons love: they 
willingly hurt their neighbor.'84
Froissart reported that as these Gascon lords worked more closely with Charles V 
and VI to improve the Franco-Gascon relationship, it became evident that the French throne 
too would become overbearing. At the same time, England went through rather humbling
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experiences in the 1370s and so as the English learned to swallow their pride in the 1380s 
and 90s, they became more attractive, once again, to the Aquitanians. Many of those 
Gascon lords that at once contemplated French sovereignty heartily repented this decision 
and came back to the fold of English allegiance. Upon their return, Froissart was quick to 
respond to why the Anglo-Gascon relationship is so strong. He noted, "Such are the 
Gascons: they are very unsteady, but they love the English in preference to the French, for 
the war against France is the most profitable; and this is the cause of their preference."85
In August 1396, just when the peace talks neared collapse, Richard II personally 
intervened and made a major effort to conclude a lasting peace. His ploy was not suddenly 
to concede to all of France's demands but to make a grand, conciliatory gesture of a type 
not uncommon in the Middle Ages, i.e. to marry a key member of his opponent's family, 
in this case Charles Vi's daughter, Isabella. This course of action was open to Richard 
because his beloved wife, Anne, had recently died and he had just disposed of those 
members of the English nobility most opposed to his reaching a settlement with the French. 
Thus, in the fall of 1396, after his wedding to Isabella and several direct talks between the 
two kings, a twenty-eight year truce was concluded.86 Despite all the attendant pomp and 
ceremony, the final peace agreement was left unsigned and the opportunity to come to 
closure was lost just three years later when Richard was forcibly removed from the throne 
and succeeded by his cousin and Earl of Derby, Henry Bolingbroke. Bolingbroke was the 
son of John of Gaunt and had been exiled by Richard when John died in 1399 because the 
king did not trust those from Lancaster. With the support of a growing band of the English 
nobility who believed they had been wronged by Richard, Henry returned to England, 
imprisoned Richard, and fueled propaganda that claimed the king was a tyrant who had 
forfeited his right to rule. Parliament declared an empty throne and a new era emerged 
when Bolingbroke — a Lancastrian — claimed it for himself as King Henry IV (1399-
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1413). Richard, incidentally, did not cope well in incarceration and eventually starved to 
death in 1400.87
This second deposition of an English monarch in less than a century provided an 
opening for those who had opposed Richard's efforts to reach a settlement with the French 
to reignite the conflict. It soon became clear, however, that Henry IV was too engrossed in 
protecting his claim to the English throne to renew the fighting with France and, in any 
event, was often too ill to lead military operations. As for the French, while they wanted to 
capitalize on England's increasingly obvious weakness, they too found themselves dealing 
with internal strife. Since the early 1390s, Charles VI had shown significant symptoms of 
mental illness and his condition was growing steadily worse. This situation which made 
carrying on the business of the French government increasingly difficult also created an 
opportunity for powerful French nobles like the Duke of Burgundy to reduce their 
allegiance to the king and to establish competing power centers within the realm.88 Despite 
such growing political problems, Charles took advantage of Henry's preoccupation with 
affairs at home to exert military pressure on the Gascon frontier and to seize some English 
fortifications.89
Fortunately for the wine trade, the simultaneous preoccupation of both kingdoms 
with their internal difficulties created another window of opportunity for the winegrowers 
and shippers of Bordeaux to replant their vineyards and concentrate on making and 
shipping wine. The result was a return to a period of modest prosperity during the last 
twenty years of the fourteenth century. It is important to stress, however, that the recovery 
of the industry was gradual because the destruction of the vineyards in Gascony had been 
so extensive and because the newly planted vines needed time to become productive. Thus 
the volume of Bordeaux exports grew only incrementally throughout the 1380s.
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It should be noted, moreover, that much of the information about the wine trade 
available from Gascon tax records during this period is incomplete. Nevertheless, the 
research conducted by Margery James provides a generalized picture of what was going on; 
it is based not only on the data for Bordeaux exports but for the imports to England as well. 
Her analysis shows that in the first half of the 1390s the recovery in shipments from 
Bordeaux was well underway as the replanted vineyards once again became commercially 
productive. Still, the wine flow from Gascony remained well below the levels it had 
achieved in the early part of this century, in large part because the vineyards of the Haut- 
Pays district remained in French hands. From the evidence available, James concluded that 
in the 1390s Bordeaux's average annual output had risen to only about 20,000 tuns. In 
other words, production had doubled since the disastrous lows of the 1370s but was still 
only two-thirds of what it had been in the 1360s.90
One of the most positive developments during this period of recovery was the 
virtual perfection of the wine convoy system which ensured that what little wine was 
coming out of Bordeaux was at least getting to England and other destinations safely. And 
James' research also makes clear that while Bordeaux's exports were slowly growing in 
the last twenty years of the century, so too was the proportion of the output being imported 
by England. She estimates that while English merchants took only about one-fourth of 
Gascony's wine exports in the early years of the century, at its end between three-fourths 
and four-fifths must have been arriving in the Island Kingdom. Furthermore, as the 1300s 
drew to a close, Richard II was encouraging Gascon merchants to participate freely in the 
reciprocal flow of raw materials and manufactured goods to Aquitaine from England 91
Wine pricing was.still an issue in this period and England sought to pressure the 
Gascons into reducing the cost of their chief product. The English importers were 
anticipating such a reduction as the Bordeaux vineyards became more productive and when 
they felt that the price levels were falling too slowly, they persuaded Richard II to mandate 
wholesale prices at a level between £4 and £5 a tun. When this effort at government-
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imposed price control failed to achieve the desired results, it was repealed. Only when the 
years of abnormal production fluctuations -- stemming chiefly from the war — came to an 
end did the Gascon merchants drop their prices.92
One might think that the advent of the fifteenth century would have prompted the 
monarchs of France and England to resolve their seemingly endless conflict either by force 
of arms or through negotiation. Instead, they settled for a continued stalemate and 
therefore the uneasy peace that had characterized the preceding twenty years was extended 
well into the next decade. In retrospect, one might fairly conclude from the relative 
passivity of Henry IV and Charles VI in this period that both monarchs had decided after 
more than sixty years of on-again, off-again warfare that theirs was a conflict that was 
impossible to settle.
While the French court certainly was disinclined to undertake overt military action, 
it clearly recognized the weaknesses of Henry IV's government and pursued more subtle 
means of subverting England's position on the continent. Furthermore Charles VI had 
decided on a revised military strategy, one which called for avoiding costly combat with 
England on a country-wide basis and concentrated instead on just one region: Aquitaine. 
The French monarch's first attempt to undermine English authority in Gascony was to 
detect and foster dissension among the duchy's inhabitants. Charles VI sent several 
envoys to the area to test public opinion and, if possible, to provoke a rebellion. The 
French expected to find cracks in the Gascon alliance with England because of the enmity 
that was created by the clumsy rule of the Black Prince and, more recently, John of Gaunt. 
To their surprise, they found Bordeaux once again at ease with London though this may 
have been due less to England's efforts to repair its relations with its independent-minded 
province than that Henry IV was distant, weak, and gave the Gascons little concern. 
Frustrated when his Gascon project proved fruitless, Charles turned to supporting
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dissension in Wales by sending money, arms, and troops but this effort also produced few
positive results for the French.93
While Charles VI was busying himself with these covert methods of ejecting
England from Aquitaine, some of his nobles still wanted to proceed more directly with a
full-scale invasion of Gascony. Louis of Orleans orchestrated such a plan and eventually
got permission from the royal council to attempt to seize the maverick duchy by force. The
campaign which was designed quickly and launched in 1405 came remarkably close to
achieving its goal. Perroy succinctly describes the story of the invasion in this fashion:
Advancing from Poitou, the Constable, Charles of Albret, liberated all the 
fortresses situated south of Saintonge and on the frontiers of Perigord. The French 
advance reached the Gironde and the lower Dordogne. Meanwhile, having 
recruited an army in Languedoc, the Count of Armagnac operated in Middle 
Gascony, south of the Garonne, and seriously threatened Bordeaux. But once 
more the enterprise was beyond the means available. The campaign intended to be 
a lightning-stroke, dragged on to no profit. . . [T]he new Duke of Burgundy,
John the Fearless, entrusted to reducing Calais, was indolent in his attack . . . His 
heart was not in it. The struggle between the two princes was becoming keener, 
and led to the abandonment of the plans of conquest.94
It was amazing that a campaign that began with such passion could have disintegrated so
quickly into yet another exercise in futility. This endeavor, however, was typical of the
period. After seventy years of conflict, the aims of both sides were clear but their
resources were scant and those who took initiatives soon tired and were easily distracted.
France's renewed efforts to drive the English from Guienne had predictably
negative effects on the wine industry. Despite this, the data show that in the first part of the
decade the recovery of the Anglo-Gascon wine trade that was underway in the 1380s was
continuing and that greater stability in annual production was returning. As James
described this development:
Fluctuations did, of course, occur and their causes were generally the same as 
those which underlay those of the fourteenth century — war, pestilence, famine, and 
the interruption of sea communications. . . . thus the study of the early fifteenth
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century is much less complex and presents fewer problems than that of the previous 
period.95
WINE EXPORTS FROM BORDEAUX DURING THE 15TH CENTURY96
Year W ines o f  
B ordeaux: 
B urgesses, 
nob les, v 
ecclesiastics
W ines from  
ou tsid e  
B ordeaux: 
B urgesses
W ines from  
H a u t  P ays  
under E n g lish  
rule: 
B urgess n o n ­
burgess
O th er  w in e s1 T o ta l2
(tu n s)
1402-3 10,067
1409-10 4,840 3,533 3,618 1,223 56 13,270
1412-13 5,171 2,810 4,246 557 264 13,158
1418-19 1,086 1,195 102 232
1422-23 6,107 2,886 5,822 1,388 105 16,258
1427-18 3,796 2,225 2,410 705 28 9,074
1428-29 3,747 2,817 2,769 1,004 228 10,765
1429-30 5,333 3,055 3,527 1,197 10 13.222
1430-31 5,528 2,882 3,934 1,244 46 13,634
1431-32 2,929 2,608 2,307 782 0 8,626
1433-34 2,663 2,994 604 0
1435-36 5,586 2,616 3,466 911 14 12,603
1436-37 4,748 2,316 3,170 669 0 10,903
1437-38 2,333 712 1,430 268 18 . 4,761
1438-39 2,638 257 871 286 0 4,052
1443-44 4,502 2,141 1,549 735 0 8,827
1448-49 5,638 2,339 905 124
1452-53 5,337 2,712 1,448 422 0 9,919
Notes: lOther wines includes wines of the Agenais and wines on which custom was 
compounded at one franc o ro n e  noble a ton.
T o ta ls  do not include returns of customs collected at Libourne.
Source: derived from James, M. K., Studies in the Medieval Wine Trade, edited by Veale, E. 
M.. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971: 55-56
The return of some stability in Bordeaux's annual output must have been a welcome 
development to exporters and importers alike but there was no denying that the overall 
production level was hovering near historically low levels. On average, the annual wine 
exports from Bordeaux ran between 12,000 and 14,000 tuns and when shocks to the 
industry occurred, like the one caused by the French invasion of Gascony between 1405 
and 1407, production fell to about one-third of these levels. Again, the English responded 
by buying up nearly all the wine available, taking generally between 9,000 and 11,000 tuns 
annually. While the English were only perpetuating their trend of taking a larger slice of a
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significantly smaller pie, the response is noteworthy because it further identified 
Bordeaux's wines as indispensable to the English. And, although the Gascons had learned 
not to expect much from the monarchy of Henry IV, they liked it that way and clearly 
understood from where their money was coming. With that continually on their minds, 
they kept up their strong resistance to the French.97
Since the dawn of the new century France had tried to capitalize on the weak­
nesses of the new Lancastrian regime in England. But the deficiencies of the French 
monarchy were also growing as Charles VI became increasingly unstable, making his 
government weak and inviting some of the more powerful nobles to consider deposing the 
king. In the early 1410s, the Duke of Burgundy began an effort to unseat the Valois 
monarch and transfer power to himself.98 England learned of this development and sought 
to take advantage of the situation by sending delegates, money, and reinforcements to both 
the Burgundians and the supporters of Charles VI. Despite the civil strife that ensued, 
England's intervention was resented by both sides and there was serious talk of renewing 
the war against Henry IV. Exactly who would lead this campaign against England 
remained unsettled until 1413 when the French court received the news that Henry had 
died. His successor was to be his eldest son, also Henry, whose qualities as a far more 
vigorous leader than his father were already well known to the French. As Perroy has 
noted, "with the new king’s accession war became almost a certainty."99
It would be difficult to find someone better prepared to be a medieval sovereign 
than Henry V (1413-1422). As early as 1408, when his father was weakened by illness, 
young Henry demonstrated the ambition of some of his most renowned Plantagenet 
predecessors, taking on dangerous assignments and eventually acquiring enough 
supporters to try to force his father's abdication. Although unsuccessful in this effort, the 
son's evident impatience to rule was indicative of a prince who was sure of himself, his
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capabilities, and his rights.100 Kenneth Fowler has summed up England's apparent king of 
kings as follows:
By a singular irony of fate, the first king of England who had some English 
blood in his veins . . . was also the man who achieved for his son the dream 
of his Plantagenet predecessors: the union in one person of the crowns of 
England and France. To succeed where Edward III had failed took outstand­
ing qualities and in these Henry V was not lacking. King at the age of twenty- 
five, as a boy he had seen service in Ireland with Richard n , had served a hard 
military apprenticeship in the Welsh campaigns at the beginning of his father's reign 
and had subsequently shown himself eager to exercise the royal power. A good 
soldier he was also, like his ancestors Henry II and Edward I, a businesslike 
bureaucrat, a sound administrator, and a stem judge. . . His popularity among 
his countrymen was hardly less, and was possibly greater than that of 
Edward III; . . .101
Henry V went straight to work upon the death of his father to ensure that he did not 
lose the precious political advantage Henry IV had begun to exploit by playing on the bitter 
rivalry between the Valois and Burgundian factions in France. Henry V continued to 
provide arms and men to both sides and in return received territorial concessions. In a 
series of negotiations conducted over two years following his ascension, Henry favored 
whichever party proved more generous in turning over French land to the Plantagenet 
throne. From Paris in August 1413, to Leulinghen in September, to London in November, 
and then back to Paris in January 1414, the new English king's negotiators met with the 
French factions and each time the territorial demands from Westminister became more bold. 
Henry began by asking for sovereignty over Aquitaine and soon escalated his demands to 
restoration of the boundaries set by the Treaty of Bretigny back in 1360. As the 
Burgundian-Valois struggle became more acute, England's demand for concessions turned 
even more grand. Eventually, Henry asked for restoration of England's old Angevin 
empire as it existed under Henry II and demanded sovereignty over Handers and Artois as 
well. Although he probably expected less than he requested, Henry pressed his advantage 
over the French vigorously because he was essentially killing three birds with one stone: 
undermining the strength of the French monarchy; regaining English territory in France; 
and keeping his military costs at a minimum.102
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It was remarkable how much the French factions were willing to concede to the 
English in order to gain an advantage over one another. For instance, at the conference 
held at Leicester in May 1414, the Burgundians — whom Henry V distrusted — made some 
generous proposals. In return for a promise of English men-at-arms to serve in a joint 
campaign against the Valois forces, they offered Henry a share in the spoils of victory. But 
before Henry made the deal, he wanted to learn more specifically what the Burgundians 
were offering and therefore moved to continue the talks at Ypres in August of that year. 
Jean, Duke of Burgundy, quickly realizing what the English had in mind for concessions, 
was left with little choice but to break off the talks because by granting such demands, Jean 
would have jeopardized his own plans for achieving hegemony in France. The royalists 
must have felt threatened by these meetings between the Plantagenets and the Burgund­
ians because they soon went even further along the path of concession. Already having 
promised Henry much of the land in the former Angevin empire, they also offered him 
payment of some old Valois war debts, full sovereignty over Aquitaine, and a dowry of 
two million francs for Henry to marry Charles Vi's daughter, Catherine.103
In one important aspect of his foreign policy Henry V differed from his 
predecessors and that was in the indifference he displayed toward the possession of 
Aquitaine. For this Plantagenet king, Gascony seemed relatively unimportant, probably 
because he had even grander goals in mind. With the progress that he had been making in 
reacquiring French territory by playing the factions of France against one another, Henry 
had begun to entertain the thought of reasserting England's claim not just to parts of France 
but to the French throne itself. He realized that this grand ambition was not inconceivable 
because, with the royalists offering the king's daughter in marriage, Henry had a realistic 
chance of becoming a prince of France and therefore a legitimate aspirant to the Valois 
crown. Moreover, with the territorial concessions he had already received, Henry was well 
on his way to controlling many of the provinces north of the Loire and therefore knew that, 
if his way to a legal takeover of the throne was barred, he was in a position to seize the lie-
137
de-France militarily. As Henry saw it, the French monarchy would soon be at the mercy of
London, or at least rendered impotent, by being caught between the Burgundian domains in
the east and the English-held territories in the north and west.104
With things already looking bleak for the Valois dynasty, the Gascons added insult
to injury by going on the offensive in 1414 and promptly recovering all the fortresses it had
lost to the French in their Aquitanian campaign of 1405. In addition, the Gascons pushed
forward, invading Saintonge and threatening La Rochelle, while the English fleet made a
raid along the Normandy coast at Dieppe. These modest military victories by the Anglo-
Gascon forces backfired politically, however, at the then ongoing negotiations between
Henry V and the Valois court. Charles VI and his envoys finally seemed to get their wits
about them, broke off further talks in 1415 and repealed their earlier concessions to
England. Henry, who had thought he was on the verge of achieving unparalleled success
in France, was suddenly thwarted; incensed, he sent a message threatening war and placing
the blame for it upon the French.105 Another medieval chronicler by the name of Jean de
Waurin captured the intensity of Henry's fury and the sincerity of the king's intentions in
reaction to the above events. Waurin reported:
. . .  it was concluded by the English that if the king of France did not give King 
Henry with his daughter the duchies of Aquitaine, Normandy, Anjou, and 
Touraine, with the counties of Poitou, Le Mans, and Ponthieu, together with all 
things formally pertaining by inheritance to the kings of England his predecessors, 
he would in no wise forego his expedition, enterprise, and army, but would
in every direction and to the utmost of his power destroy the lands of his adversary 
the king of France and his kingdom,. . . wherefore he intended to recover all his 
property, and even to take from him the crown of the fleur-de-lys.106
Despite his show of outrage and surprise, it seems that a renewal of full-scale war 
had been at the core of Henry V's planning from the start of his reign. Clearly, the 
royalists and the Burgundians knew that Henry had been playing them off against each 
other and, given the examples of prior French concession-making, had never regarded their 
offers to Henry as binding. Henry, certainly, was equally aware of the temporary nature of 
French political settlements and this realization probably explains why he had been
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assembling and training an army ever since he took the throne. Charles Vi's abrupt 
reversal of policy in 1415 finally gave Henry an excuse to throw his rebuilt forces into 
action.
The new campaign, which began in August of that year, was originally intended
only to reconnoiter the Normandy coast for a suitable disembarkation point for an invasion
of northwest France at a later point.107 The Plantagenet king and his troops, however,
moved inland far more easily than expected and were proceeding toward Calais when they
were finally forced to make a stand against a much larger French army near Agincourt on
the Artois plateau on October 25th. The French apparently had not learned from their
mistakes at Crecy and Poitiers by sending a large cavalry charge at the English position
over very poor terrain against entrenched men-at-arms and England's most devastating
force, its archers. An eyewitness to the battle, who fought on the side of the English,
described the events in the following manner:
And when they came near enough to attack, the French horsemen posted on 
the sides rushed against our archers on both flanks of our army; but quickly, 
they were compelled to retreat by the showers of arrows and to flee behind their 
lines . . . except the large numbers whom the points of the stakes or the 
sharpness of the arrows stopped from flight by piercing the horses or the 
horsemen. . . No one had time to receive them as captives, but almost all of 
them without distinction of persons, when they fell to the ground, struck down by 
our men or by those following them, I know not by what hidden judgment of God, 
were killed without intermission . . ,108
Once again, France's knights went down in great numbers and the English won an over­
whelming victory. Following this triumph, Henry and his men proceeded on to Calais 
unmolested. The immediate impact of this victory was mainly psychological but the 
material payoff came two years later when a second English invasion conquered Normandy 
easily and Henry's troops took up permanent quarters to force the French to a settlement on 
England's terms.109
139
The events which followed would have made Edward III proud. France, still 
embroiled in civil strife, had lost the best of its army to its ancient foe who was now in the 
process of building or improving unassailable stone fortresses over much of the land it had 
seized in the northern and western parts of the country. In the east there were the 
Burgundians, equally bitter toward the king and successful in their military expansion at 
France's expense. Charles VI was no longer in a position to argue with the Plantagenets; 
he had to concede. Henry V, who had spent the better part of his first years as king 
negotiating with the contending factions in France knew his opponents well and was now 
at a bargaining table of a different sort. The difference, of course, was that he was at last in 
a position to dictate the terms of the peace.
It took several years but a treaty was concluded at Troyes in May 1420. According 
to the agreement, Henry V was granted Charles Vi's daughter, Catherine, in marriage and 
was given a promise that upon Charles' death the French crown would pass to Henry and 
subsequently to his and Catherine's children. Moreover, because of Charles' growing 
mental illness it was agreed that Henry would begin to serve immediately as regent of 
France. With the mutual consent of his parents, their son the Dauphin was disinherited and 
plans were made to establish a dual monarchy of France and England.110
Henry V's 1420 triumph in assuming the leadership of both France and England 
had been the Plantagenet's dream since their dynasty began in the twelfth century. The 
victory was all the more remarkable because, less than fifteen years before, England's 
position in France had been reduced to nothing but a small strip of land between Bordeaux 
and Bayonne. Unfortunately for Henry, this high water mark in England's dominance of 
France proved to be short-lived. Two years after Henry's effective assumption of the 
French throne, he led a force into the Loire valley to subdue the Dauphin who reneged on 
the terms of the Treaty of Troyes. In a siege of the town of Meaux, Henry contracted
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dysentery and died after only nine years on the English throne. But the political tide was 
not to change there only. Two months later, King Charles VI died as well. The year 1422
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had turned out to be a disaster for both sides but especially for England. As Elizabeth
Hallam described the situation:
Henry had restored the crown to its full dignity and authority after the calamities of 
the fourteenth century. He governed his subjects with justice and mercy and strove 
to extend his empire over France, the ancient enemy, to bring peace and security to 
both realms. Although all this was achieved in a remarkably short time, much 
remained to be done when he died and his death left the English in an untenable 
position in France.112
Upon the deaths of Henry V and Charles VI, Westminister attempted to extend the 
status quo by solemnly proclaiming Henry's son as King of England and France. But, 
since Henry VI (1422-1461) was only nine months old at the time, this ascension lacked 
credibility and Henry V's older brother, John, Duke of Bedford, was appointed regent of 
the dual monarchy. Moreover, the success of Bedford's regency was complicated from the 
start in that the specific terms and organizational structure for jointly governing the two 
realms had not yet been completed when Henry V died so unexpectedly in 1422. In reality, 
Bedford found himself nominally in control of nothing more than an uneasy Anglo- 
Burgundian alliance in the north and east of France and a badly weakened but still viable 
Valois state in the south which increasingly regarded the Dauphin as its true leader. 
Bedford and his Burgundian ally, Philip the Good, were supposed to work in harmony but 
their cooperation came to an early end and the English dominion was reduced to those parts 
of northern France actually occupied by English troops plus what remained of the ancient 
province of Aquitaine.113
A lasting Anglo-French state might have emerged had it not been for the Dauphin 
who claimed a significant piece of French territory south of the Loire where he had 
instituted a provisional government at Bourges. With the exception of the Gascon duchy, 
much of the leadership and populace of southern France was disposed to put their faith in 
the disinherited son of Charles VI and thus allied themselves with the royalist faction. Had 
Henry V lived longer, it is possible that this opposition to his rule would have been crushed 
but with England led by an infant king and a dual monarchy recognized in England only in
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a now discredited treaty, there were few signs that the Dauphin and his followers would 
submit themselves to Henry VI and his regent.114
The Dauphin was twenty when he succeeded his father in 1422. Still, like his 
nemesis across the Channel, Charles VII would not rule in his own right for another ten 
years or so. The territory which Charles held was substantial and the provisional 
government that he led had the potential not only to discredit the concept of a dual 
monarchy but to challenge England militarily. But, as Fowler explained:
For although the kingdom of Bourges (as those lands which recognized him 
came to be known) was superior to the Lancastrian government by virtue of 
the area under its control, its financial potential, its support by the appanaged 
princes, and the ability of its civil service, nevertheless a lack of morale at the 
top and the influence of dishonest officials and greedy courtiers for long 
prevented a bold military effort.115
The greatest threat to the success of what remained of the French kingdom,
however, was its leadership. The Dauphin was not, at least at first, a capable military
leader and, as Fowler also pointed out:
unlike his grandfather, Charles V, he was no judge of character, was unable 
to delegate responsibility effectively or to inspire good service. He doubted 
himself, his followers, even his rights; after his father’s death he relapsed into 
apathy, of which his entourage were quick to take advantage.116
It would be years before the Dauphin's effectiveness as a leader emerged and, as the legend
tells, not until a bold young woman from Domremy with visions of glory for France
appeared and inspired him to force the English from the continent.
In the Anglo-Gascon wine trade, the relative stability which had characterized the 
first decade of the fifteenth century continued well into the second. With the exception of 
the French invasion of Gascony in the first years of the century (1405-1407), the duchy 
had remained relatively free of military strife and its vintners and shippers had been able to 
produce a steady flow of wine for their overseas customers. Nevertheless, the average
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annual volume of these exports had remained at a significantly lower level than those 
achieved in the fourteenth century. Perhaps in response to this situation, there was some 
expansion in this period of the vineyards in the districts surrounding Bordeaux. Given its 
grim experience with the war, which by this time had extended over three generations of 
Gascon wine growers, the industry knew it could no longer count on the vineyards of the 
Haut-Pays but continued to believe that the capital region itself would not fall into French 
hands.117
The relative stability of the trade that prevailed in the 1420s continued into the
1430s. This good fortune can be attributed to both Henry VI and Charles VH who were
too young and their kingdoms too weak to undertake major military action against one
another. The period of the 1430s, though, was not without problems for the wine
industry. As one burgess in Aquitaine recorded, between October 1431 and August 1439
there was a substantial decline in the revenues derived from the shipments of wine from the
port of Bordeaux. Although the number of ships, predominantly English, that entered the
city's harbor remained generally constant, their cargoes may have been reduced.118 The
available evidence does not permit a clear answer to whether the Bordelais were producing
less wine or the English were taking less.
The quality as well as the quantity of the wines from Bordeaux also appears to have
been in decline during this period. As M.G.A. Vale has reported:
In the Parliament of 1432 it was said that the quality of Gascon wines had 
recently deteriorated. This was thought to be a result both of adulteration by 
the growers and of the normal effects of shipping the pipes and barrels to England. 
The Commons claimed that the deterioration had set in 'because such vesselx as thei 
(the wines) be putte ynne aftir theire pressure, be not filled be eight or nyne inches, 
so that the saide wynes may not have theire naturell bulying ande purging outward 
as theim ought. . .,119
The theory that the quality of the wines from Gascony were deteriorating en route because
the barrels were not completely filled is a plausible argument since exposure to air would
have had that effect. It is also possible that, with the low levels of output in this period, the
shippers were diluting some wines with water.
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While the problems with the wine may have been associated with the producers or
shippers, it is equally important to consider that the decline in quality should have been
linked to the point of sale as well. The king's Patent Rolls prove particularly insightful
with this charge. During the reigns of several English kings in this period, there were
many entries found addressing the vendors of wine in England, warning them not to
adulterate the beverage or otherwise face official reprisals. For instance, one decree stated:
The king being given to understand that the vintners of the city of London and their 
taverners selling wine by retail in the city and suburbs, mix weak and bad wine 
with other wine, and sell the mixture at the same price as pure wine, not permitting 
persons drinking in the taverns, or otherwise purchasing wine, to see whether they 
draw the wine in the measure from casks or take it elsewhere, to the scandal of the 
city and danger to the health of buyers of wine, the mayor and sheriffs are 
commanded to make proclamation that such practices shall cease, and to fine such 
as offend thereafter.120
It would be virtually impossible to determine whether or not this decree was enforced, but 
that is not the issue. The important thing to note here is that the decree was made at all and 
that the king considered the quality of the wine highly enough that he was willing to 
criminalize violations of the trade. Indeed, the Gascons may have compromised the quality 
of their wine to help reduce expenses, but it would be naive to assume that English 
taverners were not motivated by the same incentives.
With regard to the reduced wine production levels during this decade, M.K. James 
has provided some helpful analysis. Her reading of the tax data is that, while there was 
indeed an overall decline in the volume of exports for the 1430s, production was fairly 
constant until 1437 when the French renewed their efforts to recapture the duchy. This 
shock to the industry's productivity was then doubled the following year by a recurrence of 
the plague. The result, she argues, was that while earlier in the decade the average annual 
output had been running at between 10,000 and 12,000 tuns, by 1438 the combined effects 
of the war and pestilence had resulted in a severe drop in production to about 4,000 tuns -- 
the worst vintage of the fifteenth century up to that point.121
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The resumption of fighting in Gascony in 1437-38 was only part of a larger effort 
undertaken by the royalist forces supporting the Dauphin that had begun back in 1429 to 
defeat the Anglo-Burgundian coalition created by Henry V. For nearly two decades France 
had been a kingdom divided by the factional strife between the Burgundians and the House 
of Valois and its royalist supporters. It was also still confronted in that great stretches of its 
territory were occupied by the English. In 1429 the English were conducting a siege of one 
of the great cities of the Loire valley, Orleans, and the French had been utterly unsuccessful 
in driving them away. Charles, then in residence at nearby Chinon was wracked as usual 
by indecision but he and his court were ready to try anything to relieve Orleans.122
A young woman named Joan appeared in court, claiming that she had been sent by 
God to rescue France and crown the Dauphin. Moreover, she said she was ready to lead 
the Dauphin's troops in an attack which would break the siege of Orleans. Charles raised 
some troops, furnished them with supplies, and permitted Joan to accompany the relief 
expedition. This unlikely military effort was unexpectedly successful and was taken by the 
royalist party as a sign of the divine intervention they had sought for so many years. Joan 
not only held her own in battle but by risking herself in the forefront of the fighting proved 
to be an inspiration to the royalist troops.123 The recapture of Orleans was like an epiphany 
for Charles who saw it as the turning point in his larger plan to force out the English, unite 
the kingdom, and end the dual monarchy. It was here that the legend of Joan of Arc began 
and quickly she became the emotional leader and good luck charm for a bold new campaign 
to expel the foreigners and reclaim the French throne for France.124
In a plan inspired by Joan, the Dauphin decided to use the momentum gained by the 
French victory at Orleans to march across the kingdom to the eastern province of 
Champagne whose capital, Rheims, was the traditional coronation site for French kings. 
The march which its planners believed would be very hazardous turned out to be nothing 
more than a military parade. Many of the suspected pockets of opposition to the Dauphin
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proved to be bastions of support. This welcome but unforseen development was probably 
due, in part, to the French success at Orleans but also because the populace had become fed 
up with the decades of civil war and was ready to settle for a unified kingdom under any 
monarch so long as he was not English. As a result, virtually every town and hamlet either 
surrendered to Charles' forces or welcomed them with open arms. By July 1429, the 
Dauphin had reached Rheims and at its great cathedral, with Joan at his side, was formally 
crowned as King Charles VII (1422-1461) of France.125
Although the royalist faction was oveijoyed that the coronation had at last taken 
place, the fact remained that Anglo-Burgundian forces still occupied considerable portions 
of France. The most immediate task for the new king was to force the English out of Paris. 
An assault on the capital was made in September 1429 but, despite the best efforts of Joan 
and her troops, the attack failed. Even though much of the rest of the Ile-de-France had 
submitted to the royalist forces, the Anglo-Burgundian troops were able to hold onto the 
capital. The next step was a blockade of Paris while the French army attacked England's 
positions in Normandy.126 Meanwhile, Charles VH worked to settle his old feud with 
Burgundy. He knew that the French treasury and the uncertain state of his government 
could not support an extended military campaign and that the best way to secure his 
position in Paris and throughout the kingdom was to end his dispute with the Burgundians 
and thus deprive England of its ally on the continent. Besides, it was in the king's nature 
to pursue this strategy because Charles always preferred diplomacy to battle.127
Although the military campaign to retrieve Rheims and Paris and, more generally, 
to reduce the Anglo-Burgundian grip on France did not accomplish all its objectives, it did 
produce political benefits, the most important being the onset of the reunification of France. 
Moreover, it had become clear that this process of restoring the French monarchy and 
reconciling the regional factions must go forward despite that the expulsion of the English 
through the recovery of Normandy and Gascony had not yet been achieved.128 Therefore, 
Charles VH and his envoys made every effort to accomplish their political goals while
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France's extended military operations continued throughout the 1430s. These campaigns 
had many setbacks but the overall trend for France was improving. Joan of Arc was 
captured by the Burgundians in 1430 and burned at the stake by the English in May 1431. 
Her legendary piety and patriotism had already become rooted, however, and the net effect 
of her death was to inspire the French and to raise fears in the English soldiery that they 
had murdered a saint.129
In the political sphere, the decade began with the coronation of the nine-year-old 
Henry VI in Paris — the only English king ever crowned in France — as Westminister 
sought to reassert the viability of the dual monarchy concept despite the personal weakness 
of its new king and the rising fortunes of an independent France. It seemed as though all 
the dynamic characteristics that had made Henry V such a great king were absent in his 
son. To be fair, Henry VI did not take over the direction of England's affairs until 1437 
but because he was still only fifteen when the regency ended, he remained completely 
unprepared for the task. It may also be fair to note that his task as a leader was complicated 
in that, unlike all his predecessors except his famous father, Henry VI was supposedly the 
ruler of both England and France. Although Henry was a good man, reportedly pious and 
not inclined to hold grudges, he wanted to consistently please those around him — an 
impossible task in the England of the high Middle Ages.130 The immediate effect of his 
assumption of power was that England remained so preoccupied with its domestic 
problems that it could hardly give a lot of attention to its interests across the Channel.
The advent of the 1440s did not bring much change in Charles VII's increasingly 
effective military and political policies. The French monarchy had succeeded in reconciling 
its differences with Philip the Good of Burgundy in 1435 and the French attacks against all 
English-held lands on the continent thereafter had met with growing success. As the Ile- 
de-France was freed, French attention could be focused increasingly on Gascony.
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Between June and December 1442, a number of sieges were undertaken against the
duchy's fortifications, and when conditions looked promising, Charles himself took the
field to lead an army that helped to capture the Anglo-Gascon garrisons at St. Sever and
Dax. Bordeaux itself might have fallen that year had it not been for a minor setback at La
Reole. The English, suddenly roused to protect Gascony, sent an expedition with the
intention of reaching Bordeaux and "reviving the spirits of the Gascon partisans." The
relief force, which was dispatched from Normandy, was led, however, by an incompetent
noble who never got further than Anjou. The campaign was a miserable failure and the
Gascons were left feeling abandoned.131
It appeared that Charles VII's efforts, both military and political, finally were
bearing fruit. The English, who had shown themselves increasingly incapable of
protecting their interests in at least the French half of their purported dual monarchy, let it
be known in France that peace talks were in order. The event that may have forced
London's hand was the formal evacuation of Paris on the 13th of April, 1444. The English
position by this point had been reduced, once again, to Gascony and only portions of
Normandy and Maine, apparently convincing Henry VI that negotiations remained the only
way to salvage what was left. As Perroy put it:
Henceforth the peace party was triumphant. On both sides of the Channel the 
people, crushed by taxation and exhausted by all the ravages of war, clamoured for 
peace and demanded an end of the conflict. . . Above all, the truce (Tours, May 
1444), the first since the Treaty of Troyes, in other words for nearly a quarter of a 
century, set the seal on the recovery of the Valois and confirmed his conquests. A 
fresh phase of the conflict, the last phase, was soon to begin.132
Although the resumption of peace talks was welcomed by the citizenry on both 
sides, the negotiators must have known that a lasting settlement would not result. As 
always, the issue over sovereignty came to the fore and the English took a rather high­
handed stance, considering the weakness of their military position. They made clear that 
they were unwilling to renounce the French crown or to render homage for any of the 
territory they still held in France. While ready to sign a truce, the English wanted to defer
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substantive discussions about a general peace until conditions permitted an agreement more 
on their terms. As both sides had done at previous points in the now century-long conflict, 
England was simply playing for time despite that it had almost no leverage with which to 
bargain. The Anglo-French kingdom now existed in name only. It could no longer call on 
the Duke of Burgundy for support, nor on the Holy Roman Emperor who, though he 
declared allegiance to Henry V and his successors, had abrogated this alliance and sided 
with the French monarchy after Charles VII's coronation.133
Notwithstanding this increasing isolation, England got what it wanted at Tours: a 
declaration of truce and a conclusion that a peace agreement was impossible at that time. 
Moreover, the parties agreed to secure the accord as they had done in the past with a 
marriage covenant that called for the betrothal of Charles VC's niece, Margaret of Anjou, to 
Henry VI. The cease fire, dating from 28 May 1444, was to last for ten months but could 
be extended by mutual agreement. Both parties knew, however, that as soon as the 
necessary resources became available, they would be back on the field of battle.134
As it turned out, the cessation of hostilities lasted for about five years, which was 
good news for, among others, the vintners and merchants in the Anglo-Gascon wine trade. 
Until the truce at Tours, the fighting during 1442-44 had taken its usual toll on the wine 
output of the duchy. With the conclusion of the accord, however, another cycle of 
prosperity began, one in which, as James reported, "exports from Bordeaux and imports 
into England were maintained at a high level." James does not have precise numbers for 
the shipments leaving Bordeaux in the 1440s but M.G.A. Vale has stated that the average 
annual output was around 12,000 tuns. These number would plunge again, of course, 
once the French attacks on the duchy were renewed.135
The merchants in the wine trade, like all the other well informed participants in the 
war, seemed to know that the Treaty of Tours could not last. They strove to make the
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most, however, of this opportunity which lasted from 1440 to 1449. The effects of the 
resumption of hostilities is immediately apparent in Vale’s export data for the period. From 
the 1448 vintage, the Bordelais shipped 11,070 tuns; for 1449 the total shipments dropped 
to 5,900 tuns.136
The Valois throne made the most of the extended cease fire by continuing with its 
military reorganization efforts and building up its coffers in preparation for a return to the 
conflict. In the meantime, the French army kept its edge by picking at the English positions 
in Normandy. To avoid breaking the truce, these attacks were kept at a low level but this 
harassment eroded English morale and increased the cost of maintaining these 
fortifications. Little by little the region was effectively reconquered and by 1449 when the 
fighting resumed in earnest, the English hold on Normandy was almost broken. This left 
Charles VII free to turn his attention to Gascony and in the summer of 1449 he stepped up 
his intelligence operations to learn what he would have to do to conquer England's most 
enduring enclave on French soil. Charles quickly learned that he would have quite a fight 
on his hands because, despite England's faltering support, it was reported that the Gascons 
remained steadfast in: "their self-interested loyalty towards the ducal dynasty, their long­
standing habit of political autonomy and the trade links with England which ensured their 
prosperity."137
Charles VII knew that these factors would keep the Gascon resistance high and that 
without the support of the people the duchy would be far harder to take than Normandy. 
Despite these odds, he decided in 1449 to break the truce and sent several small armies into 
Aquitaine to capture some of the Anglo-Gascon border fortresses. By the fall of 1450, 
some of these garrisons were in French hands, including those at Bergerac and Bazas, but 
with Bordeaux in sight winter forced the French to halt their operations. By the spring of 
1451, French forces went back to their task in earnest. A campaign was launched under
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the command of John Dunnois, Count of Orleans and Joan of Arc's partner in lifting the 
English siege of that city in 1429. Dunnois quickly infiltrated the Bordeaux region, taking 
the fortresses at Blaye, Fronsac, and St. Emilion and, not long thereafter, began a siege of 
Bordeaux itself.138
The Bordelais knew they could not long resist the French attack in the absence of an 
English relief effort. With no such rescue in sight, the city fathers began to prepare for the 
surrender of the capital and designated Gaston de Foix, a noble loyal to the English as their 
negotiator. It was decided that if the English sent no reinforcements by the 24th of June, 
they would have to surrender the city but this plan became moot when Dunnois and his 
forces broke into Bordeaux on the 12th. At this time, virtually all the garrisons which had 
held out in the hope of English relief capitulated to the French. The one exception was 
Bayonne which remained obstinate to the last and had to be broken by siege. To Charles 
and his men the great surprise in these dramatic events was that, like Normandy, the 
conquest of Gascony had taken only a year. They had expected far worse.139
Charles VII proved to be largely conciliatory in the terms of surrender he offered 
the duchy. Only the defenders of Bayonne who resisted so obdurately were subjected to 
paying war indemnities and the loss of their communal liberties. Everywhere else, Charles 
seemed to have seen it in his best interest to minimize dissension by maintaining the 
privileges and institutions of the conquered communities. His one major mistake was in 
Bordeaux where he had assigned northern Frenchmen to the positions of Seneschal and 
Mayor. The English learned by hard experience that these were offices which could not be 
filled with anyone but natives but the French, not sensitive to the long tradition of local 
autonomy in the Gascon capital, brought the wheels of the duchy’s government nearly to a 
stop until they corrected this error. Moreover, despite Charles' best intentions, the 
occupation of Gascony by the French forces met considerable resistance from the citizenry 
who bitterly resented the pillaging of their homes by French soldiers, the ousting of local 
officials, and, worst of all, the cessation of the maritime trade on which their livelihoods
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depended. The Bordelais had, in effect, made it very clear to Charles that they would 
revolt at the earliest opportunity and, in addition, made sure that their continuing fealty to 
England was reported in London.140
Given such loyalty, it is fair to ask why the English had not yet come to Gascony's 
rescue. The implementation of a relief effort initially seemed impossible for the 
government of Henry VI which was increasingly paralyzed by insolvency and by the 
growing dispute between the king's family, the House of Lancaster, and its chief 
opponents, the House of York. Following the treaty negotiations at Tours, Henry failed to 
make the best use of the lull in the fighting as Charles VH had done and the prospect of 
losing most of England's territory in France had spurred growing animosity among the 
English nobility. Henry desperately wanted to hold onto both Normandy and Aquitaine but 
his slowness to act sealed their fate. Eventually in 1452, utilizing a force which had 
originally been assembled for the defense of Calais, Henry answered the calls for help from 
Bordeaux. The expedition, which consisted of about 4,000-5,000 men gathered among the 
Channel ports, sailed under the command of the venerable John Talbot, Earl of 
Shrewsbury. He landed in the Medoc district down river from Bordeaux on October 14th, 
1452 and within four days retook the capital with the aid of a general revolt of its citizens 
who greeted the English commander as "Le Roi Talbot". This victory initiated a rebellion 
which spread across the duchy, spurring Gascon forces to take back all the fortresses lost 
to the French from Angoumois to the Aquitanian frontier.141
How had Charles VII allowed this to happen? In bringing the southwestern portion 
of the country under the rule of the Ile-de-France, he had finally achieved what no other 
Valois or Capetian king before him had managed to do in more than four hundred years and 
in less than a year he let it slip through his fingers. In fairness, the French had been misled 
by initially valid information that Talbot and his forces were committed to action in 
Normandy and, acting on these reports, Charles had reduced his defenses in Gascony to 
send reinforcements to northwestern France. Confronted by this unexpected reversal of
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fortune, the French king made the best of a bad situation and spent the winter preparing for 
a counter-offensive.142
This seasonal pause also allowed England to send reinforcements to Bordeaux but 
in the spring of 1453, when the French army advanced into Gascony, it was plain that 
Henry Vi's force would be no match for that of Charles VII. In fact, France's numbers 
were so far superior that Talbot knew he could not hope to oppose them directly. He 
decided to wait until the French broke up their forces and to attack them piecemeal; and 
when he followed one small army into the Medoc where it had begun a siege of the town of 
Castillon near Liboume, he confidently threw his entire 6,000 man force against it. Talbot 
expected an easy victory and attacked impetuously but the French had by now learned their 
lessons from Crecy, Poitiers, and Agincourt and protected their forces from the English 
archers by entrenching them behind stockades. The conditions were also poor for the 
English cavalry and when the French loosed an artillery barrage -- at that time a rarity 
except in static siege operations — followed by a flank attack by Breton forces, the Anglo- 
Gascon army was destroyed. The drama of this last act of the Hundred Years War was 
captured by a medieval chronicler who worked under King Charles VII. As an eyewitness, 
he reported that:
. . .  in particular, Talbot’s hackney was struck by a shot from a culverine, so that 
it fell at once to the ground quite dead; and at the same time, Talbot, his master, was 
thrown under it, and was at once killed by some archers. And thus died this 
famous and renowned English leader, who for so long had been reputed to be one 
of the most formidable scourges of the French, and one of their most sworn 
enemies, and had seemed to be the dread and terror of France.143
Thus, on the 17th of July 1453 at Castillon, all of England's hopes of holding on to 
Gascony came to an end. Charles VII’s clean-up campaign moved promptly as the French 
began another siege of Bordeaux, coupled with a naval blockade of the Gironde. Because 
of his experience with Gascon popular resistance in the preceding fall, the French king 
believed that this second attempt to invest the capital would be prolonged. At first, it 
appeared that the Gascon burgesses and nobility were ready for fierce resistance but, when
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they realized that no further reinforcements were coming from England and saw the
condition of the English soldiers who had survived the battle at Castillon, the Bordelais
understood that they had little choice but to open negotiations. The talks began at the end
of September and were concluded by October 19th when the Gascons and remaining
English surrendered unconditionally.144
This time Charles VII showed no mercy. He began by imposing a collective fine
on all the Bordelais and those who had held positions in the local government were
banished from the region. Like the first occupation, French rule was harsh and
burdensome but the difference this time was that everyone seemed to accept that the change
was permanent. As Perroy concluded, "This was the end of the link, three centuries old,
between the Gascons and the kings of England. This was the end of the great fief of
Aquitaine which had led to the Hundred Years War."145 And the realization that the ties
that had bound England to Gascony — indeed to France as a whole — were now irrevocably
broken was deeply felt in the Island Kingdom as well. As Morgan put it:
after (the French) victory at Castillon . . . the English territories in the 
southwest were entirely lost. This was the most shattering blow of all: Gascony had 
been English since the twelfth century, and the long established wine and cloth 
trades with southwest France were seriously disrupted. Of Henry V's entire empire 
only Calais now remained. The defeated and disillusioned soldiers who returned 
to England regarded the discredited Lancastrian government as responsible for their 
plight and for the surrender of what Henry V had won. At home, Henry VI faced 
the consequences of defeat.146
There can be no doubt that the English defeat at Castillon broke the back of
England's claim of sovereignty over Gascony and — though England did not formally
surrender its title to the French throne until the Treaty of Amiens on 1802 ~  shattered its
larger hopes of once again ruling all of France. The shock of these losses cannot be
overestimated. As Morgan reported:
Within three weeks of Castillon, Henry VI suffered a mental and physical collapse 
which lasted for seventeen months and from which he may never have fully
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recovered. The loss of his French kingdom (and Henry was the only English king 
to be crowned in France) may have been responsible for his breakdown, though by 
1453 other aspects of his rule gave cause for grave concern.147
The author is referring, of course, to the growing civil strife embodied by the competition
between the houses of York and Lancaster. This was fueled, in part, by the burning issue
of who was to blame for the loss of France and was about to expand into the Wars of the
Roses. This conflict was to consume England for the next three decades and to foreclose
any hopes of recovering Gascony or any other of its former territories in France.
These facts confirm that England's political and military relationships with Gascony
were definitely concluded by the mid-1450s. In the economic and cultural spheres,
however, the bond between the two regions, though battered, remained intact and the most
resilient strand in those ties proved to be the wine trade. Charles VII found that his new
prize was no pleasure to govern and that, even without any hope of English rescue, the
Gascons were by no means ready to accept French rule. The citizens of Bordeaux were
particularly stubborn and their contempt for their new lord and masters remained ill-
concealed as the following account shows:
When the city was taken by a French army at the end of the Hundred Years War, 
the French conqueror, Charles VII, found himself distinctly persona non grata , 
openly mocked by his Bordelais countrymen. The two forts that Charles built to 
protect the city from future enemies were facetiously dubbed Chateau Trompette 
and Chateau Ha — the first because the king's builders were forced to summon the 
recalcitrant workers with blasting trumpets; the second immortalizing the king's 
dedication speech. As he stood at the rostrum before his assembled subjects, the 
only word the tongue-tied monarch seemed to be able to come up with was a 
triumphant: 'Ha!'148
The Bordelais, as this anecdote makes evident, were still acting like Bordelais, i.e. 
as brashly independent and disrespectful of outside authority as they had been under the 
English. Edward I had characterized them as stiff-necked and Charles VH was discovering 
the truth of that statement. Nowhere is the commitment of the Bordelais to conduct 
business as usual and to maintain ties with England more evident than in the wine trade. 
As Hugh Johnson has pointed out with respect to the aftermath of the loss of Gascony in
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1453: "Of course what sounds like a great finale is nothing of the sort. Every year 
produces wine and growers and merchants must go on living."149
And, go on living, they did. The record of the Gascon wine trade in the 1450s 
makes clear that, while Bordeaux's shipments to England were roiled by the dramatic 
changes on the political and military fronts, the flow of wine continued on like a force of 
nature. In 1451, for example, when the Gascon capital was first occupied by the French, 
no cessation of the trade with England occurred. While the French made it difficult, they 
allowed those who refused allegiandfe to Charles VII to leave with their goods, ships, and 
merchandise within six months.150 Henry Vi's Treaty Rolls confirm this offer as the king 
formally requested that some efforts be made to at least collect that year's vintage. The 
document proposes a "License for Thomas Shiplode, William Howell, John Taverner, 
William White and Walter Corston, merchants of Bristol, to send one ship of 300 tuns or 
less to Bordeaux to fetch goods and money held by them in that city when it fell into the 
hands of the French."151 As it turned out, many English and Bordelais took them up on 
that offer and by January 1452 about twenty-six English ships cleared the Gironde under 
safe-conduct passes and had taken at least a portion of the 1451 vintage with them. 
According to James, about 6,000 tuns of that vintage reached England.152
Then, when the reconquest of Gascony by the English occurred in the fall of 1452, 
it could not have come at a better time because the vintage was about ready for transport. 
Even though there is a modest discrepancy in the numbers provided by Vale and James, 
i.e. 8,700 tuns versus 9,900 tuns, respectively, it seems clear that the 1452 vintage was a 
better year for the trade than the preceding one.153
In 1453, when Talbot was killed at Castillon and the city was surrendered for the 
last time, the record-keeping of the wine shipments from Bordeaux apparently was 
suspended. After all, these accounts were maintained by the duchy's tax collectors to 
monitor the flow of wine to English and other foreign ports. When the French took over,
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they had no reason — at least initially — to keep these data and therefore no record of that
year's shipments seems to have survived. We do know, however, that:
The French gave the English six months to ship the 1453 vintage . . . They 
grudgingly and selectively granted safe-conducts to English vessels coming for 
wine, while they invited Scots, Dutch, Flemish, Hanseatic, and Spanish to come 
and buy freely, hoping to widen the narrow (i.e. English) scope of the trade.154
While precise production figures for 1453 and the rest of that decade are still not available, 
it is clear that the capitulation of Aquitaine led to far less favorable conditions for the trade 
and significantly reduced the volume of Gascon shipments reaching England for quite a 
while.155
Although there may have been a brief moment in which no wine was flowing 
between Bordeaux and England, we have no confirmation of such a break. The demand 
from the British Isles was too well established to allow a complete cessation of the trade 
even if the wine had to find its way to English tables through third parties. Nevertheless, 
as the declining Gascon wine production figures for the first half of the fifteenth century, 
and the increasingly reciprocal nature of the trade make clear, the dynamics of the Anglo- 
Gascon commerce were changing well before the French took over. England was still 
taking 90% or more of the annual wine output of Gascony but it is not certain whether that 
figure is driven by the question: was demand that high or was production that low? In any 
case, there is evidence that England, as early as the latter half of the fourteenth century, was 
in search of alternative sources of wine. Some examples were Portugal and Spain, whose 
brandy-strengthened wines, port and sherry, were able to resist spoilage on the longer 
voyages from the Iberian peninsula to England. With the annual output of Gascon wine 
markedly lower than it had been in the previous century; with its price both higher and 
subject to sharp fluctuations; and with suspicions of war-induced declines in quality, it is 
not surprising that English merchants had taken steps to develop other markets.156 It is 
here that the Treaty Rolls of Henry VI prove fruitful as well. For instance, in an entry 
dated 24 February 1454, there was a "License for Henry May and John May, merchants of
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Bristol, to trade for one year with any countries not in amity with the English, with a ship 
or ships of 300 tuns, exporting any except staple goods."157 Of course, from the wording 
of this license, " . . .  any country not in amity with the English, . . ." could include 
France among others, but it does suggest that England was looking elsewhere for other 
markets, possibly including wine. What is more important, however, is that despite all 
these reverses — the most important being the loss of Gascony as an integral part of 
England — the English never lost their taste for claret and the shipments from Bordeaux 
never stopped entirely.
It may be surprising to learn that after the capitulation of the city to France, the party 
most interested in stimulating the Anglo-Gascon exchange was the French monarchy. 
Charles VII quickly recognized the trade's potential to contribute to his coffers and in 1455 
implemented a tax of twenty-five shillings on every tun of wine exported from Bordeaux. 
As the revenue began to come in, Charles sought to benefit further from the wine trade by 
encouraging a modest level of reciprocal shipments from England. The restrictive 
conditions he imposed, however, made for trading conditions far different from the free­
wheeling commercial activity that had prevailed when England was in charge of both ends 
of this lucrative relationship.158
Although the available records for the years after the French takeover only show 
what was brought into England, not what left Bordeaux, they are sufficient to show that the 
average annual volume of wine imported stayed in the range of 2,000 to 4,000 tuns per 
year throughout the remainder of the fifteenth century. The most significant and costliest 
restrictions imposed by the French on this commerce were the licenses and safe-conduct 
passes required for the English and Gascon merchants. Not only were these documents 
difficult and expensive to obtain, they provided no guarantee that the English shippers 
would be free of hostile treatment once they reached Bordeaux.159
Notwithstanding such harassment, the trade continued and, as this account of the 
relationship between the wine trade and the Hundred Years War should have made clear,
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this economic relationship — despite its fluctuations — was "dominated by a sense of great 
vitality, for while the trade was threatened at all points, in the growth, production, and 
transmission of the wine", it always recovered.160 This vitality is attested to by Jancis 
Robinson in her just published, landmark study, The Oxford Companion to Wine. As she 
states, in part:
In 1453, at the end of the Hundred Years War, Gascony reverted to French rule; 
yet its trade with England soon picked up again, even though it never regained its 
fourteenth century volume . . . after the English were expelled, the Dutch 
became dominant (and) it was the Dutch who drained the marshy Medoc in the mid­
seventeenth century, thereby creating the basis for the fine wines that (re)made 
Bordeaux's reputation throughout the world.161
This qualitative revolution, which changed the image of Gascony from a source of cheap,
light, fast-spoiling wines to the premier home for luxurious, dark, age-worthy wines
(thanks to the simultaneous invention of the corked bottle) first came to the attention of the
English public in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. Suddenly, wines like
Chateau Lafite, Latour, and Margaux became in great demand and the Anglo-Gascon wine
trade flourished anew despite an ongoing trade war between Britain and France and ever-
increasing duties on French wines. As Robinson has found:
Officially, British wine imports from Bordeaux declined but smuggling must 
have been rife to judge from the prevalence of bordeaux (from those years) in 
the household sales conducted by Christie's after their foundation in 1766. 
Conditions in both Bordeaux and Britain were ripe for the development of trade in 
fine claret: in the Gironde there was now an affluent bourgeoisie . . . with the 
means to plant and maintain expensive vineyards, while in Britain, Bordeaux's 
almost exclusive market was created by a wealthy, landowning aristocracy and, 
soon, the new industrial middle class.162
One need not trace the pattern of good days and bad in the Anglo-Gascon wine
trade any further into modem times. The point is that this vital economic link between the
two partners, though it has shown substantial strain over nine centuries for a variety of
reasons, was never broken. Moreover, the cultural ties have been equally resilient and
enduring for, even today, as Creighton Churchill has noted:
in no other part of France will one find so much fluent English spoken as a second 
language by the educated classes. It is still standard procedure for the sons and
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heirs apparent of Bordeaux firms to be sent to England to serve their 
apprenticeships: to gain a mastery of the language and to cement economic and 
social ties.163
In short, while there is no doubt that it was England which lost the Hundred Years 
War, it is equally true that it has not lost its unique and rewarding 'special relationship' 
with Gascony in trading wine and a host of other valued products. Moreover, it is also 
clear that it has not lost its kinship with a people who were as impatient with absolute 
authority as the British ultimately proved themselves to be.
CONCLUSION
From 1337 to 1453, England was fighting France for a variety of reasons on many 
fronts. Most scholars would agree that among its territorial objectives, none was more 
persistent than that of Gascony. That was where the war began and where it ended. Of 
course England's kings wanted the northern French provinces from which their Norman 
ancestors had come and the warmer western lands which were the home of the Plantagenet 
family that had supplied the great majority of the Island Kingdom's monarchs. Indeed, 
these English rulers wanted all of France if they could get it and Henry V nearly made that 
happen. But it was Gascony — first, last, and always — which drove them to war despite 
its greater distance from the Channel ports, despite depleted treasuries, despite 
simultaneous military demands in the British Isles, and despite competing internal 
demands, even including civil war, at home.
About these facts there is not much dispute. It is in evaluating the reasons for 
England's tenacious commitment to Aquitaine that authorities can differ; and it has been the 
contention of this study that in that process not enough weight has been assigned to the 
attachment England had to its wine trade with this southwestern comer of France. From 
the far-away perspective of the late twentieth century this is an error that is easy to make. 
Because of the circumstances in which we live, it is hard to conceive of the devotion the 
members of England's ruling classes in the early centuries of the second millennium had to 
wine; it is harder still to imagine that they would fight and die for more than a century to 
retain one place from which wine could be procured.
Our difficulty in comprehending why wine and, indeed, Gascon wine in particular 
would drive England's kings to such great lengths stems from the fact that we live in an era
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of safe drinking water and in a culture which not only offers a myriad of wines from many 
origins but whole classes of other beverages which the people of medieval times could not 
even imagine. In their era, when pestilence could reduce national populations by half in 
less than a decade, wine was regarded as one of the few beverages a person could consume 
without fear of disease and death and one of the few medicines one could take to restore 
health. Moreover, in their time when all the Christians of western Europe shared a single 
faith, wine was also one of the two essential physical requirements for sharing in the most 
central sacrament of that faith: the Holy Eucharist. It would be wrong to insist that wine 
was as critical to the functioning of medieval society as petroleum has become to our own. 
Still, when one is reminded of those people who controlled the political and economic life 
of England in the times leading to and through the Hundred Years War and how they 
looked upon wine not just as a source of pleasure but as a protector of their health and their 
spiritual well-being, it is easier to understand why it was one of the few imported 
commodities for which their emerging nation would risk mortal combat.
Moreover, it was not just wine but Gascon wine for which they would hazard so 
much. From 1224 forward, with France at least periodically back in control of most of its 
territories formerly held by the English, Gascony was the only practicable source for this 
beverage that was thought of not just as a nicety but a necessity. England had already 
proved to itself that its location and that of much of northern France lacked the sunshine 
necessary to make wine of acceptable quality and sufficient quantity. Burgundy and other 
wine regions of eastern France were never important suppliers for England in this era 
because the shipment of their products involved long and hazardous land or river transport 
before reaching European ports on the English Channel; and because they already 
established markets in France, Germany, Switzerland, and the Low Countries.
After the Hundred Years War, as we have seen, Spain, Portugal, southern France, 
and Italy all came to play a part in slaking England's thirst for wine but never won the favor 
accorded Gascony — not only on the grounds of taste — but because they were outside of
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England's dominion. Most importantly, in a period still centuries away from the corked 
bottle, any source of wine further from England than Bordeaux was regarded askance 
because the quality of any wine deteriorated with every extra day at sea. Thus, during the 
period with which this study is concerned, it was Gascony that was held to be England's 
one abundant, nearby, accessible, and national source of good, affordable wine. For all of 
these reasons and more it was therefore seen as indispensable.
Virtually all of the historians of the period seem to have taken these facts too little 
into account when considering the motivations behind England's dogged determination to 
hold on to Gascony during the Hundred Years War.1 Sovereignty over Aquitaine was, of 
course, the primary issue that divided Westminister and Paris in this conflict, but, for 
England, a vital reason for maintaining its political control over this territory was to 
continue to secure this source of wine, the lucrative trade it generated, and the important 
contributions this trade made to the monarch's treasury.
Documenting the degree of England's attachment to this economic and cultural 
asset has been one of the tasks of this thesis and, as should have become apparent, the 
primary sources available have been the tax records the English kept of the wine exports 
leaving Bordeaux for all destinations and of the portion of that flow that arrived in England. 
As has also been evident, these official records, while sufficiently complete to document 
the general dimensions and directions of the early Gascon wine trade, include gaps in the 
data which leave important questions unanswered. This makes it increasingly difficult to 
reconcile the conclusions they suggest with other economic evidence, for example, the 
income sources of the kings of England. Consequently, in considering those avenues for 
further research into the subject of the roles played by the Gascon wine trade in the conflict 
between England and France, the first to come to mind is the pursuit of more official 
records — both English and French — which could shed light on this phenomenon. With 
such evidence in hand, it seems likely that scholars could go beyond the pioneering work 
of James, Unwin, and Vale in this field.
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In addition, it is evident that the question of the extent to which Gascon wine 
mattered to the Englishmen of this period merits more research. Such an inquiry would 
undoubtedly prove laborious but could also be exceptionally helpful in confirming the lines 
of argument advanced in this paper, so many of which are based on inference. We infer, 
for example, that the English upper classes turned to wine with such zeal because 
experience had taught them that water made them sick. But what, if anything, did they 
actually say about this subject? Further, we infer that the English initially moved their 
source of wine ever southward not only because of the lands they controlled but because 
they perceived that the qualitative and quantitative improvements they experienced in this 
migration were due to more exposure to the sun. Are there any written records to confirm 
this point? Most importantly, we infer that English monarchs prized Bordeaux not only as 
a source of wine but wine revenue because we have statistical evidence that the latter was 
among the most important contributions to their royal coffers; but what, if anything, did the 
kings or their treasurers have to say on this subject?
These are just some of the questions or concerns that come to mind about the 
Anglo-Gascon medieval wine trade. As this thesis is hardly an exhaustive discussion of 
the subject far more research could be focused toward a number of the issues presented in 
this work. For instance, did the Gascons ever return to the business of transporting in 
addition to the production of wine following the close of the war? That is, in response to 
the reduction of business with the English, did the Gascons have to pick up the slack in 
terms of shipping their product to markets or did they simply pass that task on to other 
European merchants? In addition, further avenues of research can be directed toward the 
issue of the quality of the wine as the war dragged on. There were complaints raised on 
behalf of the consumers but it would be valuable to discover if the problems arose from the 
point of production as M.G.A. Vale found or was the problem at the point of sale with 
taverners spoiling the vintage as some of the primary sources suggest.
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History is a subject replete with mystery, and very often not enough evidence exists 
to give a complete and full picture of the past. This thesis is not an attempt to answer all the 
questions concerning the medieval commodity exchange, but rather at the time of the 
Hundred Years' War, to present a picture of an aspect of the Anglo-Gascon wine trade that 
had heretofore been underexamined. It is the hope that by reading this work, one can be 
made more aware of the vital, if not fundamental, role Aquitaine played in the events 
leading to and through the Hundred Years War and how the production, sale, and 
distribution of wine between England and Gascony certainly contributed, in part, to the 
inception and perpetuation of the conflict.
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CONCLUSION
1. The only historians who give this argument its due respect are those whose subject is 
the medieval wine trade. As for the historians of the war, none hardly give my argument 
any attention at all. The only one who comes close is Edouard Perroy; however, it is his 
opinion that the Anglo-Gascon wine trade is a relatively insignificant side issue. The 
primary sources show a similarly contradictory view. The chroniclers, like Froissart and 
Wavrin, hardly mention the wine trade at all much less its impact on the war. But, as one 
investigates the public and private records of the English monarchy, and note the volume to 
which they addressed issues concerning Aquitaine and wine, one can clearly see the 
importance of those items of the period.
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